Long road after ceasefire

By V. R. Raghavan

INDIA'S DECLARATION of a ceasefire in Jammu & Kashmir has, not unexpectedly, generated a range of responses. On the military level, it has apparently brought some respite to the population of the State. It has provided a breather to the militant groups from the pressures of security forces chasing them. The major impact of the ceasefire is to be seen at the political level where each week brings forth new developments of considerable potential for peace and stability. If the potential being created for peace is to be fulfilled, an understanding of future possibilities is necessary. It is therefore all the more important that the ceasefire is seen as a means, and not an end in itself.

The Indian Government's ceasefire initiative had evoked a positive international reaction. That forced Pakistan to make a constructive response. After absorbing the unexpected surprise, Pakistan has come forward with a promise to demonstrate maximum restraint on the Line of Control. Its senior officials have followed up the promise of military restraint with a political clearance for the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to join negotiations with the Indian Government. These steps are indicative of the way Pakistan views its role in the final outcome of the Kashmir issue. It has indicated two things by these initiatives. It intends to use the APHC to speak for Pakistan's locus in future negotiations, until the latter itself joins such talks at some indeterminate stage. This is important for Pakistan since there few signs of a tripartite negotiations coming through soon. This also elevates the APHC to a special status in the negotiations hitherto not quite warranted by its political strength in Jammu & Kashmir. The APHC, from being unsure of how to handle the negotiations with New Delhi, has been anointed a major player on the table. On the other hand, the Hizbul Mujahidin which has played a major role in the militancy over the years, is apparently being sidelined. There is a message in it for other militant groups, about their allegiance to Pakistan's interests.

Second, the response from Pakistan indicates its unwillingness to stop armed militant activity. It has not asked the Hizbul Mujahideen or the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups to abide by the ceasefire. Pakistan quite clearly views the trans-border terrorist activity as a meaningful instrument in influencing the peace process, or, to abort it if needed. The conditional response from Pakistan can be better understood if one heeds the views being expressed in the Pakistani media. India's ceasefire is described as an admission of the failure of its policy to ``crush the uprising''. The ceasefire and the offer of talks are seen as means to engage the Kashmiri leadership while keeping Pakistan out. Indian initiatives are also viewed to be designed to create differences between the mujahideen, Kashmiris and the Government of Pakistan. There are comparisons made between Pakistan's role in Kashmir, and its being reduced to the status of Mr. Yasser Arafat as the leader of a local authority!

It is obvious that the political fallout of New Delhi's ceasefire initiative has been meaningful. It has triggered a wide range of responses from major nations, from Pakistan, and the militant groups supported by it. Some militant groups have expressed unhappiness at Pakistan's decision to display maximum restraint on the LoC. The ceasefire and the possibility of negotiations are indicating the inherent contradictions in the agendas of those who have had to react to the ceasefire condition. Such contradictions are not being made any easier to resolve by the Indian offer to extend the ceasefire, if Pakistan ends trans- border terrorist activity. Above all, the jockeying for positions on the negotiating table has begun. It may well turn out to be an unseemly spectacle, with Pakistan trying to keep some of the horses in its stable from bolting, and preventing others straining at the reins from upsetting the applecart.

There are some other developments which can have an impact on the success or failure of the negotiations, as and when they start. The first is the possibility of change of opinion in Pakistan itself. General Pervez Musharraf had met Mirwaiz Omar Farooq at the recently-held meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). He is reported to have indicated that the U.N. resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir, and particularly the one about a plebiscite, are no longer practicable. This report has not been denied by Islamabad. If this is indeed a reflection of thinking in Pakistan's ruling establishment, it is a pragmatic position of considerable importance. When juxtaposed against the Indian position of greater autonomy to Jammu & Kashmir in a future negotiated arrangement, the position offers real hope for constructive possibilities. It would also mean that Pakistan would need to do much more than to ensure the success of negotiations. It will need to offer matching constitutional rights to the portions of Kashmir under its occupation.

The second development of some significance is the formation of an Alliance for Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. It brings together most non-religious parties of Pakistan, including the Pakistan Muslim League (Sharif) and the Pakistan People's Party. The Alliance has made known its demands. It rejects the military Government's devolution plan, and has sought a timeframe for holding general elections under a neutral caretaker government. The low credibility of the PML and the PPP notwithstanding, their coming together in the Nasrullah Khan-led Alliance is likely to generate a new political dynamic in Pakistan. The military Government's actions on Kashmir are more than likely to become the subject of political criticism.

General Musharraf's Government has lived out one of its three judicially sanctioned years of tenure. The General says he is determined to hold elections on time. There are also elections to be held in Jammu & Kashmir in 2001-2002. The conjunction of electoral compulsions offer interesting possibilities in structuring the negotiations, on which all eyes are focussed. The APHC has so far chosen not to participate in the electoral process. It would have enough pressures to take a position on the subject even as negotiations are continued. If Pakistan can bring itself to ask the APHC to negotiate with New Delhi, it can also ask it prove its credibility in a fair and free elections to the State Sssembly. In fact the APHC's negotiating position would be strengthened by participating in elections, just as its credibility would be dented by keeping away from them. It would be interesting to watch Pakistan's and the APHC's response on this.

The negotiations will gain greater legitimacy by the Kashmiri people being truly represented in it. Who is to represent the Kashmiri people is a moot point. Who would represent the militant groups, the people of Ladakh, Jammu and other minorities at the negotiations? What position would the elected Assembly and the Government in Srinagar have in the negotiations? What issues are to be negotiated is another major issue which would need clarifying and some understanding before long. Are negotiations conditional upon New Delhi reducing the security forces? This cannot happen without a demonstrated capacity on Pakistan's part to order a cessation of hostilities from militant groups who have not accepted the ceasefire so far. Pakistan's capacity on this count remains suspect, as seen from the reactions to its offer of restraint on the LoC.

There is a long journey beyond the ceasefire. It is on an uncharted road and in uncertain company. The destination is also not clearly spelt out. That does not mean that talks and negotiations cannot start. It does, however, require that those wanting talks and negotiations be prepared to indicate, where they wish to reach through the negotiations route. It is better to know the destination and then work out the routes to it, instead of the other way around. The time to make such positions clear is imminent. Once negotiations start, it would be best to refrain from a public discussion of its every nuance. Talks and negotiations cannot be made a platform for posturing and scoring debating points. In the meanwhile, every move of the Governments in India and Pakistan will be examined closely to know if they, as nuclear weapons states, seek peace or continuing conflict.

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