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Chief Minister appointment - Governor sole judge
SOME VIEWS have been expressed that the power exercised by the
Governor in choosing Ms. Jayalalithaa as the Chief Minister of
Tamil Nadu is not correct and that it is violative of the
constitutional provisions. In particular, in the article
``Discretionary power of Governors'' (TheHindu, June 16), it is
stated that in the light of Articles 173(c) and 192 of the
Constitution the swearing-in of Ms. Jayalalithaa who is not a
member of the Legislative Assembly is violative of the
Constitutional Law and Convention. It is necessary to examine the
above views in the light of the provisions of the Constitution as
interpreted by various decisions of the apex court.
It is a fact that the nomination of Ms. Jayalalithaa to stand as
a candidate of the AIADMK for the election to the Assembly was
not accepted even though her appeal against her conviction was
pending in the High Court and though at about the same time Mr.
Balakrishna Pillai's nomination for the election to the Kerala
Assembly was accepted by the returning officer there despite his
conviction. Ms. Jayalalithaa sought the mandate of the electorate
in Tamil Nadu offering herself as the chief ministerial candidate
and obtained a massive mandate. The AIADMK Legislature Party
chose her as its leader. The Governor after satisfying herself
that Ms. Jayalalithaa enjoyed the confidence of the majority in
the Assembly appointed her as Chief Minister.
The real question therefore is whether Ms. Jayalalithaa being a
non-member of the Legislative Assembly could be appointed as
Chief Minister.
Not to be called in question
Article 163(1) of the Constitution provides that there shall be a
Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid
and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except
in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to
exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Article
163(2) states that if any question arises as respects which the
Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his
discretion, such decision of the Governor shall be final, and the
validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in
question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted
in his discretion. Article 164(1) provides that the Chief
Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other
Ministers shall be appointed on the advice of the Chief Minister.
Article 164(2) provides that the Council of Ministers shall be
collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the
State. Article 164(4) provides that a Minister who for any period
of six consecutive months is not a member of the legislature of
the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a
Minister.
The question whether a non-member of the legislature of a State
can be appointed as Chief Minister has been settled 30 years ago
by the Supreme Court. In AIR 1971 SC 1331 the Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court held that the appointment of Thribhuwan
Narain Singh as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh was
constitutional though he was not a member of either House of the
U.P. legislature at the time of his appointment. After referring
to Articles 163 and 164, the Supreme Court held that Clause (1)
of Article 164 does not provide ``any qualification for the
person to be selected by the Governor as the Chief Minister or
Minister and clause (2) makes it essential that the Council of
Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative
Assembly of the State and that this is the only condition that
the Constitution prescribes in this behalf.'' Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that the only condition to be satisfied for a
person to be appointed as Chief Minister is that he should
command the confidence of the House. The Court referred to
Article 177(1) and also to the constitutional provisions in
England, Australia and South Africa for arriving at the
conclusion that a non-member can be appointed as Chief Minister
for a period of six months.
A similar question arose regarding the appointment of K. P.
Tewari as a Minister in Uttar Pradesh though he was not a member
of the State legislature. The Supreme Court referred to its
earlier decision in the Thribhuwan Narain Singh case and held
that the appointment of K. P. Tewari as a Minister was valid. The
Supreme Court on quo warranto petition under Article 32 held in
AIR 1985 SC 282 that no material change had been brought about by
reason of the amendment of Article 173(a) of the Constitution in
the legal position that a person who is not a member of the State
legislature may be appointed as a Minister subject, of course, to
clause (4) of Article 164.
In July 1987 a question arose whether the appointment of Sitaram
Kesri as a Member of the Central Cabinet was legal as he was not
a member of either House of Parliament. The Supreme Court held in
AIR 1987 SC 1969 that to appoint a non-member of Parliament as a
Minister does not militate against the constitutional mechanism
nor against the democratic principles embodied in the
Constitution. The combined effect of Articles 75(5) and 88 is
that a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament
can be a Minister for six months. Though he would not have any
right to vote, he would be entitled to participate in the
proceedings thereof. The court in arriving at the above decision
referred to the speech of B. R. Ambedkar in the Constituent
Assembly which was as follows:
``Now with regard to the first point namely, that no person shall
be entitled to be appointed a Minister unless he is at the time
of his appointment an elected member of the House, I think it
forgets to take into consideration certain important matters
which cannot be overlooked. First is this and it is perfectly
possible to imagine that a person who is otherwise competent to
hold the post of a Minister has been defeated in a constituency
for some reason and which, although it may be perfectly good,
might have annoyed the constituency and he might have incurred
the displeasure of that particular constituency. It is not a
reason why a member so competent as that should not be permitted
to be appointed a Member of the Cabinet on the assumption that he
shall be able to get himself elected from the same constituency
or from another constituency. After all, the privilege that he is
permitted is a privilege that extends only to six months. It does
not confer a right on that individual to sit in the House being
(not?) elected at all. My second submission is that the fact that
a nominated Minister is a Member of the Cabinet does not either
violate the principle of collective responsibility nor does it
violate the principle of confidence because he is a member of the
Cabinet if he is proposed to accept the policy of the Cabinet,
stands part of the Cabinet and resigns with the Cabinet when he
ceases to have the confidence of the House, his membership of the
Cabinet does not in any way cause any inconvenience or breach of
the fundamental principles on which Parliamentary Government is
based. Therefore, this qualification in my judgment is quite
unnecessary.''
