The new CVC Bill

A COUPLE OF recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Central Vigilance Commission Bill 1999 leave much to be desired. They seem directed at curbing the powers of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and restricting the autonomy of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The most surprising suggestion made by the Committee relates to restoration of the Single Directive, which was explicitly quashed by the Supreme Court. The Directive was an iniquitous guideline under which it was mandatory to seek governmental approval before registering a case against officials of the rank of Joint Secretary and above. The Directive has been defended on the ground that it is necessary ``to protect bona fide actions at the decision-making level'', but its practical effect was to inhibit investigations against the specified class of officers it covered. There is another reason why the call for the Directive's restoration is mystifying. It was only two years ago that an ordinance on the CVC had to be amended because its provisions were not in line with the view of the Supreme Court. One of the key issues of divergence was the Directive itself, which the original or unamended ordinance had attempted to smuggle in. The court came down on this at the time and it is difficult to understand why - in the light of the past events - has the Committee risked further judicial disapproval.

The Committee has sought a restricted role for the Central Vigilance Commission, which it has recommended should be a three- member body on the lines of the Election Commission (where a majority is required for all decisions). Some debate is bound to be generated by the suggestion that the CVC's superintendence over the CBI is construed in a manner which does ``not amount to undue interference in the agency's functioning''. Since there have been no complaints that the CVC has been meddling with the CBI's functioning, it is not clear why it was necessary to explicitly prohibit the Commission from directing the CBI to ``investigate or dispose of a case in a particular manner''. It will be quite clear to anyone who is aware of the manner in which the CBI functions that its autonomy is threatened less by the CVC than by the Government of India. Given this, the Committee's decision to stress the limits of the CVC's power vis-a-vis the CBI is somewhat odd and raises fears that the desire to control the agency remains undiminished in the political class. In a dissenting note, one of the Committee members, the Rajya Sabha MP, Mr. Kuldip Nayar, felt that the recommendations would dilute the powers of the CVC.

The Committee seems to have concluded that the present Central Vigilance Commissioner, Mr. N. Vittal, has overstepped his brief by issuing various instructions to ministries and departments, often on policy matters, which fall within the executive authority of the Centre. Therefore, the Committee's insistence that the CVC's superintendence of the vigilance administration is consistent with overall government policy. This is not an unreasonable suggestion. Whatever Mr. Vittal believes in, the CVC's role was never envisaged as a policy-making body. This is the third time an all-party panel of MPs has examined and passed a Bill on the CVC. It was three years ago that the Supreme Court had laid down a broad framework in order to insulate the CBI from governmental interference. Vesting the superintendence of the agency with an independent CVC was at the heart of the court's directive. It is something of a shame that the legal framework for this has not yet been put in place. The CVC Bill must be enacted as soon as possible, but not before some of the anomalies are ironed out.

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