Redress of public grievances

CORRUPTION IN public services, specially at the delivery end of the system, is extremely harassing to the mass of lower middle class people who have to deal with the field staff in such matters as water supply, electricity, construction or alterations to small residential houses, sales-tax assessment in small business, securing the benefits of various welfare schemes launched by government, school admissions, medical service in public hospitals, and so on in daily life.

The first and foremost concern of the victims of such corruption is the prompt and effective redress of their grievance that arises from the delay or denial of service to them by the staff concerned. Preferring a formal complaint against the erring staff, later participating in the enquiry process against them and getting them punished is only secondary in the view of the victims of corruption. In many departments which are notorious for exaction of mamool bribes for services rendered, the victims are afraid of reprisals from the department as a whole if they formally complain against any individual staff. All our anti- corruption measures have to reckon with this ground reality.

Vital gap

The law to deal with corruption, namely the Prevention of Corruption Act, the investigating agency, disciplinary procedures and court trials in the existing system are all designed to punish the corrupt personnel. This system has been progressively strengthened in the last 50 years but corruption has only increased, in public experience and perception. What is more deplorable, nothing concrete and effective has been devised to redress the grievances of victims of corruption. Wrongs are not set right and the corrupt departments' stranglehold on common people has remained tight. It is time the institutionalised anti- corruption measures covered this vital gap in the system.

Public grievances arising from maladministration were sought to be redressed by an authority called Ombudsman which was first conceived in Sweden in 1809 as an autonomous, independent inquisitorial authority to inquire into complaints of transgression of law by administrative authority in the course of handling administrative affairs, illegality or delays in reaching decisions, discourtesy or rudeness, unfairness, bias, incompetence, high-handedness, mistakes, failure to respond, furnishing misleading statements, etc. Similar institutions of Ombudsman with some modifications regarding powers and responsibilities were established in Finland in 1819, Denmark in 1953, New Zealand in 1962, Norway in 1963, United Kingdom in 1966 and Austraila in 1976.

A statutory body of this type, called Lok Pal, to function at the Centre, and similar bodies called Lok Ayuktas in the States were first recommended by the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) headed by Morarji Desai, set up by the Government of India in 1966. In its interim report on ``Problems of redress of citizens' grievances'' the ARC had emphasised the following main features of these statutory bodies.

(i) They should be demonstrably independent and impartial.

(ii) Process of appointment of members of these statutory bodies should be objective and free from political or any other bias.

(iii) The status of the members should compare with that of a judge of High Court/Supreme Court.

(iv) They should be empowered to deal with all matters in the discretionary field involving acts of corruption, favouritism, injustice or prejudice of any kind.

(v) They should have statutory powers to obtain all information relevant to their duties.

(vi) They should be prohibited from deriving any benefit or pecuniary advantage from the government after they demit office in the Lok Pal/Lok Ayukta, except the pension and allied benefits to which they would be entitled in the normal course.

Central legislation for this purpose was taken up in the form of the Lok Pal Bill in 1968. This Bill contemplated enquiries into complaints in regard to not only corruption but also acts involving favouritism, discrimination, callous negligence, undue delay, arbitrary or malafide exercise of discretion/power resulting in harm and injustice to citizens. This legislation fell through because of the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in 1971. Attempts were again made in 1971 itself and later in 1977, 1985, and 1989 to reintroduce the Bill in different forms but all the Bills failed to come to the final stage of getting passed in Parliament. The proposed new Lok Pal Bill is an attempt by the present Central Government to enact the much awaited legislation.

Not desirable

The Lok Pal as first perceived in 1968 was focussed on redress of citizens' grievances arising from maladministration. However, emphasis in the subsequent Bills shifted to mere investigation into specific acts of corruption with a view to punish the wrongdoers. From the point view of the people who are harassed and aggrieved by maladministration, such a bill will be welcome only if it includes the aspect of grievance redress within its ambit.

In the recent years the Supreme Court and High Courts have found it necessary, in the interests of impartial administration of law and justice, to intervene even at the stage of investigation and direct the course of investigation by the CBI or the State police in some sensational cases against politically influential accused. Investigations in all such cases need to be insulated against extraneous interference as a regular measure in future. However, it is not desirable that the Supreme Court or High Courts themselves get involved in this directing process. It would detract from the judicial image of the courts to get drawn into the executive arena of field investigation. Further, their objectivity and fairness in deciding appeals arising from such cases at a later stage would appear somewhat dented because of their earlier substantial involvement at the stage of investigation itself. Therefore, a more acceptable and desirable alternative would be to make it statutorily possible for a high powered judicially oriented body within the existing vigilance set-up itself to monitor investigations in specified cases and ensure their fair and impartial course.

Effective arrangement

The most practicable and effective arrangement to meet all the purposes noted above would be to merge the existing Central Vigilance Commission and the proposed Lok Pal into a multi-member apex body, say with a chairman and two members. The chairman will primarily perform the functions of the Lok Pal, while one member will perform the CVC's role and the other will focus on grievance-redress and have the statutory powers to intervene effectively and set right the wrong resulting from corruption and mala fide administrative action. In this totality of its functions this apex body can effectively oversee all anti- corruption measures in administration and also function as an Ombudsman for the redress of grievances.

The Justice Ramanujam Committee for Administrative Reforms and Prevention of Corruption constituted by the Tamil Nadu Government in 1996 had gone into this matter in detail and had recommended such a comprehensive apex body at the State level, to be called the State Vigilance Commission. It would be supported by `grievance-redress-cells' in the districts within easy reach of the affected people. The committee had also furnished a comprehensive draft Bill for this purpose along with its report. Central legislation on similar lines for expanding the Central Vigilance Commission could be taken up immediately to bring about an integrated holistic approach to the problem of malfeasance in administration. The proposed Lok Pal Bill should be carefully drafted to cover all the requirements of public expectation. The draft Bill appended to the Ramanujam Committee's Report could well serve as a working paper to be crafted further by the legal pundits at the Centre. A mere rehash of the Lok Pal Bill of the previous years will not do in the present times. A statutorily empowered multi-member apex body as suggested in this article has to be brought into position quickly at the Centre and in the States to provide relief to the harassed victims of corruption in public services.

Fear of reprisal

The employees in any department know quite a lot about the existing malpractices in the department. Some of the new entrants in the department, in their zeal and enthusiasm for cleanliness in public service, may be anxious to bring all such information to the notice of senior officers for corrective action. But they would hesitate to prefer written complaints about corruption at higher levels because of fear of reprisal at the hands of corrupt officials above them. The reprisal may take the form of arbitrary transfer to a far away place, deliberate downgrading of the employee's performance in the annual report written by his superior officer, prejudiced appraisal of his overall service and denying his promotion, deliberately magnifying minor faults and blackening his record by award of punishments, and so on.

Young recruits who join service at the middle level in the system may start their work with ideological motivation to participate in honest public service but may soon get disillusioned when they actually witness corrupt transactions at the levels above them. The system will go to decay if it does not sustain the ideological motivation of its young members. In such context, a regular policy has been evolved by the administration in the U.S. for the protection of ``whistle blowers'' in government departments. This policy is reflected in the provisions of section 2302(b)(8) in Chapter 23 - Merit System Principles introduced by the Civil Service Reform Act, 1978 (Public Law 95- 454). The Central Vigilance Commissioner may set up a small study group to examine the full implications of such a policy and recommend appropriate legislation for its adoption in a suitable form for sanitising our services.

C. V. NARASIMHAN

Former CBI Director

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