Bringing peace to Kashmir

By Amitabh Mattoo

EVEN CYNICS will concede that the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir has created, after more than a decade, an invaluable opportunity to begin a genuine peace process in the State. The overwhelming enthusiasm with which the announcement was greeted by all shades of public opinion in the Kashmir Valley is just one indication of the timeliness and propitiousness of the Centre's boldest initiative in recent years.

It is also becoming clear that the Prime Minister's announcement is part of a larger rethink on Kashmir, and not merely a tactical manoeuvre to secure short-term advantage. However, the Centre will need to continue to persist with its new Kashmir policy, even in the wake of the manifold provocations and hurdles that it will inevitably encounter in the weeks to come, systematically building on the peace constituency that is beginning to reveal itself. It should be clear also to the Kashmiri separatist leaders and militant groups that moments like this rarely reappear easily, and unless they seize the initiative they will risk not just political marginalisation, but it will also erode the possibility of their playing an important role in bringing back peace and stability to the beleaguered State. No less significantly, it is critical that the ruling regime in Pakistan also realises that there can be few better chances for it to rehabilitate itself internationally, and create the conditions essential for the resumption of a meaningful political dialogue with India.

Shorn of rhetoric and diplomatic gobbledegook, New Delhi's new Kashmir policy seems to combine at least three elements. First, the Centre has signalled that the ceasefire, so far limited to the month of Ramzan, could continue into the New Year. If this happens, it will be by far the most important move undertaken by the Centre in reducing the alienation of the Kashmiri people. In recent years, the public sentiment against the Government of India has intensified, particularly in the Kashmir Valley, because of the harassment faced by the ordinary Kashmiri from the security forces during their counter-insurgency operations. Recall also that for at least the last five years, separatist mobilisation has been made possible only because of human rights violations and rarely have people responded in large numbers to the call of azadi. All evidence seems to suggest that the ceasefire is, by and large, being scrupulously adhered to by the security agencies and that there has been a suspension of all pro-active measures against militant organisations. While such a move does carry the risk of making the security forces more vulnerable to militant attacks, may even erode the morale of a section of the forces, and could lead to a re-grouping and consolidation of militants, the long term benefits - given the overwhelming Kashmiri sentiment against violence - are far greater than these short term costs. In other words, not only will the unilateral ceasefire firmly isolate forces that are continuing to perpetuate violence, but may help create the conditions under which the Kashmiri people - rather than security forces - will disclaim and fight those who continue to spread terror and violence.

The Centre has also indicated its willingness to speak to any Kashmiri group or militant organisation. It is significant that no mention has been made of conditionalities and there has been no suggestion that these talks have to be within the framework of the Constitution. Instead, the Prime Minister's formulation, ``the framework of insaniyat'', has signalled that given the human tragedy that Kashmir represents today, the possibilities of peace should be explored not within the codified limits of a legal document but within the bounds of humanism. All those who have been hesitant to talk to the Centre, believing that they would lose their credibility if they accepted conditions right at the beginning, should now get the confidence to respond to this offer of engagement.

Finally, New Delhi has signalled - more clearly than ever before - that it is willing to re-engage Pakistan if Islamabad takes concrete measures to create the conditions in which a meaningful dialogue, as envisaged in the Lahore summit, can be pursued. This means, first of all, that the ground reality in Kashmir must show a visible change, and that there is a reciprocal ceasefire by all militant groups that Pakistan has sponsored and trained and which are increasingly now being manned by Pakistanis.

The Centre's new Kashmir initiative requires patience and determination, and should continue to be handled by the top political leadership of the country. More incremental confidence- building measures may be needed in the near future, including the issue of travel documents to Kashmiri leaders who wish to go abroad, the release of political detenus - some of whom have languished in jail for the last decade - and a more explicit invitation for a dialogue to individual separatist leaders. Even if the Centre's gestures continue to be non-reciprocated it has little to lose. For increasingly it will become clear to the Kashmiri people and the international community that forces in Pakistan and a section of the separatist leadership in Kashmir alone stand between Kashmir and peace.

As a body, the All Party Hurriyat Conference has, despite intemperate statements by individual leaders, welcomed the ceasefire. There are also indications that many of the APHC's leaders are willing to enter into bilateral dialogue with India. Pakistan's green signal on this score has probably strengthened the constituency in favour of, first, engaging India. And yet the APHC leadership is hesitating from giving a more positive response for probably two reasons.

First, there is a feeling within a section of the leadership that not enough groundwork has been done and that any step taken by the APHC, without adequate consultation with various shades of Kashmiri public opinion, may be counterproductive. Second, there is a feeling that even before talking to the Centre, the APHC leadership needs to engage the leaders of the militant groups most of whom are based in Pakistan, and that without the militants' acquiescence any peace process could be derailed. There is some merit in both these arguments, and indeed there should be no objection to giving Hurriyat leaders permission to travel to Pakistan to persuade the militants to cease fire, and in allowing public meetings all over the State. However, the APHC too must realise that the Prime Minister's brave initiative demands statesmanship from them too, as well as the capacity to take risks and hard decisions which have to be rooted in the realisation that, above all, the Kashmiris want peace and an end to the misery of the last twelve years. The APHC leadership must also be prepared to accept that the Indian political leadership may, from time to time, have to make tactical gestures and statements to appease various domestic constituents and to prevent a rebellion from within its ranks. In the final analysis, it should be clear to the APHC leadership that the Kashmiris will not forgive those who squander what may be the last chance for peace for some time to come.

For Pakistan, the choice is even starker. It can either continue on the track of international isolation and regional belligerence, or take steps that will eventually put it back on track as a civilised member of the comity of nations. Half-baked tactical gestures will not do. The need is for an unprecedented response to an unprecedented situation pregnant with historic opportunities. Will General Musharraf now demonstrate, as visitor after visitor from Pakistan seems to suggest, that he is really interested in getting out of the mess that his predecessors have created in Kashmir? Or will he confirm to the stereotype, dominant in the Indian imagination, that the man who destroyed Lahore at Kargil can hardly be interested in peace? Ultimately, it should be clear to all that bringing peace to Kashmir, at least at this stage, is not about goals and the final product but about gradually creating a process in which all the main dramatis personae have a stake, and which cannot easily be derailed by the number of vested interests who have made a business out of the conflict in Kashmir.

(The writer is Chairperson, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, JNU.)

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