A chink in India's diplomacy?

INDIA'S GEOPOLITICAL REACH does not seem to have sufficiently impressed the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Their latest decision not to invite India to the annual summit-level talks involving the ASEAN and its East Asian dialogue partners is not good news for an aspiring global player. However, it is a setback that New Delhi must be able to take in its stride. The ASEAN has reckoned that India is not an automatic choice for the membership of an informal economic club that consists of 10 Southeast Asian states as also China and Japan besides South Korea. The ASEAN+3 has already acquired some definitive shape in the past few years as an exclusive pan-East Asian caucus. In openly endorsing India's exclusion from it, China has now seized upon the point about the geographical limits of the ASEAN+3 as an East Asian grouping. However, India had, in evincing interest in the ASEAN+3, taken note of its political diversity. New Delhi hoped to give a thrust to its own `Look- East' policy by interacting directly with an outfit that consists of not only Japan, an economic powerhouse, but also China, a key player on the fast track of international politics and strategic affairs. The other consideration was that India should not divorce itself from the growing economic vibrance of East Asia. As a microcosm of the world economy, the ASEAN+3 can indeed seek to harmonise the views of a rich country like Japan with those of the developing nations on global trade issues. From India's standpoint, therefore, a diplomatic `uplinking' with East Asia may partially offset the disadvantages of a continued exclusion from the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The ASEAN's reasoning about the ``difficulty'' of widening the scope of a quintessential East Asian summitry does not ring hollow. History and the cross-currents of Asia-Pacific politics account for the ASEAN's special relationship with the China-Japan-South Korea triangle. In the ASEAN's own perspective, a pan-East Asian dialogue translates into a systematic engagement with an economic superpower besides a political- military force as well. India is not obviously seen by the ASEAN as either a regional economic power or a major political force of direct consequence to Southeast Asia at this juncture. It is in this context that New Delhi needs to demonstrate the truth in its stated view of itself as a stabilising force in Southeast Asia.

Now, the proposal for an `East Asia Security Forum', which the Philippines floated at the time of last year's informal meeting of the ASEAN+3, is still an idea with little or no endorsement by key Southeast Asian countries. Its strategic scope remains undefined in a region that plays host to the U.S.' military personnel. However, given the potential of the ASEAN+3 to evolve into a multi-dimensional outfit, India may have lost a desirable opportunity in regional diplomacy. Yet, New Delhi's existing connections with the ASEAN are not to be under-estimated. Regrettable, therefore, is that the ASEAN thinks it is too early now to consider holding separate annual summits with India. In this context, New Delhi may do well to inject a dose of dynamism to its ties with the ASEAN as also its sub-regions. A new beginning has been made in recent weeks. What India must do now is to add substance to the agreement in principle on the Mekong- Ganga Cooperation Initiative. New Delhi will certainly profit by dispelling an impression of wanting to compete with China for the affections of the ASEAN sub-region linked to the Mekong. Overall, India must signal that it regards the ASEAN as a prime and not collateral area of interest.

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