Making coalitions work

By K. K. Katyal

LONG LIVE coalitions. Down with coalitions. This is what the recent developments in the political arena add upto. One section of the political establishment, the Congress(I), modified its earlier stand against power-sharing, thus widening the acceptability of this arrangement. The other segment, the BJP and its allies, made a total mess of the coalition put together with great fanfare, bringing it into disrepute. This conflict, in a nutshell, represents the tragedy of the present-day politics. As things stand, there is no escape from a coalition at the Centre, but the record of political players establishes their utter incapacity to make a good job of it. The country's woes, on this count, could end only if either there is a switch back to the single-party majority - of which there is no likelihood, as of now - or we learn to make a success of coalitions. The hope that the political elite, learning from the process of trial and error, would be able to get over the hiccups of the transition has not materialised. In the foreseeable future, therefore, the nation should reconcile itself to being run by inefficient, shaky coalitions, operated by petty-minded politicians. In the process, the country may take one step forward, another backward - this may well be the best case scenario. On balance, the outlook is far from inspiring.

The Congress(I) took nearly five long years in political wilderness to realise the inevitability of coalitions for its return to office. Till recently, it continued to live on the glory of the past, of the decades of the monopoly of power at the Centre. It now recognised the sea-change brought about by new political dynamics. That was the meaning of the political resolution, adopted by the Congress(I) plenary at Bangalore earlier this month.

The formulation on ``electoral alliances and coalition governments'' did not mince words in reversing the line, taken not long ago, at the party conclave at Pachmarhi (where it pledged to work towards the restoration of the party to primacy in national affairs). Maintaining that the Pachmarhi line was misunderstood, the Congress(I) clarified ``that, taking into account the present political scenario, the party would be prepared to enter into appropriate electoral or coalition arrangements with secular parties on the basis of mutual understanding but always without compromising its basic ideology.'' The Congress(I), added the awkwardly-worded resolution, ``will play a proactive role in restoring secular governance to this country''. In doing so, it ruled out any understanding with the ``communal forces like the BJP or any party consorting with such communal forces'', and emphasised its political priority of forestalling the BJP ``from pursuing its ulterior motive of pushing forward its core communal agenda''.

Bangalore-watchers missed one crucial point - that the Congress(I) chose to commit itself to the coalition well before Tehelka burst on the political scene. It needed to be clearly understood that the draft of the political resolution, barring one (related to the expose) of the 31 pages, was finalised some weeks ago. But since it was presented to the plenary and adopted by it after Tehelka had shaken the country, it was misconstrued as the party's response to the changed situation. On its part, the Congress(I) leadership made no attempts to clarify that the change in its stand on coalitions predated the damage done to the ruling alliance by the expose. As such, its resolve to ``play a proactive role'' was interpreted as its plan of action in the new context. These words were even amplified to suggest initiatives by the Congress(I) to contact others in the Opposition to explore the chances of an alternative. Based as it was on a wrong assumption, this conclusion had no factual basis.

The misplaced view - and the haste with which it was spread - served to bring out the contradictions in the non-NDA or non-BJP formations. This was evident from queries in the midst of speculative reports. Would the Congress(I) and the CPI(M) be able to agree on an agenda, especially on economic matters? Would not the combined bid of the Congress(I) and the Mamata party to work for the ouster of the Left Front Government in West Bengal strain the ties of the non-BJP parties at the Centre? Would the Uttar Pradesh stalwart, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav, and his Samajwadi Party give up their opposition to the Congress(I)? Would the Congress(I) president, Ms. Sonia Gandhi, and Mr. Yadav be able to shed mutual allergy?

The Congress(I) reversed the Pachmarhi line after due consideration, taking into account the consequences of its ``no'' to a coalition in 1999 after the loss of majority of the first Vajpayee Government. And the ``proactive role'' signified the party's keenness to ensure against a passive stand. For, was it not the reluctance to play a ``proactive role'' that found the Congress(I) supporting a non-BJP Government (of the United Front) without sharing power? The negative speculative talk in the last fortnight damaged the case and concept of a ``non-BJP coalition''.

This at a time when the existing coalition, which appeared firmly placed till recently, damned itself - with the president of the leading constituent, the BJP, caught by camera while accepting money from an ``arms dealer'' and the leader of another constituent, the Samata Party, figuring in a dubious role and the bickerings among the partners acquiring unmanageable proportions. Even before the latest unseemly spectacle unfolded itself, the compulsions of State-centric politics had taken a heavy toll - first, of decision-taking processes and, then, of the cohesion of the alliance. The way the economically sound decisions on the hike in the prices of petroleum products and increase in railway fares were thwarted was one unhappy chapter of the coalition's functioning, another - and more damaging - being the ease with which some of the constituents were prepared to sacrifice the cause of the coalition for the sake of their interests in their States. The PMK left the combine because it felt it could improve its prospects in the coming Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu by swinging over to the non-NDA party, the AIADMK. Ms. Mamata Banerjee had all along given priority to her West Bengal agenda over her role as the Central Minister or as the leader of a constituent of the coalition. This was a mockery of the federal principles, supposed to be served better in a coalition rather than by a single-party Government. What else is the meaning of the wrecking of the coalition on the basis of narrow State- specific political factors?

The series of experiments with coalitions has been far from happy, as was evident from the fact of two general elections in three years (1996-1999). The United Front coalitions, the first led by Mr. H. D. Deve Gowda and the second by Mr. I. K. Gujral, collapsed because of their reliance on an external prop - the outside support of the Congress(I). Its withdrawal first led to the change of leadership and, later, to the fall of the Government. The instability of that power-sharing arrangement was rightly ascribed to the artificiality - of the largest party choosing not to join the Government. It would not have met the sorry fate had it rested on the largest force - this was how the causes for the instability were rightly diagnosed. The BJP-led coalitions did not suffer from this handicap - the first Vajpayee Government was led by the BJP, by far the biggest constituent as also the largest single party in the Lok Sabha. And, yet, it came to grief. The present dispension, too, revolved round the largest force - the BJP again - and, unlike its predecessor, had a lead of more than 30 over the combined but disparate opposition. The margin is now reduced by the exit of the PMK and the Trinamool Congress and, as a result, the support of the Telugu Desam from outside holds the key to the continuance of the coalition. The BJP-led Governments did not have the disadvantage that was the undoing of the U.F. predecessors and yet stability proved elusive (it was the fall, in one case, and deep worries about survival, in the second).

The reasons for the phenomenon witnessed since 1996 are deeper. Numbers are, no doubt, important but unless the political establishment imbibes a true coalition culture, stability will not be possible. Coalition dharma finds wide acceptance but what about coalition karma?

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : The odyssey of Mir
Next     : Globalisation - an American perspective