China's fast track diplomacy

By P. S. Suryanarayana

CHINESE LEADERS have long been expected to step on to a fast track of diplomacy to enhance Beijing's claim to a role in shaping the post-Cold War global order. Till very recently, the conventional wisdom was that the catalyst would be the issue, almost fully settled at present, of China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, Beijing has now chosen the sensitive political question of missile non-proliferation to signal a categorical intention of traversing the diplomatic fast track. China obviously has sought to assert its credentials as an aspiring global player and confirmed regional superpower with a definitive East Asian orientation.

Now, with the WTO-welcome coming into focus, Beijing can hope to accelerate its diplomatic activism. Given this prospect, China is keen on warding off any potential shocks to its eventual goal of sovereignty over Taiwan. As home to the forces that had lost to the Chinese communists on the mainland in 1949, the island of Taiwan, a U.S.-blessed `entity' since then, is still outside Beijing's control. The paramount objective of securing Taiwan, albeit at some time in the future, is the motive force behind the latest diplomatic urgency evinced by the leadership-duo - the President, Mr. Jiang Zemin, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Zhu Rongji. China's new initiative on missile non-proliferation has been determined, at least in part, by the Taiwan issue. More precisely, this relates to Beijing's perceived suspicion that the U.S., if not humoured, may put in place sooner than later a theatre missile defence system, which has already been masterminded with some direct protective benefit intended for the `Taiwanese' leadership.

The key question raised not long ago at a major hearing by the U.S. Senate sub-committee on international security was the perception of China's activities ``at the centre of a worldwide proliferation web''. Under scrutiny was China's transfer of M-11 ballistic missile-related equipment and technology to Pakistan as confirmed by a top U.S. administration official. It was an open review of the State Department's view on China's nuclear weapons- related assistance to Pakistan as also Iran besides, of course, its suspected transfer to Iran of some dual-use precursors that could be diverted for the manufacture of chemical weapons even while being supplied for civilian purposes. Beyond the maze of technical details, some positive signs were also recognised by the U.S. China acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and later supported the U.S.-led efforts to perpetuate the document as a permanent repository of the ``international norm'' of non-proliferation. China's signature on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention were also commended. Yet a puzzle, then as indeed now, is the perceived ``disconnect'' between China's commitments and its actions based on ``national security'' considerations.

As sinologists Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross argue, successive leaders have consistently felt that their ``national security'' will be enhanced by varied proactive policies. These include the augmentation of Pakistsan's military strength. India's potential as an international player is a factor in such Chinese thinking. China's overall post-Cold War geopolitical calculus at the moment is shaped by four other major considerations: (1) the possibility of Japan re-emerging as an assertive power over time; (2) Beijing's compulsion to hold its own on the maritime and land zones of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in the face of a pronounced U.S. military presence; (3) China's desire for an honourable political equation with Russia and (4) the perceived need for a Sino-American strategic dialogue if not a partnership. Its dealings with Europe and the Islamic world may somewhat be peripheral extensions of these essentials, but those contacts too figure prominently in the global compass as viewed in Beijing.

It is in this context that China, old ``Middle Kingdom'', has now pledged to refrain from making significant ``contributions'' to the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and their deployment by any country. China's overall sweeping pledge of restraint, which will cover its export of dual-use equipment and knowhow, is in tune with the guidelines of the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It is not an ``MTCR- partner'', and a Western theory is that the major powers have not been very keen on bringing Beijing under the MTCR purview for fear of having to take China into confidence about the secrets of their own ballistic missile programmes.

A logical question is why China should now seek to commit itself to abiding by almost the entire spectrum of dos and don'ts of the MTCR. In 1994, Beijing agreed, at the U.S. behest, to follow the MTCR guidelines on restraint in exporting missiles but not the parallel injunction against the transfer of related knowhow. It is a different matter whether China has fully translated that commitment into reality in respect of Pakistan. The doubts are indirectly confirmed by the reassuring tone of China's latest plenary pledge. A quintessential Western view is that any scaling up of American military supplies to Taiwan has often prompted China to ``retaliate'' by extending proliferation-related support to Pakistan and Iran in an arc of the U.S. interests. The reasoning is rooted in the Western intelligence assessment that China's M-11 missile-related transactions with Pakistan began in the context of the U.S. decision to sell a huge consignment of F- 16 fighter bombers to Taiwan in 1992. It stands scrutiny in this sub-context that the Chinese leaders, who have consistenty equated Taiwan with Hong Kong as Beijing's rightful piece of geopolitical real estate, should also want to mould the post-Cold War global politics.

Not surprisingly, China's latest declaratory manifesto - an abstinence from fostering missile-proliferation worldwide - acquires meaning as an invitation to the U.S. for a diplomatic bargain. The benign statement followed a China-U.S. summit on the margins of a multilateral conference. Given the manifest Taiwan factor in China's missile-related diplomacy, it is conceivable that this new charter is designed to induce Washington to reciprocate suitably. Beijing wants the U.S. to abandon or suspend its plans for building a post-modern `great wall' of defence against China, namely a theatre missile system in East Asia.

Now, unlike in the case of the U.S. plans for a national missile defence system with a global reach, China cannot easily bring itself to make common cause with Russia in opposing Washington's theatre-specific ideas. Moscow already possesses the means to counter Washington's missile gamesmanship in East Asia. This does not, however, diminish Russia's strategic imperative of joining hands with China in sketching out plans for a multipolar global order in the 21st century. Viewed thus, another high-profile aspect of China's new fast track diplomacy pertains to statesmanship in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides weaving a network of agreements with Southeast Asian states for enhanced bilateral cooperation, China is zeroing in on ways to liberate itself from the gravitational pull of any particular geopolitical zone. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Regional Forum (ARF) and groupings such as the ASEAN+3 have given China ample scope for casting its strategic net wide. The WTO will be a global field for economic diplomacy. China's comprehensive strategic agenda cannot be dismissed as a cosmic dream. Beijing has already begun to knock at the door of the Group of Eight, consisting of major industrialised powers and a strategically important Russia, besides wanting a say in the emerging international arms control institutions. It is a question of how China and the West can accommodate each other.

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