Does Musharraf have a fallback option?

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, JULY 11. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, a former Finance Minister of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto era and an active protagonist of India- Pakistan amity now, makes this interesting point in an article in the Dawn - that no one blamed the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, for taking unpopular decisions or for his failure to take popular steps but in Pakistan, the military rulers were squarely blamed when things went wrong under their dispensation.

Though he did not extend the argument to the present situation, the question may well be asked - whether Pakistan's President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, would not find himself on the receiving end in his country in case the Agra summit failed. And whether this realisation would spur the General into putting in his very best to avert a breakdown or a nil result?

The way Gen. Musharraf has sought to identify his mission with progress on Kashmir may not augur well. Going by objective reality, only a preliminary, small step to start the search for a solution seems a realistic expectation. Gen. Musharraf may well succeed in projecting it as an advance on the ``core issue''. But if he is unable to do so or if his words do not sound convincing to his countrymen, they may not take kindly to him. And when it comes to apportioning the blame, there will be none else to share it. That is the meaning of his exclusive supremacy in the present set-up.

Mr. Vajpayee is not placed that hopelessly - he can take failure in his stride. Unlike the General, his escape routes are not closed. What would be said in the case of a failure is that the General was not prepared to walk the ``high road'' to peace and prosperity, the objective with which Mr. Vajpayee extended the invitation for a summit meeting. There was nothing pathologically obsessive about the stand taken by India.

Mr. Vajpayee will not be blamed if there is no progress in the discussions on the ``entirety of relationship'', but Gen. Musharraf may have to do some hard explaining if the ``centrality of Kashmir'' is not established. What is the moral? The Pakistani leader would do well to revert to the earlier stance, when he talked of an ``open mind'' and ``flexibility''.

The game of blame worked differently in India and Pakistan in the past. In the case of the bus journey in February 1999, for instance. The Lahore peace process, which for a brief while appeared a roaring success, was undone by Kargil. In the final analysis, it did not hurt Mr. Vajpayee - he succeeded in projecting it as a case of betrayal by Pakistan (which, in fact, it was) and won a crucial election on that slogan. As against that, the Pakistani Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, had to pay heavily. Whatever the factors leading to the coup and his downfall, Kargil came in handy as a big handle against him.

In 1972, the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, agreed to a generous deal with the Pakistani boss of the day, Z. A. Bhutto, in the hope of permanent peace in Kashmir. She accepted Bhutto's plea not to make public his undertaking to convert the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir into the international border. Later, when Bhutto went back on his word and a crucial component of the Shimla exercise did not work, it was not Indira Gandhi but her advisers, P.N. Haksar and T.N. Kaul, who were blamed. It was stated that they prevailed upon her not to adopt a vindictive approach and be magnanimous as a victor, so as to avoid complications in the future.

In Pakistan, Bhutto was both hailed and lambasted. When it came to the blame, it was foisted on him exclusively. Though a civilian, he suffered the fate of military rulers.

The Dawn article mentions the past cases - of how the military rulers alone (not their advisers or Ministers) attracted the blame. To begin with Iskandar Mirza - ``Everybody blames him. Nobody blames the National Assembly or his Ministers, who elevated him to the high office and cooperated with him and signed on the files before he did, of abrogating the Constitution and imposing martial law in October 1958''.

Then Ayub Khan, the ``target of successive generations for the disservice he did to the country''. Here again, those who persuaded him to become the Field Marshal and collaborated with him in the deeds, leading to the country's debacle, did not get any critical notice. In 1971, Gen. Yahya Khan was regarded solely guilty for the country's break-up.

And as for Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, military ruler in the decade ending 1988, does anyone blame his other Generals, legal advisers or the intelligence set-up for the numerous misdeeds?

Gen. Musharraf may have become the President, but remains essentially a military ruler. As such, he cannot escape past logic.

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