Political stability and fixed terms

ON THE FACE of it, the Prime Minister's strong pitch for a fixed tenure for Parliament and State legislatures may seem like a mere reiteration of his Government's view. After all, the NDA's election manifesto promised measures for introducing a fixed term (five years) for elected bodies. In 1999, the President's speech to the two Houses of Parliament made a clear reference to the desirability of having fixed terms in order to ``prevent political instability'' at the Central and State levels. But what is really astonishing is that Mr. A. B. Vajpayee's call for fixed tenures should have come in the middle of a speech in which he strongly defended the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) - the very body constituted to examine what, if any, changes are required to be made in the Constitution. Clearly, Mr. Vajpayee was not reflecting the NCRWC's view on this subject, which was contained in one of the consultation papers it released last week. The paper puts forward a number of suggestions (of varying merits) which are aimed at injecting more stability into the system of governance. But it specifically stresses that these be ``contra-distinguished from the suggestions of some to provide fixed terms to the Government and to the legislators''. This, the NCRWC declares, ``cannot be considered legitimate'', going on to add that the basis of governance should not be determined by fixed terms. Evidently, the Prime Minister and the NDA Government are quite out of sync with the Constitution Commission on the proper mechanism to achieve political stability.

More generally, the fixed term proposal suffers from many drawbacks, some of which have a serious bearing on the proper functioning of a parliamentary democracy. Although fixity is proposed for legislatures (as a House) and not for Governments, the bald fact is that, in practical terms, this will serve to entrench Governments in power even when they, to quote the NCRWC once again, are ``performing poorly and/or making grievous errors, deliberate or compulsive''. It is perhaps no surprise then that many Opposition parties perceive the fixed term proposal as a ruse for the BJP Government to shore up its position and remain in power. The advantages of fixed terms have been repeated ad infinitum; briefly, such terms will facilitate stable governments, permit long-term policy making and spare the country the huge levels of expenditure incurred on frequent elections. But it is imperative to examine the flip side. One of the cornerstones of a parliamentary democracy is that a Prime Minister and his Government remain in office only while enjoying the confidence of the Lok Sabha. And one of the great advantages of our political system is that it affords free play to a variety of social groups with a multitude of (often competing) interests to express themselves in party politics and through a system of free elections. Any measure which seriously inhibits legislators from withdrawing support to a Government and suppresses them from searching for an alternative set-up within the House or by going to the people will go against the grain of this parliamentary democracy. In a country where the political class is often predisposed to be arrogant and insensitive to the needs of the people, fixed terms could have dangerous ramifications. Where ministers and members of Parliament are so firmly in place that they cannot be removed, it is easy to imagine a situation where the abuse of political power assumes even more frightening dimensions. It is true that a country which has had five Governments since the 1996 general election needs to think hard about the question of political stability. But fixed terms are hardly an appropriate solution.

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