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By K. K. Katyal

RESUMPTION OF India-Pakistan dialogue in February next? There is no basis yet to be definitive but it does not look as far-fetched a proposition as it did till recently, since Kargil. Yes, there is a case for optimism but it has to be heavily laced with caution. India's unilateral decision on a ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir was a major initiative, marking a refreshing departure from the reactive approach of the past. This, as also its extension beyond the month of Ramzan, produced a positive response (despite ifs and buts) in Pakistan and a section of the militants in the State and their political supporters. This was, no doubt, encouraging. As against that is the opposition to the peace process by jehadi outfits operating from the other side of the line and their resolve to continue the ``mission'', in other words, not to give up violence and terrorism. That theirs was no empty threat was ominously borne out by the killing of five Sikh drivers on the Srinagar-Jammu highway three days after the announcement of the ceasefire and the strike at the high security zone of Delhi's Red Fort a day after its extension, apart from attacks on the security forces.

The Government had factored in the continuance of terrorist actions on a reduced scale while deciding on the ceasefire and related steps. New Delhi's tolerance, however, could not be limitless - it will be hard to maintain the present restraint in the event of a major strike. That could lead to derailment of the ceasefire and the peace bid.

Hopefully, such a scenario will not materialise, the positive trends discerned now will continue and, perhaps, gather momentum and a qualitatively new process may well begin - entailing, in the first instance, consolidation of the ceasefire and, later, talks at various levels. The present ``suspension of operations'' by the Government is different from the ceasefire announced by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen some time ago (to which New Delhi responded positively). Though both New Delhi and Islamabad were kept informed when it was in the making and conveyed their approval, their subsequent conduct was different. New Delhi, which had given travel documents to Hizb leaders to facilitate their discussions on the two sides of the LoC, did not lose time, after the ceasefire announcement, in designating a team of officials for talks. As a matter of fact, a meeting, in which the masked militant representatives took part, did fructify and although it provided unusual footage for television networks, the discussions did not take off. As for Pakistan, its intelligence agencies did clear the Hizb move but later retracted. Islamabad had counted on rejection of the move by New Delhi and on making a good propaganda use of it. With their calculations upset by India's positive response, the Pakistani agencies were quick with the retraction.

It is a different case this time. Having drawn flak from the world community for scuttling the Hizb-initiated ceasefire, Pakistan could not afford to adopt a negative stance on the Indian initiative. Islamabad could not have been unaware of the relief among the people of the State in the wake of the Hizb move and their subsequent disappointment over its withdrawal and, as such, may not be rash in dealing with the Indian move. Also the serious problems, economic and political, facing the military regime in Islamabad tend to induce caution. So while pointing out ``deficiencies'' in the ceasefire announcement and its extension by New Delhi, it chose a positive response - ``maximum restraint'' on the LoC, on the first occasion, and ``partial withdrawal'' of troops from it, in the second case. The decisions by New Delhi and Islamabad, no doubt, add up to major steps towards consolidation of the ceasefire. To say this is not to lose sight of the mischief potential of the jehadi extremists.

There is a faint sign of hope as regards resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan. Each has moved away from the earlier positions that came in the way of the renewal of contacts at the political level. In the last 18 months, New Delhi was in no mood to talk to Pakistan, first because of the Kargil treachery and, later, because of the army coup. After a while, India gave up its objection to dealing with the military ruler, realising that it had done so in the past, but stuck to the other condition - that cross-border terrorism had to end so as to make the climate conducive to talks. It cited continued terrorist strikes in Jammu and Kashmir and intensity of firing along the LoC in support of its decision against resumption of talks. The ground situation has improved - as a result of the ceasefire and reciprocal steps announced by Pakistan. This is recognised by New Delhi and, as a result, there is flexibility in its approach to dialogue with Pakistan and, of course, a willingness to talk to Kashmiri leaders, representing various sections, notably the Hurriyat. The statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, on the extension of the ceasefire did emphasise that infiltration from the Pakistani side ``must cease entirely'' and reaffirmed the ``Government's commitment to achieve this end'' but stopped short of mentioning it as an absolute precondition. ``The existence of a suitable environment for such a process (dialogue) is self- evidently necessary,'' it said. Then followed a reference to the continued commitment to the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration and the decision to initiate ``such exploratory steps as are considered necessary by it (India) so that the composite dialogue process between India and Pakistan could be resumed''.

What would the exploratory steps be like and to what purpose? Obviously, to find out whether Pakistan is prepared for bilateral talks - which is what Shimla and Lahore were all about - and whether it would accept the format, already agreed upon by the two sides. It envisaged a composite dialogue - with two issues, peace and security and Kashmir to be taken up by the Foreign Secretaries, and the other six including Sir Creek, terrorism, and economic and commercial cooperation by the officials concerned. The two sides, as a matter of fact, initiated the process in keeping with this agreed pattern. The Lahore Declaration did not supersede that agreement but merely emphasised the ``resolve to intensify the efforts to resolve outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir''. Any resumption of the dialogue, therefore, means an adherence to this pattern - of bilateralism, of composite discussions with a pointed reference to Kashmir. This does not mean any trilateral discussions among India, Pakistan and ``Kashmiri leaders''.

Equally important, no ``exploratory step'' will be complete if it does not pinpoint Pakistan's responsibility for the activities of terrorist organisations operating from its territory - and openly bragging about them - and seek effective remedial measures. No government in New Delhi will find it possible to engage in dialogue, with public opinion exercised over incidents of the type witnessed at the Red Fort.

In some respects, Pakistan appears to have given up its earlier rigidity. For instance, the military ruler now accepts the relevance of the Lahore process, though soon after assuming power he sought to trivialise it. The concept of trilateral talks was invoked to wreck the Hizb ceasefire. The Pakistan rulers could not be so naive as not to realise that India would not accept any three-sided process. Islamabad has not formally given up that position but otherwise has let it be known that the requirements of trilateralism would be met if India were to initiate talks with the Kashmiri leaders, apart from resuming the dialogue with it. As regards talks with Kashmiri leaders, which India regards as a domestic affair, the Prime Minister has already made a beginning - with a plea for settling all issues in the spirit of ``insaniyat'' (humanism).

If the exploratory steps envisaged by Mr. Vajpayee serve to bring out the prior joint commitment on modalities, resumption of the dialogue could be a reality - say, soon after the present extension of the ceasefire expires on January 26 next (to be followed by further extensions), in February. This ``achievement'' will, however, take care of only procedural matters. The substantive aspect is yet to receive the required attention. Resumption of dialogue would not be of much use if it is confined to a public restatement of known positions on substantive matters. This could better be entrusted to back- channel diplomacy.

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