A matter of 'truce' and trust

THE `UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE' which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced, in a virtual public-relations blitzkrieg, has been rejected by the Sri Lankan Government with much political circumspection. The `truce' is effective for a month from Christmas. There is nothing in the LTTE's media-spin to suggest that its ``hope'' of reciprocation by official Colombo was a coded conditionality. Viewed in this perspective, the LTTE seems to have taken upon itself the unusual onus of sustaining a `truce' on its part for the stated purpose of facilitating new ``initiatives'' by Colombo for de-escalation of the prolonged ``armed confrontation'' between the two sides. In a purely technical sense relevant to their equally important `psycho-war', it is now clear that the LTTE had not formally communicated its decision to the Sri Lankan authorities through Norway, which has been acting as an intermediary in their recent dealings with each other. Nonetheless, it was a good sign that Colombo indicated, in a preliminary comment, that its instinctive ``caution'' over the LTTE's declaration should not be construed as an impediment to an eventual ``positive view'' if that might be justifiable on serious second thoughts. The Government's ``unhappy experiences'' in dealing with a mercurial LTTE were said to have induced such caution and a sense of ``inquiry'' at this stage. Not surprisingly, a dominant political feeling among Sri Lanka's majority Sinhala population is that the LTTE's offer of `truce' in its fighting with the armed forces would be really meaningful only if it is extended to the entire country. The transparent suggestion is that the LTTE must not also seek to strike ``terror'' in Colombo and elsewhere across the island-republic.

The LTTE's dramatic move, explicitly timed for the festive season of Christmas-New Year-Pongal, was in tune with the overall popular mood on the current South Asian scene, which is marked by a sudden spurt in neighbourly feelings despite the actions of some determined anti-peace militants. With the LTTE affirming that it could go beyond its `unilateral' announcement if the Government were to respond positively by ``ceasing armed hostilities,'' the President, Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga, may still find that she will have to seize the moment of hope sooner than later for the high stakes of peace. There is of course no question mark over Ms. Kumaratunga's track record of vision- driven moves for a constitutional settlement of the basic question of a rightful place for the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka as an indivisible state. Yet the mainstream Opposition United National Party as also non-militant and formerly militant Tamil groups have not rallied behind her for a variety of reasons. While this still poses a delicate challenge to the President, she knows that dealing with the LTTE is a much more difficult matter of trust.

Brazenly disingenuous is the reported suggestion by a transparent LTTE-lobby that a specified military operation, which was launched well before the time set for the commencement of the `unilateral ceasefire,' was clear proof of Ms. Kumaratunga's alleged attitude of pleasing donor-nations with insincere promises of a peace initiative. What she needs to grapple with in the present situation is how to redefine the offer that she expounded at a recent meeting held under the World Bank auspices in Paris. She said that while the ``doors are always open for negotiations'' Colombo would ``not entertain any conditions imposed by the LTTE.'' This formulation, spelt out before the LTTE's `unilateral' move, may require fine-tuning in the context of the militant organisation's promise to create conditions for ``a stable ceasefire and direct negotiations'' in the event of Colombo halting ``armed hostilities'' presumably without pulling its troops out of the conflict-zone. But confidence building is the first step.

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