U.S.-China military brinkmanship

By V. R. Raghavan

THE STANDOFF between the U.S. and China over the spy plane incident is revealing in the approaches they have taken on finding a solution to an awkward incident. The event had taken both countries by surprise. The response of the leaderships reveals a great deal about the nature of the relationship they are attempting to build. The incident is indicative of the way the two systems respond to conflict and the way public opinion influences such responses. The U.S. and the Chinese leaderships have each attempted to obtain a larger gain even as they have put in place mechanisms for resolving the situation and to put the incident behind them.

The U.S. surveillance over Chinese waters and naval activity has gone on for over 40 years. As the Chinese naval capabilities improved, the U.S. surveillance increased both in frequency and persistence. Recently China had acquired two Russian warships and these had been put to some intensive work on the high seas. The U.S. surveillance had intensified and a number of flights had taken place close over these warships. The Chinese for their part had for some time taken to challenging the surveillance flights by aggressive fighter aircraft action. This involved flying extremely close to the slow-moving surveillance aircraft, gesturing to the U.S. pilots and even dangerous manoeuvres under and above the surveillance aircraft. In the more sensitive portions of its coastline, China had notified a few exclusion zones. The incident occurred close to one such area.

It is apparent from what has been estimated so far that there was an accident involving the U.S. and Chinese aircraft. In a dangerous and threatening manoeuvre, a Chinese fighter aircraft attempted to come up ahead of the U.S. plane from below it. There was an error of judgment on the part of one or both pilots and both aircrafts were damaged. Photographs show the nose cone of the U.S. aircraft sheared off and at least one propeller damaged. The Chinese aircraft was disabled enough for the pilot - who was probably injured - to eject. The pilot has in all likelihood perished. Another Chinese pilot was witness to the accident and was in fact a party to the manoeuvre. His version of the event is yet to be made known. The U.S. crew knew all along what was happening until the accident occurred. They then flew in a disabled condition to the Chinese airfield and made a good job of landing safely. The crew had a little over 20 minutes to destroy the surveillance equipment and data, while getting ready for what could have been a catastrophic end.

The Chinese had on hand a technical windfall of a surveillance aircraft and the political advantage of the U.S. crew being captive. The aircraft was stripped of all its secrets and the crew was put through questioning under threat to obtain information on the nature of their work and on the intelligence they had collected. The crew in Chinese custody created great public pressure on the U.S. administration for their safe return. Every additional day of the crew in Chinese custody unleashed American memories of the Iran hostage drama, and the year-long Pueblo surveillance ship ordeal. As expected, yellow ribbons tied to trees quickly made their appearance in areas where the families of the American crew lived. The administration was forced to rope in loyal Republicans and think-tank analysts to certify the efficiency with which it was dealing with the matter. The U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, got low ratings for his lack of involvement and sense of urgency in getting the crew released.

The U.S. response was initially based on the imperative of retaining its superpower image, and its claim to leadership of the free world. A demonstration of the limits of U.S. capabilities could do untold harm to the confidence of its allies. As for China, the incident presented an opportunity to demonstrate that it can stand up to the superpower and extract a settlement on equal terms. It promptly accused the U.S. of hostile action and arrogance and demanded an apology. It wanted the U.S. to admit to willful wrong-doing. The Chinese President, Mr. Jiang Zemin, left on a scheduled tour abroad, leaving the distinct impression that his country would take its time resolving the matter.

The U.S. claimed the accident occurred over international waters, and that its aircraft was justified in entering and landing in Chinese territory while in distress. It demanded that since the crew of the aircraft were in uniform and on legitimate duty, they could not be treated as spies and held prisoners. The reality was that with its aircraft and crew in Chinese hands, the U.S. had very limited options. In international law it would be very difficult to confirm or deny that the accident occurred in international air space. The U.S. legal experts opined that there were no objective adjudicators available to conclusively decide the issue. They declared approaching the International Court of Justice as too slow a process to contemplate recourse to it. Left with rapidly receding choices, the U.S. authorities opted for softer options.

The administration's spin doctors then came up with the idea of creative solutions being the need of the hour, rather than the technicalities of who was right. It evolved the policy of talking firm in public and dealing soft behind the scenes. It put out arguments about China's economic needs from the U.S. and refused an apology. In a nuanced set of moves, the U.S. Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell, expressed regret over the loss of the Chinese pilot and aircraft, implying some U.S. involvement in the incident. Before the Chinese could reject the expression of regret as inadequate, Mr. Bush reiterated the regret over the Chinese loss. In hectic behind-the-scenes activity, the U.S. prevailed upon the Chinese to allow access to the crew to confirm their safety. After ensuring the crew were safe, it brought on parents of some of the crew members to talk in patriotic terms of the duty their son was performing. This took some of the sting out of the domestic criticism and gave the administration time to negotiate without being driven by the pressure of public opinion.

To counter public opinion in the U.S., the Chinese sent off a scathing letter from the wife of the missing pilot addressed to Mr. Bush. Chinese television channels in the U.S. also criticised the emphasis placed solely on American interests. The U.S. quickly came around to working out a face-saving formula. The Chinese used the U.S. crew to gain time, put pressure on the Bush administration, and force a conciliatory conduct on it. There is a emerging debate in the U.S. on who really won in the standoff. To stave off further criticism, the administration has come up with strong language over what can be done to China on the issue of trade, human rights and its claims to host the Olympics. The U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, who was kept off the media during the crisis, came up with films of Chinese aggressive flying in the past. The fact is that the U.S. demonstrated great concern for the safe return of its military personnel and did everything short of offering a formal apology.

The incident shows the inherent risks in continuing to demonstrate military power unilaterally and routinely. It also demonstrates the two contradictory strands of policy which China and the U.S. have adopted. On the one hand, there is the urge to engage in and benefit from economic and trade relations between the two countries. There is, on the other hand, the continuing urge to contain and confront each other in geopolitical and military terms. The Chinese have gained through the incident an advantage in technical and political terms, and more in building the image of a power which cannot be trifled with. The U.S. has got away with a military embarrassment which could have been worse. Astute foreign policy management played a large part in retrieving the situation created by military brinkmanship. Therein rest the lessons for the future.

(The writer is currently a Fellow with the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford University.)

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