Summit expectations

By K. K. Katyal

EVEN AT the risk of sounding repetitive, the need for guarding against high expectations from the India- Pakistan summit needs to be stressed. It is equally necessary to avoid total pessimism or to write off, in advance, this first post-Kargil interaction as an exercise in futility. What then is a realistic estimate? Some small steps intended to set in motion an engagement process and the establishment of a mechanism or a framework for that purpose. Pakistan is certain to stress the core issue, while India will give priority to peace and security on the subcontinent and, in that context, call for steps to tackle all the problems, causing tensions, of course, with a pointed reference to Kashmir.

A suitable formulation may be evolved that takes care, on the one hand, of Pakistan's insistence on the centrality of Kashmir and, on the other, of India's concern over the totality of the relationship. Pakistan's plea for a time-bound process may not be practical, but the level of engagement may be raised. The task may be entrusted to the specially- authorised emissaries or representatives of the two heads, instead of the Foreign Secretaries as used to be the case in the past. The two sides may have some difficulty in agreeing on the shape of the ``framework''. Pakistan may like it to be high-profile and Kashmir-centric. India's preference would be for addressing the entire gamut of relations, Kashmir not excluded.

This may roughly be the result of the two-day talks between the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Pakistan's President and Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf. Anything more than that will be a pleasant surprise, anything less will be a disappointment.

The words ``chemistry'', ``personal rapport'', one can be sure, will recur in the coverage of the summit and the encounter between a seasoned politician and a professional soldier will be viewed from all angles. The fact that the two leaders had met at Lahore (at the Punjab Governor's House) soon after Mr. Vajpayee's arrival there by bus in February 1999 and their three telephonic conversations since the invitation for talks will come handy to the media in their descriptives. Considering the caution and restraint shown by the two sides in the run-up to the summit, the chances of a hiccup or a mishap are to be discounted. They will disperse to meet again - hopefully, in New York, on the occasion of the U.N. General Assembly session, beginning in September, and on the sidelines of the SAARC summit towards the end of the year, in Kathmandu. The outcome may well be modest but positive.

Of late, a thoughtless utterance from one side did jar the other, but the situation remained manageable. One such instance was Gen. Musharraf's reported remark that American pressure had led Mr. Vajpayee to invite him. The Prime Minister was deeply pained by this ungracious view and, perhaps, the other side was told about it. The report was denied, with remarkable promptness. Likewise, Islamabad was unhappy with stories in the Indian media on divisions in the Pakistan army. Suitable clarifications were provided by some papers which carried the report.

The discussions in New Delhi and Agra may, for the most part, cover the modalities for resolving the outstanding problems. The substantive aspect, especially of Kashmir, may have to be taken up later at other levels, of course, under the political mandate of the heads. New Delhi has been good on tactics, bad on strategies. That, unfortunately was the case since the time of the first initiative, the Ramzan ceasefire. The gains of the ceasefire were allowed to be dissipated in the absence of an action plan at the political level. Had Mr. K. C. Pant, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, been entrusted in November last year with the mission he was given months later, it would have been a different story. The people in Jammu and Kashmir welcomed the ceasefire and the promise of a respite from violence and terrorism. But that relief soon yielded place to alienation, caused by the action of the security forces in controlling some ugly situations. True, the problem was deliberately created by the militants as part of a considered move to wreck the peace process but the administration could have taken care to diffuse the tension, instead of accentuating it. Had Mr. Pant been in position then, all this may have been averted.

Now there was another master-stroke - the invitation for a summit. The impact was tremendous. Mr. Vajpayee, for a while, seemed the master of the situation - in a position to influence the shape of events. The other side was confused, groping for the reasons that prompted the Indian initiative. Good that far. There was nothing to suggest that India was clear on the road-map, on the next substantive move on Kashmir. Pakistan did take time to gather its wits but soon it was proclaiming from the roof-tops, as it were, its known stand on Kashmir - seeking to make full use of the advantage accruing to it from its role in organising terrorist activities in the State and in communalising the situation. It sought to occupy a high ground of reasonableness by continuously talking of the ``Kashmiri sentiments'', calling for the involvement of the true ``representatives'' of the State. It succeeded in hiding the reality - its involvement in terrorist violence and in projecting the pro-Pakistan elements as the true representatives of the people.

For some strange reason, New Delhi found itself in a reactive mould. Pakistan wanted the Hurriyat leaders to be given an opportunity to meet Gen. Musharraf. India rejected the suggestion. New Delhi, no doubt, was on a strong footing - obviously, it could not agree to an arrangement that could have been projected as a trilateral dialogue. As seen by New Delhi, the Hurriyat (or other representatives) had to deal with it but they chose not to do so (as was evident from their refusal to meet Mr. Pant). And yet it was the Centre that appeared on the defensive. The same was the case in regard to the theory of U.S. pressure behind the Vajpayee invitation.

Some time back, the Centre had a chance to turn the debate away from ``azadi'' or pro-Pakistan options. That was when the Kashmir Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, and, at his initiative, the Assembly adopted an autonomy package. The Sangh Parivar and the Central Government reacted sharply, imputing all manner of motives to the sponsors of the autonomy move. Dr. Abdullah might have been prompted by his personal calculations.

In the absence of an officially-backed, straightforward move by New Delhi, the air is thick with the talk of mysterious formulae and propositions for the final settlement of the Kashmir issue. There is the most-talked about proposal, mooted by a group claiming high connections in the two countries as well as the U.S. It revolves round the trifurcation of the State, with Jammu and Ladakh remaining in India, ``Azad'' Kashmir in Pakistan, with some innovative arrangements, either diluted Indian sovereignty or division, for the Valley. Then there was the soft-border option, mentioned occasionally both in India and Pakistan. If a week-end report in the daily Dawn were to be believed, it may emerge as a serious proposition. Quoting diplomatic sources, the Dawn story said: ``There is a strong policy interest in Delhi which is willing to accept a solution to Kashmir short of its absorption in the Indian Union. If both sides of Kashmir are granted maximum autonomy, with the leaders of Kashmir joining hands to support a transit point of healthy diplomatic and trade interaction between India and Pakistan, Delhi may be happy with this arrangement.'' Vague but not quite baseless.

The progress of the resumed India-Pakistan dialogue is bound to be slow but it is worth pursuing. The fact that Pakistan is under a military ruler need not be a deterrent. The armed forces are certain to be a major factor in that country whether it has a ``democratic'' Government or military rule. It is better if they are part of the engagement process; otherwise there could be the danger of another Kargil - and a major setback to bilateral dealings.

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