Indo-Pakistan minuet

By C. Raja Mohan

AFTER LOOKING away from its western neighbour for more than a year and a half, India has once again focussed its attention on Pakistan. By announcing a unilateral ceasefire last month, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, has prepared the ground for a diplomatic minuet with the generals in Pakistan. If things go well in the next few weeks, India and Pakistan should be back in the business of negotiations. But how does one know if things are going well? Even as the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir begins to take hold, we are already into new war of words between the diplomats on both sides. The rhetorical posturing is a ``pre- negotiation'' between New Delhi and Islamabad on the terms of the proposed engagement. The verbal sparring between the two Governments leaves most people cold. Here is an easy guide to cut through the verbiage and figure out the direction of the movement.

In any set of ``talks about talks'' between adversaries, three key questions are always in play - when, how and what. When do you talk? This is about the conditions both sides want met before the actual negotiations begin. How do you talk? To put it in diplomatese, this is about the ``modalities''. More simply it is the argument on the shape of the negotiating table. And finally what do you talk about? This refers to the substance of the proposed negotiations.

Let us begin with the question, when? India has made it abundantly clear, over and over again, that it is ready to engage the Kashmir militants and the Pakistani Government when they put the gun down. The unilateral ceasefire was a gesture of good faith from the Indian side that it is prepared to find a way out of the political impasse in Kashmir. The key words in Indian diplomacy are ``cross-border terrorism'' and ``conducive atmosphere'', New Delhi's bottomline: no talks so long as the gun is pointed to its head.

Pakistan, too, has its own demands on what India should do before the talks begin. The initial reaction of Pakistanis to the Indian move was to insist that India must do more to ``prove'' its sincerity about a dialogue by reducing its troops in the Valley, end its ``oppression'' of human rights, and release militants from the prisons. But as world opinion and the sentiment in the Valley turned out to be in favour of a ceasefire, Pakistan had to make a move, without being seen as giving up its conditions. It comes up with the decision to observe ``maximum restraint'' on the Line of Control. New Delhi, in response, is saying ``good, but not good enough''. It wants to see a sharp decline, beyond the seasonal variation, of the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist activity in Kashmir. India's assessment on whether cross-border terrorism has come down is expected to come only towards the end of the month of Ramzan. At that point a decision is due on talks with Pakistan.

If you are looking for movement in the next few weeks, break down the concept of ``cross-border terrorism'' into its different elements - military temperature on the Line of Control, infiltration, and terrorist violence. India wants movement on all these issues, not just on the LoC. If there is sustained progress on all, India will indeed offer talks. But will Pakistan agree to talk when India is ready? What about the conditions Islamabad has set? Given his strong desire to lock India into a negotiating process, Gen. Pervez Musharraf is unlikely to insist on the conditions he started with.

That brings us to the question, how? Here the diplomatic play is on finding different ways of saying three. Pakistan wants a table for three to address the dispute over Kashmir. For India three is a crowd. Recall that the earlier attempt at a peace process between New Delhi and the Hizbul Mujahideen last August collapsed because of Pakistan's insistence on the tripartite talks. Islamabad has not given up. But is there a deadlock? Not yet. In the last few days, Pakistani officials appear to be loosening the formulation on tripartite talks. Words like ``trilateral'' and ``triangular'' - which may be construed as less rigorous than ``tripartite'' - are being used. It, however, has not given up the basic idea. Pakistan says it is ready to begin a process in which the militants will negotiate separately with New Delhi and Islamabad in the next few days to prepare the ground for a ``tripartite process'' after Ramzan.

And India says ``not now, not ever''. It is ready for two separate and parallel sets of talks - one with the militants and the other with Pakistan. But what about the third track - between Islamabad and the militants? The Government has indeed allowed some of the Kashmiri dissident leaders to travel to Pakistan. And it is unlikely to have serious objections to letting the militants talk informally to the Pakistani leadership. In short, it is possible to have ``three way'' talks on the ground without a numerical descriptions of the talks. Pakistani diplomats can claim a gain by pointing to the reality that all the three parties are involved in the process. India too can claim there is no concession for there are only two separate tracks in the formal sense. While letting the leaders of the Hurriyat Conference, the preferred protege of the Pakistanis, engage Islamabad, India will in no way accept their claim to being the sole representative of the Kashmir people. After all there is an elected Government in Srinagar under Dr. Farooq Abdullah. Pakistan, while focussing on the Hurriyat Conference has not insisted that it is the only voice from Kashmir. To be sure, Pakistan wants to keep other Kashmiri cards in play in case the Hurriyat Conference becomes ineffective or goes out of its control.

And finally, what will India and Pakistan talk about? New Delhi wants to return to the framework of the ``composite dialogue'' that was agreed in the late 1990s and reaffirmed at Lahore when Mr. Vajpayee went there in February 1999. This framework covers everything - from the Kashmir dispute to nuclear confidence building measures to trade and commerce. Pakistan on the other hand wants the focus purely on Kashmir. Gen. Musharaf has been critical of the Lahore process charging it with not giving due importance to Kashmir. Having taken the initiative in the Valley, India is now clearly ready for a substantive discussion of the Kashmir dispute and might even be contemplating possible final solutions. But it will not countenance a negotiation with Pakistan that is limited to Kashmir. India is looking for a more fundamental transformation of the relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is under some international pressure to reaffirm the commitment to the Lahore process, and the next few days will show whether Pakistan is ready to comply. The question, what, is likely to come into a greater focus only after the other questions, when and how, are answered.

The Indo-Pakistan diplomatic sparring does not take place in a vacuum. The external political environment and the internal political dynamics will have a strong impact on the evolution of the current pre- negotiations. In India there is a new confidence, thanks to the altering mood in Kashmir, New Delhi's improved relations with great powers, in particular the United States, and the relatively stable domestic political and economic situation. General Musharaf, on the other hand, faces new tensions with the major powers over Afghanistan, internal and external questions on the legitimacy of his rule, a stalled economy, and the growing political clout of the jehadis in the domestic political discourse.

Pakistan, however, has important leverages in its ability to become a spoiler in Kashmir and raise the military and political tensions in the subcontinent. The next few days and weeks will show how New Delhi and Islamabad will play to their strengths and minimise their weaknesses.

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