India, U.S. and Gulf security

By C. Raja Mohan

EXPLORING THE prospects for political cooperation with the United States in the Indian Ocean area, the Gulf in particular, must be at the top of the agenda of the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, when he travels to Washington next week for the important engagement with the Bush administration. Although Mr. Singh's talks in the U.S. will cover a wide range of issues - old and new - it is the Indian Ocean that offers a new template to develop the much talked about ``natural alliance'' between the two nations.

Mr. Singh is expected to meet the top layer of the Bush national security team next week. The first substantive interaction between the Government and the key players of the Bush administration is unlikely to go into too much detail. That the Bush administration has not yet fully settled down suggests the discussions will have to be in the nature of setting a broad direction for future Indo-U.S. cooperation.

The idea of working together in the Indian Ocean has come from the U.S. Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell, himself. In his Senate confirmation hearings a few weeks ago, Gen. Powell talked about India's potential for maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and its vast periphery, and the importance of the U.S. supporting such a role. These first substantive comments by the Bush administration on India suggest how radically the conception of Indo-U.S. relations might be changing not just from the Cold War period but also from the Clinton era.

During the Cold War period, India was deeply uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and had opposed it through such slogans as ``Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace''. The U.S., on the other hand, saw India as an ally of the Soviet Union, and in pursuing its rivalry with Moscow in the Indian Ocean, Washington tried to limit New Delhi's influence in the region.

But that framework has long been buried. The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and the liberation of Kuwait by the U.S. made explicit the reality that Washington remains the principal bulwark of regional security in the Gulf. Most of the Gulf states would like to see a continuing American security role in the region. They have accepted the vastly increased American military presence in the Indian Ocean and the setting up of the U.S. Fifth Fleet after the Gulf War.

India, too has discarded its old diplomatic baggage on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It is one thing to demand that outsiders get out of the Indian Ocean and another to create a security structure that addresses the concerns of the weaker states vis-a-vis their stronger and aggressive neighbours. All the rhetoric of security cooperation among regional non-aligned states vanished into thin air when Iraq pushed Kuwait off the map in 1990. And it was the U.S. military intervention in the Gulf that restored Kuwait as a state. There is no running away from that fact.

Equally important for India is the reality that dominance in the Gulf by a distant power like the U.S. may be preferable to the exercise of hegemony by a local power, say one of India's neighbours. Put in a different way, it is in New Delhi's best interest that security in the region is maintained by a coalition of powers, including India and the U.S., who share similar political objectives such as sustaining political moderation, economic modernisation and regional stability.

Gen. Powell's focus on the Indian Ocean as a potential area for Indo-U.S. cooperation is important for another reason. For years, India has sought a framework for Indo-U.S. relations that looks beyond the Pakistan question. New Delhi's hopes after the Cold War for such a shift in Washington did not materialise, thanks to the emphasis of the Clinton administration on non-proliferation in the subcontinent and the Indo-Pak tensions over Kashmir. Although the former U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, talked about a broader framework for Indo-U.S. relations, his focus remained steadfast on one theme - ``Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint''.

Gen. Powell's remarks suggest there may be a different approach in the offing. But there should be no expectation in India that the U.S. is about to give up its long-standing relationship with Pakistan. That relationship is likely to evolve on its merits and demerits. Tensions between India and Pakistan, nuclear or otherwise, would always draw international attention. But bilateral ties defined on a broader basis would certainly help reduce the salience of Pakistan in Indo-U.S. relationship.

What could be the broad elements of Indo-U.S. cooperation in the Indian Ocean? First, there is energy security. India has become one of the world's largest importers of petroleum products. As its economy grows, India's reliance on the Gulf for its energy needs will continue to increase. The U.S. remains the principal external influence on the shape of the world's petroleum market. India and the U.S. have a common interest in ensuring a steady flow of oil from the Gulf at reasonable prices.

Second, with the volatility of the oil market and the growing dependence of East and South-East Asia on the energy resources of the Gulf, preserving the sea lanes of communication between the Gulf and the eastern parts of Asia has become a vital necessity. India, which straddles these sea lanes running through the Indian Ocean, and the U.S., the principal naval power in the region, could indeed do a lot together.

There has been talk for many years about intensifying cooperation between the two navies. But the uncertain defence relations between the two in the last decade have prevented significant naval interaction. If the Bush administration is serious about cooperation with India in the Indian Ocean region, it needs to immediately lift the restrictions on defence interaction imposed by Washington after India's nuclear tests in May 1998.

Third, New Delhi has a huge stake in the economic prosperity of the Gulf, home to a large number of Indian expatriate workers and a big market for Indian goods and services. The U.S. could play a positive role in promoting greater energy and economic integration between India and the Gulf which could form the nucleus of a broader economic and security community in the Indian Ocean littoral.

Finally, both India and the U.S. have a major interest in promoting political stability in the region that is threatened by religious extremism and international terrorism. New Delhi and Washington must find an institutional framework for sustained political consultations on Gulf security. Such a mechanism could help reduce the many misperceptions of each other's policy and real political differences on how best to deal with the complex situation in the Gulf. For example, the Indo-U.S. divergence on Iraq stands out.

However, there is a much greater possibility today for harmonising the Indian and American positions on the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. New Delhi's approach to the Gulf has acquired greater pragmatism and sophistication, as part its greater diplomatic activism in the region. It has reached out to countries such as Saudi Arabia which it had neglected in the past. It is strengthening ties with traditional friends like Oman and consolidating the relationship with Iran.

But New Delhi does need to work out a hierarchy of objectives in the region, as well as a conscious strategy for pursuing them through international and regional cooperation. Meanwhile, there is a great divide in Washington on Gulf policy, which is being reviewed and is likely to be recast in the coming months. But the parallelism of Indian and American strategic interests in the Gulf is real, and Mr. Jaswant Singh must try and build on them.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : The continuing farce
Next     : Bangladesh: transformation & turmoil - II