Stepping high, wide and plentiful

DEFENDING INDIA: Jaswant Singh; Published by Macmillan in India, 2/10, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi- 110002, Macmillan Press in the U.K., and St. Martin's Press in the U.S. Rs. 395.

MR. JASWANT SINGH was one of the few people taken into confidence about Pokhran before the world came to know of it. Appointed Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission soon after the BJP came to power in 1998, he spent most of his time there writing the book under review - which he had barely finished before Pokhran woke up the world from its slumber, in a somewhat louder voice that Jawaharlal Nehru had used 50 years ago. But, then, Jaswant explains, ``it is only power that the world respects.''

After Pokhran, still with the Planning Commission, Jaswant went into a series of hush-hush discussions with President Clinton's trusted Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott; assisted by a whole phalanx of aides, including Mr. Richard Celeste, the American Ambassador to India, and Mr. Naresh Chandra, the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Centred around the role that India could play in world politics, now that it too had become an ``emerging great power'', these talks culminated in President Clinton's visit to New Delhi last November, and the flurry of activity that followed.

By then, Jaswant had formally settled down as the Minister of External Affairs; a post in which he is likely to have a long and eventful innings. He is trusted both by Mr. Vajpayee, and by the principal contender for the Prime Minister's post, Mr. Advani; in part because he is not a threat to either one of them. The ``swadeshi'' lobby does not like him too much; but then, ``you need someone who can speak English'' for this sort of job.

The book is therefore compulsory reading for people interested in Indian foreign policy; be they Indians or foreigners, friends or foes.

Jaswant holds Nehru (of whom he is bitterly critical), Indira, and her son, responsible for pretty much all the problems India faces today; as much for the things they did as for the things they did not do. At one point, while telling us of the way ``the Indian Navy's umbilical cord with the Royal Navy remained uncut for too long,'' of the efforts of Mountbatten to foist on us a cruiser that we did not want or need, Jaswant goes so far as to quote a personal and private letter dated March 23, 1954, addressed to Lord Mountbatten by his Vice Admiral:

Edwina has been wonderfully helpful, as indeed, she always is, and it was mainly due to a whisper in the right direction that we managed to speed up the Nehru government's acceptance of the second cruiser (over the objections of the Defence and Finance Ministries) - You must get her to expand on this, because the speed with which things happened over a certain weekend was really quite remarkable.

Incidentally, Jaswant is not in favour of the long-standing tradition of subordinating the armed forces to the Defence Ministry : civilian control has been ``cumbersome, time- consuming, bureaucratic and expensive - the Defence Ministry is, in effect, the principal destroyer of the Army's morale.''

But, rather than Jaswant's opinions of what went wrong, most people will be interested in, rather, whether, thanks to Jaswant, we have now, finally, got it right. What follows might seem provocative, even combative; but even this may not be enough to provoke a response from a person who (though well aware of the enormous harm caused to India by Indira's and Rajiv's coteries in the 1980s) remains firmly convinced that Grand Strategy must necessarily be the exclusive concern of a very small, select, carefully chosen, band of people.

Jaswant's first substantive point is that Pakistan and China have loomed too large on our horizon, practically to the exclusion of all else. It is a poor and myopic sort of country, he says, whose strategic horizon is limited to its geographical boundaries. It is our entire neighbourhood (defined in a very expansive sense) that we have to focus on. We have to get all our ``neighbours'' to defend, or at least cease to subvert, our interests; while we ``defend'' theirs.

Afghanistan occupies a prominent place in this picture; as the route by which raiders have descended on us throughout history, and continue to do so today.

Jaswant's second major thesis is that, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. is now the sole super power. Getting into and remaining in their good books could pay rich dividends. As for China ``in the absence of any social, cultural, political and economic commonality, a policy of ``improving relations'' with China could yet again mortgage our future for illusions of the present.'' If, instead, India went along with American efforts to contain China, this would also give us a chance to expand our diplomatic presence in South-East Asia; and our naval presence along its shores.

Jaswant has, somehow, not noticed that the U.S., whether run by Democrats or Republicans, is as intent on containing India as it is on containing China. The issues of key importance to the U.S. are: the management of the rise of two ``great powers'' - China and India - and the continued management of the decline of another ``great power'', the Russian Federation.

So far as the U.S. is concerned, China (coalescing with Islamic extremists and Russia) is without doubt the primary contradiction. India (so long as its sense of self-importance is tactfully, assiduously, catered to by the West) is a relatively minor concern.

To put it another way, the U.S. is attracted to India not because our ``strategic value'' is greater, but because our nuisance value is smaller. ``Samajhne waale samajh gaye hain, naa samjhe wo adaani hain.''

At the rate we are going west, while Russia and China turn east, India might soon find itself with the U.S. as its nearest neighbour - though the U.S. itself will continue to have many nearer and dearer neighbours; both before and after we have outlived our utility. Nevertheless, Jaswant has no qualms about India leading from the front (and thereby stepping into the direct line of fire) in the battle against Islamic terror; not only in Kashmir, but in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well - and in the related battle against drug trafficking, the huge funds from which lubricate the terror machine, and make it easier for it to operate; by subverting administration, and by sabotaging a sense of community.

Though, come to think of it, so long as the VHP and the Bajrang Dal are around, the last of these we will be able to accomplish on our own without help from anyone else. The point is that, what started off as an effort to tackle militancy in Kashmir, may inadvertently end with our having a Talibanised Afghanistan at (and, indeed, within) our borders; instead of merely the failed state of Pakistan.

The third major strand of Jaswant's strategic thought is that we have been at the receiving end for too long; thanks to our peace- loving nature, and the policy of limited retaliation. Elaborating on this he notes that, historically:

Adversaries were confronted only after invasion; then too, on a ground of their choosing. They were never pursued (beyond our boundaries). Threats were not recognised until they actually occurred; they were neither anticipated nor neutralised before they could actually materialise.

With reference to the operations in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948, Jaswant complains that: Operations were limited to the tactical. The strategic objective of denying routes of ingress, denying lines of communication and supply, were not even examined. Air power was not offensively employed; bridges and road arteries reaching into J & K were left entirely untouched. To pulverise the adversary's capacity to strike again was not spelt out as a military task; a simple pushing back of the Pakistani military became the primary goal.

Instead, Jaswant feels, India should reserve the right to strike back in any manner at any time and place and target we choose. Anticipatory strikes must definitely not be ruled out. As a corollary, we should urgently develop a hi-tech air force (consisting of missiles as well as planes; and, though Jaswant fails to mention it, air defences); and abandon once and for all the policy of using the air force only for the limited purpose of supporting the ground operations of the army.

As for the navy, Jaswant complains that the ``political-military class'' have failed to live up to the ``natural destiny'' of India: with its ``oceanic boundaries'' running from ``the southern fringes of Asia to the east coast of Africa, and the northern shores of Australia. Besides, India lies between the choke points of the Suez Canal in the west and the Straits of Malacca in the east. As a consequence, the (growth of the) Indian Navy (has been unnaturally stunted;) it has remained a coastal protection force.''

India, clearly, is readying for take-off. Meanwhile, Jaswant has launched us into a jehad of his own - against the jehadis. Since he believes that ``India is a Hindu nation,'' and that ``the Hindus do not see things the way others do,'' it would be appropriate to share with him some words of wisdom handed down to us from ancient times.

- A king must make his home base secure before pursuing larger ambitions.

- War is inherently risky; no matter how carefully you plan, there is no saying what will come of it.

- Victories must be won without battles; the wise do not speak highly of victories won through battles.

SUDHANSHU RANADE

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