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Bush on a sticky wicket with N. Korea
By F.J. Khergamvala
TOKYO, DEC. 20. As the Clinton administration winds down to give
way to a Bush administration that threatens to make the national
missile defence (NMD) an essential ingredient of its strategic
plans, North Korea's missiles development policy waits at the
crossroads between what has been offered to Mr. Bill Clinton and
what is acceptable to Mr. George W. Bush.
The entire question of a Clinton visit to Pyongyang has boiled
down to the missiles deal, which in turn, may lead to the U.S.
lifting many sanctions and providing or blessing aid to North
Korea. That in turn implies not merely recognition but firm
intent on the part of the U.S. to help preserve the North Korean
system. But aid also requires the so far absent consensus among
the Republicans. North Korea gains prestige from a Clinton visit,
but would probably give little away without assurances that Mr.
Bush will pick up from where Mr. Clinton left.
When the Clinton administration began debating the overall
viability of a national missile defence scheme, the real
strategic motive was China but the U.S. used the ``rogue'' North
Korean State's missiles capabilities to cloak its real
justification. Mr. Kim Jong Il has put many missile related
concessions up for bargain, but acceptance by the U.S. could also
undermine the justifications advanced by Mr. Bush for developing
the missile defence. The transition in the U.S. takes place at a
time when the terms are still being negotiated. Mr. Kim Jong Il
may have timed it such that a negotiation begun by one
administration could either commit the next one, or at the very
least lock any post-Clinton administration into his singular
purpose, that of obtaining commitment to survival of the North
Korean system.
The next Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell and the National
Security Advisor, Ms. Condoleezza Rice have made fairly explicit
that the Bush administration will go ahead with national missile
defence. Neither have recently linked the NMD with North Korea.
In a statement that bore no hint of a compromise on NMD, but
which could only be inferred to include Pyongyang, Gen. Powell
said the time had come to move in the direction ``to take away
the currency associated with strategic offensive weapons and the
blackmail that is inherent in some regime having that kind of a
weapon and thinking they can hold us hostage.''
Over the past six years, the U.S. has negotiated successfully
with blackmail, and reciprocally, so too has North Korea. Dr.
William Perry, who as Defence Secretary, scarcely uttered a
sentence without the term ``rogue State,'' two years later became
the Clinton administration's chief coordinator for North Korea.
He eventually did the carrot and stick deal with the North. It
was a deal conceptually founded on the South Korean President,
Mr. Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy of engagement but negotiated
by brandishing U.S. military power and financial influence in
international lending institutions. But it was also Part II of
the 1994 Agreed Framework on Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities.
Many saw the contradiction between the rhetoric about the North
as a ``rogue State'' (now ``States of concern'') and constant,
serious engagement with North Korea over six years. North Korea's
shrewd policy-making architects also saw the opportunity to
follow through the 1994 deal and advance its foreign policy of
extortion.
In 1994, the U.S. and North Korea were absolutely on the brink of
war on Pyongyang's nuclear programme. A back down by both led to
an Agreed Framework, whereby the North would abandon, step by
step its nuclear programme, if a U.S. led consortium would take
step by step measures to provide it with two replacement 1,000
megawatt light water reactors and heavy fuel oil until the new
reactors were ready. If a deal could be done on the nuclear
programme, the North felt the U.S. might also see fit to engage
it on a bargain on missiles.
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