Not yet firm friends

By K. K. Katyal

CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT during the recent visit to India of the number two in China's political hierarchy, Mr. Li Peng, was the dark shadow which had cast on the bilateral horizon after India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The significance of the pleasant change will be clear when one recalls the fear of irreparable damage to mutual ties which persisted for months after Pokhran- II. The damage has been undone and the two sides are back on the normal track, seeking to expand cooperation and find ways to sort out differences, some of which, however, continue to be intractable - the boundary issue, security-related matters and a new subject, the dumping of cheap Chinese goods on Indian markets. What is important is that the disagreements are not being allowed to come in the way of efforts at expanding the area of agreement.

Foreign observers, at times, tend to magnify divergences, picking on the trivial to propound doctrines of crises. The other day, a foreign correspondent cited Mr. Li's remarks, made some time ago, on power cuts in Indian cities and the state of slums, to suggest the existence of tensions. He and others of his viewpoint need to be told about what Mr. Li said in a New Delhi address - his positive reference to the growth of the economy, particularly his observation that ``China wishes to express its congratulations to India on its success in various fields over the last five decades''.

China was keen on improving bilateral ties, in pursuance of a well-considered policy decision, fully reciprocating India's positivism. This, as it says, may be because of its desire for a stable, peaceful environment, to help it concentrate on its modernisation programmes. Or, as others point out, it may be because of the possibility, as perceived in Beijing, of India becoming part of the U.S. strategy.

In his present position, as chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress - or the Speaker of Parliament - Mr. Li was not expected to engage in negotiations on bilateral issues. But his was a special status, as the former Prime Minister who played a major role in his contacts with Indian leaders and as second most important person in his country, close to the President, Mr. Jiang Zemin. His was the authoritative voice of the Chinese establishment and although he did not dwell on specifics at length, his commitment to ``elevate China-India relations to a new height in the 21st Century'' had a qualitative significance.

Going by the statements from Beijing in the last few months, China acknowledged the role of our President, Mr. K. R. Narayanan, in reversing the negative trends in bilateral relations and regarded his visit as a major turning point. Mr. Li associated himself with this acknowledgement. Mr. Narayanan's visit last year was seen by him as constituting a foundation and providing a guarantee for the sound growth of India-China relations. Mr. Li pointedly recalled Mr. Narayanan's reaffirmation that China and India did not regard each other as a threat or adversary. This confirmed the end of the unsavoury controversy which had arisen out of China's misperception of India's views and caused a deep chill in bilateral ties. As against that, our own Government was somewhat frugal in giving full credit to Mr. Narayanan.

During his visit, Mr. Narayanan sought to impart a sense of urgency to resolving the boundary dispute. This matter had dragged on. No one in India was so unrealistic as to pin hopes on an early final settlement, but there had been a feeling of exasperation over the delay in clarifying the Line of Actual Control. The two sides had decided to take up this job as far back as in 1993, during the visit to China of the then Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao. This should not have taken that long because the LAC as agreed on by the two sides does not ``prejudice the respective positions of either country on the boundary issue''. However, even the establishment of an expert group and a second landmark agreement on confidence-building measures in 1996, during Mr. Jiang's visit to New Delhi, failed to expedite the process. The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's letter to his counterpart last year suggested completion of this job in a time-bound manner, if possible, by the end of 2001. In November last, the two sides took a major step, first of its type, in exchanging maps of the 545-km middle sector. The differences in this case are manageable. It should be possible to reconcile the two lines without much delay. This would mean a psychological breakthrough in dealing with the difficult job in the other sectors. Mr. Li's observations on the subject, however, did not go beyond a re-statement of oft- repeated sentiments. Over the years, the Chinese had been fond of outlining what in the Foreign Office was called the MUMA approach - mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. This was mentioned again.

Mr. Li did not mince words denouncing international terrorism but we, in India, would be deluding ourselves if this is seen as leading to an appreciation of New Delhi's plight, in the face of organised violence from across the border - much less to a willingness to make common cause with India. In the past, Chinese representatives during visits to India even avoided associating themselves, in joint statements, with condemnation of international terrorism, lest it be construed as their criticism of Pakistan. As explained by them, their stand was firm and unequivocal and their concern, as also the resolve to counter this menace, was evident from their initiative for the ``Shangai Five'' summits on the subject. This time, however, Mr. Li did not shy away from the subject even on Indian soil. This was significant but the temptation to read deeper meanings has to be resisted.

The concept of India-Russia-China triangle, too, needs to be treated with caution. The occasional focus on it in academic, seminar-level discussions tends to give it a larger-than-life projection. There is no triangle, strategic or otherwise, if it means formal, institutional cooperation among the three powers or coordinated functioning on regional or global issues or on world fora. If at all there is a triangle, it is the sum total of identical positions taken by 1) India and China, 2) India and Russia and 3) Russia and China on key issues. The commonalities emerging from this totality are noteworthy but do not add up to a triangle.

The common positions have of late been pinpointed, individually or bilaterally, on various occasions by the three sides. During his stay here, Mr. Li noted with satisfaction ``our common ground'' which ``far outweighs our differences''. He elaborated: ``Being the two largest developing countries, China and India have extensive common interests in international political and economic arena. We both favour a multipolar world, hold identical or similar positions on many major issues and can cooperate in a wide range of international affairs.''

The same warmth permeated the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and Russia, signed during the India visit of the Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin. The three countries took an identical stand on the developments in Yugoslavia, especially the NATO action in Kosovo, on the U.S. plans for a National Missile Defence, apart from the need for a multipolar system. Some time ago, the Russian Ambassador to India, Mr. Alexander Kadakin, noted the commonalities among the three countries but dismissed the talk of a triangle. ``Our countries have a lot in common as regards the new multi- polar international world order,'' he said, while opposing ``any type of alliances, triangles or pentagons, as descriptive geometry in diplomacy. When the positions of these three great powers coincide, as on the issues of strategic stability and the ABM Treaty, in denouncing the use of force under the guise of `humanitarian intervention', in combating international terrorism, and the events in Chechnya, aggression against Yugoslavia, we simply work together - not against anybody but for the sake of attaining positive goals. This is the formula for possible three-way cooperation.''

India-China relations have entered a new phase of engagement. This augurs well but a lot of hard work will be required for resolving differences on key issues. India will need to be clear about its China agenda, even though it may be limited, and keep pursuing it.

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