Agra, just a beginning

By Malini Parthasarathy

For those of us who have been unswerving in expressing our belief these last two years, that there is no other possible course in relation to Pakistan except to resume an engagement of its leadership and its people, the fact that the Vajpayee Government has now overcome its reticence and is now reaching out to Pakistan's General Musharraf, signalling the end of New Delhi's hitherto inexplicable and unproductive stance, is very welcome. Certainly the Agra summit would represent a pinnacle to the hundreds of peace activists, scholars, diplomats and journalists who have been tirelessly striving for years on the unofficial tracks to end the decades of unnatural hostility and mutual misunderstanding between the divided people of India and Pakistan. It would be a sweet irony to savour for those who have often been gently chided for what was seen as their unrealistic naivete when they argued for reengaging Pakistan, to see President Musharraf now being welcomed with open arms by the Prime Minister.

The Vajpayee Government has embarked on a course which is being effusively described as ``positive unilateralism'', by which is meant the offering of a series of gestures and steps to Pakistan that are not tied to the imperative of reciprocity. In a sense, the adoption of this course reflects an acknowledgment of a core premise of the argument that advocates of normalisation have been making for years - that as the bigger power, it is India which should take the initiative in creating a more conducive framework for engagement with Pakistan, and that negotiating concepts such as the doctrine of reciprocity which has hitherto coloured every official Indian move towards Pakistan have only stymied progress in the effort to normalise relations with the estranged neighbour.

It is now important that having acknowledged albeit belatedly the necessity of adopting this more creative and promising strategic approach that undeniably broadens the scope of the framework of bilateral engagement, whether or not to the liking of the hardliners in India and Pakistan, the Government should stay the course. There is an implicit risk in the abrupt change of diplomatic tack that has taken place these last few months that saw New Delhi suddenly jettison its loudly stated refusal to engage the ``architect of Kargil'' in the sense that such a quick turnaround has inherent volatility which needs to be guarded against. There is a possibility that the expectations that are steadily being built up, fuelled by the international attention, the media hype and the excitement would put too much pressure on the Agra summit. Should indeed the summit fail to yield a dramatic result, as is very likely, given the formidable gap in the positions of both sides, it must not translate into bitter disappointment that reflects in tossing this new constructive diplomatic approach into the wastebasket. It is vital that the Government make clear to the people of India and the international community that its commitment to a constructive engagement of Pakistan's leadership and people extends well beyond the beginning that is being made in Agra and that no longer will the necessary negotiating processes between Delhi and Islamabad be held hostage by rigid stances such as ``no talks until cross-border terrorism ends'' and the like.

To ensure that the new approach to Pakistan retains its optimal creative potential, the attempt at Agra would better succeed if the objective is to construct enduring diplomatic and negotiating processes rather than to try to reach agreements on the contentious issues. It is clear that despite the fact that considerable groundwork and painstaking rounds of diplomatic negotiation have gone into the resolution of some issues such as the Siachen glacier and into the drafting of a series of confidence-building measures, the Vajpayee Government does not see itself as having the necessary political space to pull off grand gestures such as signing an agreement on Siachen, at this stage. Nor does it seem likely that General Musharraf whose own negotiating space appears sharply constricted by his own domestic political realities, including the emphatic presence of the jehadi groups, will find it easy to allow for other issues to gently nudge the Kashmir problem off centre-stage. In any case, it is probably most useful for the Vajpayee administration which has expressed loud doubts about the willingness of the Musharraf regime to adhere to the Lahore and Shimla agreements, to secure the Pakistani President's cooperation in continuing the Lahore process which offered rich scope for confidence-building between the two countries, even as it allowed an unprecedented focus on the Kashmir dispute. Given that Pakistan's leaders including General Musharraf have had little faith in Indian diplomatic assertions that India is committed to a substantive approach to bilateral negotiations, it is equally imperative for New Delhi to demonstrate that it means what it says.

In this context, it would be possible to imbue the Agra summit with a sense of historic achievement if the two leaders are able to put in place an institutional architecture of dialogue as was done with the United States during the visit of the former President, Mr. Bill Clinton. While the presently narrow scope of the bilateral engagement might appear unyielding in terms of allowing for such a broadbased structure of dialogue, there is the distinct possibility, and which is being considered quite strongly in the official efforts to construct scope for a successful conclusion to the summit, of the setting up of a joint working group at the ministerial level to conduct further negotiations on the Kashmir question and other security issues.

The idea of a joint working group which would consist of senior Ministers from both countries who would spearhead the effort to resolve the dispute over the issues relating to Kashmir and to questions of peace and security between the two countries, including a pointed focus on the nuclear issue, could be one dramatic negotiating principle that might emerge from the Agra summit. The idea of a JWG is indeed an attractive one, containing as it does the potential to address all sensitive issues, including India's concerns over cross- border incursions and Pakistan's own sense of hurt over issues such as the Siachen glacier. There are few illusions in New Delhi that the overnight change of stance in regard to engagement of the regime in Islamabad can bring in its wake dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs on issues that have stubbornly remained unresolved through the years.

It is recognised in the corridors of the External Affairs Ministry that despite the new euphoria and anticipation that surround the Agra summit, no agreement such as was done with China on making the disputed Sino-Indian boundary a Line of Peace and Tranquility can really take place with Pakistan, in this currently inflamed atmosphere. The new buzzword in the context of engaging Pakistan is ``Peace and Stability''. In other words, there will be an attempt in Agra to get the Pakistani establishment to consider steps to make the Line of Control into a Line of Peace and Stability. By this, it is clear that the Indian official establishment hopes it can put pressure on Islamabad to take specific steps to stop the incursions of militants across the LoC. But it must be recognised that Islamabad is equally likely to state its expectation of a linkage of such possible steps with New Delhi agreeing to thin out its forces on the LoC and in the Valley.

Yet beyond all the specific diplomatic gains that can be wrested from the Agra summit, it is clear that what we are about to see this weekend is history being made. This is why it is critical that when Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf stand side by side in Agra, they acknowledge their responsibility to address the hopes and prayers of millions in the subcontinent that an enduring peace which can translate into prosperity be allowed to take root. The imperative at the Agra summit is for both the leaders to ensure that these hopes are not extinguished by any possible failure to resolve the long standing differences. It must be made clear that such failures are only temporary and do not represent the end of the effort of the two countries to keep talking. The best insurance against the danger of slumping back into the wasteland of mutual indifference and non-engagement is to firmly put in place during the Agra meet enduring processes of dialogue, of which a joint working group is just one possible example.

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