Appointment of Deve Gowda
In November 1997, a question arose whether the appointment of Mr.
H. D. Deve Gowda, as Prime Minister was valid when he was not a
member of Parliament. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier
decision in AIR 1971 SC 1331 and held that the appointment of Mr.
Deve Gowda as Prime Minister was legal and constitutional under
Article 75(5) which corresponds to Article 164(4). The court
expressed the view that the person who is appointed the Prime
Minister is chosen by the elected representatives of the people
and can occupy the position only if he enjoys the confidence of
the majority of the elected representatives in the Lok Sabha and
that the scheme of the Constitution permits such appointment. The
Supreme Court further observed as follows:
``Therefore, even though a Prime Minister is not a member of
either House of Parliament, once he is appointed he becomes
answerable to the House and so also his Ministers and the
principle of collective responsibility governs the democratic
process. Even if a person is not a member of the House, if he has
the support and confidence of the House, he can be chosen to head
the Council of Ministers without violating the norms of democracy
and the requirement of being accountable to the House would
ensure the smooth functioning of the democratic process. We,
therefore, find it difficult to subscribe to the petitioner's
contention that if a person who is not a member of the House is
chosen as Prime Minister, national interest would be jeoparadised
or that he would be running a great risk.''
In Shamsher Singh case AIR 1974 SC 2192 which is a decision of
the seven-judge Constitution Bench, Justice K. Iyer held that one
of the exceptions to the general rule that the Governor acts
always in accordance with the advice of the Ministers is that of
the appointment of Chief Minister. The learned judge held that
the appointment of Chief Minister by the Governor is restricted
by the paramount consideration that he should command a majority
in the House.
In AIR 1982 Gowhati 25 it was held that the action of the
Governor in appointing a Chief Minister cannot be questioned on
the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his
discretion and that the only check on the action of the Governor
is on the floor of the Assembly.
In M.P. Sharma's case (72 C.W.N. p.328) the Calcutta High Court
held that it does not see anything in the language of article
164(1), which imposes any restriction or condition upon the power
of the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister and that the
Governor in making the appointment of the Chief Minister under
Article 164(1) acts in his sole discretion and the exercise of
the discretion by the Governor cannot be called in question.
Referring to this judgment, H.M. Seervai, eminent jurist and
authority on Constitutional Law, in his book Constitutional Law
of India, Fourth Edition, Volume II, page 2065, has stated that
the above decision of the Calcutta High Court is clearly right.
Therefore, the view that the appointment of the present Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu who enjoys the confidence of the majority
of the Legislative Assembly is not constitutional is directly
contrary to the views specifically expressed by the Supreme Court
and also to the views of B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent
Assembly.
In appointing the present Chief Minister, the Governor has been
guided by the sole consideration that her party has absolute
majority in the Assembly and that she enjoys the confidence of
majority in the House. The Governor's action gives effect to the
people's mandate. Any other view would have created a
constitutional crisis.
The present Chief Minister does possess the qualification under
Article 173(c) read with Section 5(c) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, in that she is an elector in an Assembly
Constituency in the State of Tamil Nadu.
Equally, Article 192 of the Constitution referred to in the
article published on June 16 is not relevant. The scope of
Article 192 has been clearly explained by the Supreme Court in
Brundaban's case AIR 1965 SC 1892 referred to in that article
itself. In that case the Supreme Court has held that the
disqualification referred to in that Article should have been
incurred by a person subsequent to the election as a Member of
the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council. Article 192
refers to a subsequent disqualification after election as a
member. Disqualification prior to the election as a member will
have to be tried by the Election Tribunals. But supervening
disqualification incurred after election to the Legislative
Assembly is to be tried by the Election Commission though a
formal decision has to be pronounced by the Governor.
The scope of Article 192 has been explained by the Supreme Court
in the above case as follows:
``In regard to complaints made against the election of members to
the Legislative Assembly, the jurisdiction to decide such
complaints is left with the Election Tribunal under the relevant
provisions of the Act. That means that all allegations made
challenging the validity of the election of any member, have to
be tried by the Election Tribunals constituted by the Election
Commission. Similarly, all complaints in respect of
disqualifications subsequently incurred by the members who have
been validly elected, have, in substance, to be tried by the
Election Commission, though the decision in form has to be
pronounced by the Governor.''
It may be noted that the above observations of the Supreme Court
in Brundaban's case have been cited with approval by Justice K.
Iyer in paragraph 149 of the Judgment in Shamsher Singh's case.
Since the present Chief Minister has not yet become a member of
the Legislative Assembly, Article 192 has no relevance.
In the writer's view, the decision of the Governor in appointing
the present Chief Minister is legal, constitutional and does not
violate the basic structure of the Constitution. The decision of
the Supreme Court in the cases filed against her in the quo
warranto petition in the Supreme Court may be awaited.
S. VADIVELU
Former Law Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu
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