Securing the Delhi Summit

By V. R. Raghavan

THE VAJPAYEE-MUSHARRAF summit in New Delhi is not unlike two mountaineers deciding to meet atop Mount Everest, after agreeing to climb it from two different directions. Neither knows what shape the other would be in, nor is either sure of what would be said, after regaining breath in the rarefied air at the summit. Summits are rarely free from the danger of failure but they are also unique in the opportunities they offer. The key to success in summitry lies in total preparedness and down-to-earth expectations. The summit in Lahore lacked both, and led to the nasty surprise in Kargil followed by the emergence of a military Government in Pakistan. Lahore as a laudable idea for peace was ruined by the reality of a military regime in Pakistan. The New Delhi summit is taking place in the shadow of the failure of Lahore. While Mr. Vajpayee provides continuity with Lahore, the General remains a link with Kargil. Lack of realism and inadequate preparation for the summit, will only lead to a setback to the prospect of peace in the subcontinent, apart from all round embarrassment.

The heartening element is the carefully measured statements the two Governments have made thus far on their good intentions. The wild card is the seeming absence of an agreed agenda for the summit. In fact, the two sides have indicated their design to stick to known positions. Pakistan has left no doubt on the premium it places on the Jammu and Kashmir issue. India has responded by refusing to be tied to a one-point agenda for the summit. The measure of the summit's success can therefore at best be an uncertain one. That measure will largely depend on what each side is willing to invest in seeking peace, as opposed to merely managing conflict in Kashmir.

The experience of handling summit meetings in the past will play an important part at the New Delhi meeting. Mr. Vajpayee has a decided advantage in this with his long experience of face-to- face meetings with major political leaders in the world. He is also widely respected as a moderating influence. Gen. Musharraf, despite a temporary judicial legitimacy conferred on him by Pakistan's Supreme Court, carries the burden of his military baton and medals. His control over the Islamic militant groups is yet uncertain. His credibility as peacemaker is suspect after Kargil. He will be under the dual pressure to demonstrate his commitment to peace, and to satisfy the intractable militant organisations in Pakistan and Afghanistan on the future of Kashmir.

The New Delhi summit will be between two leaders who have not met before. What will they discuss and how will they respond to each other? The first will depend on an agenda, of which there is none in sight. It is possible to structure an agenda in which tensions are eased rather than raised. In the absence of an agreed agenda, there is the risk of surprises. Either of the leaders may find himself unprepared to deal with the surprise the other might spring at the meeting. Mr. Vajpayee's inherent courtesy and patience in hearing the other man's view is a reassuring factor. The General's record of blunt speaking, and penchant for treating complex issues in a style akin to a sand model exercise, will hopefully not be too much on display. Gen. Musharraf can, however, be relied upon to make up his own mind, uninfluenced by advice on traditional lines, about Mr. Vajpayee's desire to go beyond the existing formulations on Kashmir.

Summit meetings, in the absence of previously agreed solutions and initiatives, cannot be expected to bring about a magical outcome to please all contenders to a problem. Summits can, however, offer an invaluable opportunity to the two leaders to assess each other's calibre and commitment to stay the course on a long road to peace. In the limited time available between protocol, honour ceremonies and public appearances, the two leaders cannot be expected to undertake serious and detailed negotiations. They can, however, get to read each other's approach to the issues through a direct and personal chemistry. Based on a positive or negative chemistry, the two leaders can initiate and sustain a long term process of engagement. Mr. Vajpayee will come to know the man behind the uniform and hopefully Gen. Musharraf will notice the mind behind the Indian leader. In that lies the hope for restarting the peace process, which was attempted in Lahore but aborted at Kargil.

The New Delhi summit to succeed will have to satisfy both sides in the gains they obtain from it. Pakistan's Chief Executive has made clear that a gain on Kashmir would be his existential need from the summit. India is in no doubt that Kashmir must be tackled along with other long outstanding issues. While India seeks a wider dialogue to build confidence to go forward without inhibitions, Pakistan seeks primacy to Kashmir, to the exclusion of other issues. More importantly, while India seeks an end to violence in Kashmir as an essential need for a peace process, Pakistan seems determined to use violence as a catalyst to coerce India into a solution. These obviously irreconcilable positions will need to be tackled if the summit is to succeed. If Gen. Musharraf is going to be a long term presence on the Pakistani scene, he needs to be helped to correctly judge India's resolve on Kashmir. Indian determination to find a lasting outcome on Kashmir would also need an understanding of Gen. Musharraf's domestic compulsions. On that basis, the summit can initiate work on a framework for a sustained effort by both sides, to move beyond the strategic and political impasse.

The way to go forward towards a lasting relationship between India and Pakistan lies in ensuring that the New Delhi summit becomes the first of many between the two leaders. That the highest leaders of the two nations can meet regularly, even as they differ on key issues, will be the greatest assurance of peace in the South Asian region. That the two nuclear weapons states can agree to reducing the risks of conflicts getting out of hand will place a wholly new perspective on the nuclear flashpoint of the region. The possibility of the two Governments cooperating on finding resolution of the Kashmir issue will put out of reckoning numerous groups, who have assumed roles disproportionate to their marginal capabilities.

The success of the New Delhi summit requires both sides to agree on constructive measures to address each other's needs. India can offer raising the level of the Kashmir dialogue to a higher level. This is possible by appointing a Cabinet Minister-level interlocutor to undertake negotiations with a Pakistani counterpart. This measure would free the dialogue process from the constraints of limited briefs, which the Foreign Secretary- level meetings suffered from. A serious dialogue can then begin on Kashmir which would take into account the wishes of the people on both sides of the Line of Control. Pakistan can respond by demonstrating its capability to reign in the armed groups operating from its territory into Kashmir. The two Governments can also put into effect measures to implement the Memorandum of Understanding on reducing nuclear risks jointly agreed at Lahore. They can agree to relax the visa regimes and open additional transit points on the border. They can go further and permit greater interaction between their retired senior defence services officers, to build confidence amongst the two militaries. These measures would form the elements of a successful outcome, which would be greater than the sum total of it parts.

The New Delhi summit has more at stake than the Lahore summit envisaged. The ghost of Lahore should not be allowed to impede the next summit. The meeting, which is being held in the background of a failed summit and the prospect of an uncertain outcome, requires specific initiatives to obtain worthwhile results. A readiness to go forward by making realistic and constructive offers will allow both nations to benefit from the summit. Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf have the opportunity to make good on the positive outcomes possible from the summit. They are also in a position to do so, if they are both determined to break new ground.

(The writer is currently Fellow, Centre for International Studies and Cooperation, Stanford University.)

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