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Online edition of India's National Newspaper Friday, December 29, 2000 |
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Opinion
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A Bill to debate
NO GOVERNMENT CAN afford to indulge in fiscal profligacy and both
the Centre and the States were guilty on this count in the 1980s
as well as 1990s. But is an end to profligacy best brought about
by legislation that ties the hands of the Executive and
Parliament to pre-determined fiscal targets over five to 10
years? The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill 2000
assumes so, premised as it is on the achievement of rectitude by
fiat. But there is much that can be questioned in the Bill and
Parliament needs to move with caution so as not to create new and
bigger problems even as it attempts to ``solve'' old ones.
There is a burden of debt on the economy and interest payments
are pre-empting a substantial proportion of government resources.
The inability of the Centre to cope with competing expenditure
and revenue demands has meant that even after a decade of
attempted fiscal consolidation, the situation has not changed
much for the better. The Bill commits the Centre to a phased
elimination of the revenue deficit and a lowering of the fiscal
deficit to 2 per cent of GDP by 2005-06. If the Government fails
to meet quarterly and annual targets on revenue and expenditure,
there will be automatic cuts in outlays. A transition to fiscal
rectitude is therefore built into the system. But there are many
potential pitfalls. First, bound as the Government is to annual
targets, it will be giving up some of its freedom to prioritise
expenditure. True, the Government with all the freedom in its
possession in the existing system has been able neither to
prioritise expenditure nor contain deficits. But the danger with
a fiscal responsibility Act is that the wrong cuts in expenditure
will almost surely take place. This is the second problem with
pre-determined targets. As the experience during the IMF
programme of the early 1990s and even thereafter has shown, any
attempt at forced fiscal consolidation leads to a slashing of
social sector spending and capital outlays because the lobbies
with an interest in other forms of expenditure and those against
revenue mobilisation are much stronger. The third problem with
the Bill is that it has one too many numerical and time-bound
targets. In addition to those on revenue and fiscal deficits,
there will be a cap on government guarantees and Central
Government liabilities will have to be brought down to 50 per
cent of GDP by 2010-11. Even the famed New Zealand legislation
(whose sheen, incidentally, has considerably worn off in recent
years) did not specify a numerical target on debt since it
rightly assumed that a government would have to take a decision
based on contemporary conditions. Besides, that law also dealt
only with operational surpluses and a ``prudent'' level of debt.
The fourth but not the least problem with our Bill is that the
target for liabilities is based on the current exchange rate of
foreign debt. With the rupee steadily depreciating year after
year, any pre-determined and legally-bound target for debt
reduction on such a basis is a potential recipe for disaster. In
addition, there are operational limitations to the Bill. Three of
them can be mentioned. One, it deals, as provided by Article 292
of the Constitution, only with transactions in the Consolidated
Fund of India. The Public Account of India, which covers small
savings and other funds, is not covered. Two, it will apply only
to the Centre. And, three, it is questionable if ex ante annual
fiscal targets as a proportion of GDP can have any legal meaning
when GDP estimates are finalised only a year or more after the
event.
All this is not to deny that there is much that is positive in
the Bill. There is an emphasis on transparency (in the budget-
making process), stability (in the outlining of annual priorities
in taxation, borrowings and more) and accountability (in
compelling the Centre to explain any failure to meet targets).
But the larger approach and the operational details are deeply
flawed and call for a very careful debate lest a millstone is
tied round the Centre's neck.
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