The crisis in the northeast

THE ASSURANCE HELD out by the Union Government that the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (I-M) will be reviewed may have led to peace in Manipur, even if it be for the time being. After the violence that rocked the Manipur capital, in which a cross section of the political leaders there were hounded out by the agitators, there was no way the Centre could have denied such an assurance. And by managing the assurance, the leaders of the various political parties from Manipur may have found for themselves a little bit of space to manoeuvre in Imphal. The agitators, mostly students, had made the MLAs (of the Manipur Assembly now under suspended animation) and the various leaders of the parties their target and had even served an ultimatum that they resign from all elected positions. The demand was plain and categorical; that the Union Government rescind its ceasefire agreement with the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN that included all Naga-inhabited areas (including those outside Nagaland). The students and the various sections of the people in Manipur were agitating against the ceasefire agreement being extended to four districts in their State - Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Chandel and Senapati - where the Nagas outnumber the others.

The basis for this opposition was that by enlarging the area of the ceasefire, the Union Government would be seen ending up giving credence to the idea of a ``greater Nagaland''. Similar fears were found in Assam too. The Union Home Ministry's agreement with Mr. Muivah's outfit, struck initially during Mr. I. K. Gujral's regime (when Mr. K. Padmanabaiah took up a post- retirement assignment as the Home Ministry's emissary and managed to establish links with Mr. Muivah), for ceasefire had indeed created some conditions for restoring normality in the region. And there was no opposition to the ceasefire as such. It is in this context that the Union Home Ministry announced its fresh ``initiative'' that the area of ceasefire with the NSCN rebels has been expanded. It may be true that the NSCN had placed this as a demand and made such expansion a condition for extending the agreement. But then, the Union Home Minister and his officers could have gone about consulting the political leaders from the region - particularly from Assam and Manipur - before agreeing to the NSCN negotiators. And this is what led to the crisis.

It is in this context that one would expect all those involved with the negotiations with the NSCN representatives at this stage to learn from the past mistakes. The NSCN will now insist on the Government remaining committed to the terms agreed in June and sticking to the expanded area of ceasefire. The rebel outfit, after all, has its stakes too. But then the Union Government cannot allow itself to be goaded into any deal (even if it is done by the emissaries on its behalf) that will be seen as endorsing, even in a symbolic manner, the idea of a ``greater Nagaland''. And this will have to be the terms on which the Home Ministry officers carry out their talks with the NSCN's representatives in the coming days. And in this sense, while it is important that the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN is kept in place and the political process to achieve peace in the region is speeded up, the concerns bothering the people of Manipur and parts of Assam will have to be taken care of. There is no way that the Government can allow its negotiators to strike such agreements that will lead to insurgency and violence spreading across the Northeastern States. The imperative for the officers and interlocutors of the Union Home Ministry in this context is to involve a cross section of the political leaders in all such debates and take them into confidence before any ``agreements'' are finalised.

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