Beyond the ceasefire

HARDLY A week into the unilateral Ramzan ceasefire initiative in Jammu and Kashmir, announced dramatically by the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, some serious questions have been thrown up about the Government's strategic approach with specific reference to the ceasefire. Of late, the Union Home Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani, has been dwelling on the `Lahore-II' theme, asserting that the initiative is addressed as much to Pakistan as to the militant outfits. All along, the Vajpayee regime had been maintaining that insurgency in Kashmir was an issue strictly between the Indian state and some `misguided' elements in the Valley and, for that reason, any peace negotiations would have to be only with those groups. The official response to the Hizb-ul Mujahideen's ceasefire offer last July also reflected that position. The militants perceived it as an attempt to play upon the `indigenous-foreign' divide among them and as turning away from any engagement with Pakistan. But Mr. Advani's portrayal of the Ramzan-linked ceasefire as India's ``second'' major peace initiative after Mr. Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore (1999) and as a ``second chance'' for Pakistan is substantially at variance with the Government's earlier policy enunciations.

What stands out in all the ceasefire-centred rhetoric emanating from the powers that be - insofar as it related to Pakistan - is the Vajpayee administration's two-track approach of being seen internally as tough towards Pakistan even while projecting itself to the outside world as reasonable and gracious towards a wayward neighbour. The wide support the ceasefire initiative has received from other countries, including the United States, the U.K., Russia and even China, seemed to strengthen the internal solution approach though the support may not last too long in the absence of a move towards a permanent solution. To the extent that it opens up an opportunity for de-escalation of violence in the long traumatised Jammu and Kashmir, the ceasefire is a welcome development. There can be no denying the imperative of exploring every possible way of making it a success, either. And the positive reaction worldwide to India's move and the call, as a corollary, to all those concerned, including Pakistan, to respond positively to it are quite understandable in that context. But that cannot justify complacency of the type that has been very much in evidence in the post-ceasefire phase.

As for the situation on the ground, the scale of terrorist- related violence since the coming into operation of the ceasefire (November 28) must be said to be not particularly worrisome, considering the fact that it had met with a negative response from most of the major militant groups and that quite a few of the pan-Islamic jehadi outfits have declared their intention to step up their attacks during the Ramzan month, if only to register their disapproval of the ceasefire initiative. Even the All-Party Hurriyat Conference and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, while not rejecting the offer outright, have expressed some serious reservations and would like India to ``improve'' upon the initiative. Whether the ceasefire, which is just a week old, will hold for the rest of the Ramzan month even at the current level is difficult to say. At one level, it depends on the Government showing a resolve to stick to its decision on cessation of hostilities (without, of course, lowering its guard against terrorist offensive) despite the likely provocative attempts to scuttle it. At another and more important level, it hinges critically on the Vajpayee regime moving towards engagement with Pakistan, apart from evolving a properly-calibrated multitrack approach that encompasses the various distinctive strands of the Kashmiri opinion and interest. For a start, the Government would do well to remove the confusion, and contradictions, its recent official pronouncements have thrown up in this vital area.

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