Ceasefire concerns

By K. K. Katyal

A WEEK after it came into force and a fortnight after it was announced by the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, the cessation of operations by the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir holds good. That, no doubt, is a happy news. Not that there were no cases of terrorist violence, but the Government chose not to be deflected from the positive track adopted by it in the hope that pressures for peace would mount and saner counsel dawn on the militant and jehadi outfits and their mentors on the other side of the border. However, uncertainty and unease will continue till then.

As was evident from the start, the key to the success of the ceasefire is with Pakistan. The hard decision of the ruling establishment in Islamabad - whether or not to give the Indian ``gesture'' a chance - will determine its fate.

So far, Pakistan has not said anything that would mean a rejection of New Delhi's move. First it was ambivalent, later wanting the ceasefire extended beyond Ramzan and making a case for political dialogue, on the one hand, through New Delhi's talks with the Hurriyat and, on the other, with the regime in Islamabad. And finally over the weekend it announced it would exercise ``maximum restraint'' along the Line of Control. India treats this cautious response with ifs and buts as positive though the final judgment will be reserved until the ground situation provides firm, supporting evidence. There is no immediate insistence by Pakistan on making the talks trilateral, though this point continues to be stressed along with the need for adding ``substance'' to the Vajpayee announcement. Interestingly, the Pakistan Government is now for the Lahore process, as is evident from the statement of its Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdus Sattar. Soon after the military takeover, he gave the impression of the new regime distancing itself from Lahore - seeking to trivialise the Declaration with the use of a Punjabi expression fallana, damaka,(this one, that one), in reply to pointed queries.

Whether Pakistan's present stand is genuine or tactical will be known after some time. Because of the all-round welcome by the world community, Islamabad could not have brushed it aside. It could not have forgotten the flak it received for wrecking the ceasefire move by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

The Hizb essentially is a body of militants of the Kashmir Valley, but under the operational control of the elements on the other side of the Line of Control and the official agencies there. The Pakistani establishment cleared the earlier ceasefire suggestion by the Valley-based groups in the hope that it would not be acceptable to New Delhi. But the Centre's positive response upset its calculations. With New Delhi engaged in talks with a section of the State's militants, Islamabad feared that it would be sidelined. Hence the determined bid to scuttle the Hizb move. Hence the insistence on trilateral talks, involving Pakistan as well. Offered by New Delhi, the present unilateral move is qualitatively different. A lot more crudity would be required to wreck it.

The November 19 statement by the Prime Minister contained a lot more than was seen in it in the first instance or even later. There was no ambiguity about the operative part - that the Government instructed the security forces ``not to initiate combat operations'' against the militants during Ramzan, the most pious month in the Islamic calendar. What was not clearly understood was that the peace call was meant for Pakistan, apart from the militants. This was the meaning of the concluding part - Mr. Vajpayee's plea for full appreciation of the gesture was followed by an expression of the hope that violence in the State and - this was important - infiltration from across the Line of Control and the international border would cease and peace prevail. Read this point about the end of infiltration, along with the preceding reference to New Delhi's efforts to ``hold talks with all those who are prepared for a dialogue'' and you will find a flexibility, missing in the earlier, oft-repeated Indian formulation - talks only when trans-border violence ends. The Home Minister, Mr. L. K. Advani, merely elaborated this point when he told the BJP Parliamentary Party last week that the Government's initiative was addressed not only to Kashmiri militants but ``also to Pakistan'' and that Islamabad should take advantage of it.

Likewise, Mr. Vajpayee was not indulging in a pro forma exercise when he recalled his August 3 statement in Srinagar, calling for solutions in the spirit of insaniyat (humanism). The idea was to reiterate - for the benefit of those allergic to a dialogue within the Indian Constitution - that New Delhi intended keeping up the flexibility, indicated on the eve of the Hizb-initiated ceasefire call. He, thus, sought to underscore the parameters for fresh talks.

The Prime Minister's initiative was noteworthy on two counts - one, the unilateral announcement not to initiate action against the militants, and two, the readiness for talks with them and (impliedly) also with Pakistan. It, however, did not provide evidence of New Delhi's broad vision or the specifics of a solution to the problem it had in mind. One would not have laboured this omission had concrete or even semi-concrete indications been available in the past. On the contrary, the Centre's stand on the State's autonomy and related matters has been marked by confusion. This deficiency, however, need not be allowed to create prejudice against the peace move.

It is hard to be categorical about the outcome of what has rightly been described as a ``calculated risk'', a ``gamble''. Its great potential for restoration of normality in the hapless State is to be recognised. Sick and tired of a prolonged dislocation - and the incalculable harm it had done to an entire generation -, the people will support any move which seeks to reverse the current tide. At the same time, it is clear that a small determined minority is enough to scuttle the initiative.

In the fortnight after the ceasefire announcement (on November 19), the reactions and responses were weighted in favour of peace (though, the killings by terrorist outfits, which did not hide their identity, could not be ignored). Within the country, there was all-round support. With the exception of a fringe group, ironically a constituent of the ruling alliance, the Shiv Sena.

In Jammu and Kashmir, the militants who took a positive view (despite reservations) of the ceasefire vastly outnumbered those who did not. On the other side of the border, it was a different story. Most terrorist organisations opposed it vociferously, and only a small minority seemed prepared to give it a chance. Pakistan could not be expected to own up its role in using the jehadi outfits based in its territory for terrorist campaigns in Kashmir. But their restraint is a material factor from the Indian standpoint. Pakistan could not pretend it had no control over them. Only last year, towards the concluding phase of the Kargil operation, when the then Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, accepted the U.S. demand for withdrawal of troops from the Indian side of the LoC, did these jehadi heroes threaten defiance and declare they would organise a march to Srinagar. However, Islamabad had no difficulty enforcing their obedience.

The present initiative is the outcome of the extension of the processes which were set in motion in the first quarter of this year, with unpublicised contacts between the Hizb's representatives and New Delhi which led to the announcement of the ceasefire by it. For a while, after the collapse of that move, there was a pause. Later, contacts were resumed at various levels, involving several persons both in individual and representative capacity. Neither the new young Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid nor Mr. Mansoor Ijaz, member of the U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations and investment fund manager, who had been talking of having mooted formulae for India-Pakistan conciliation, is to be denied the satisfaction of projecting his role as crucial. The consultation process, however, was much wider - which was a plus point. What matters in the ultimate analysis is the result. Let us pray that it will be positive.

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