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Monday, July 23, 2001

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Time to return to the Valley

By Muchkund Dubey

THE MUCH-PUBLICISED Agra summit did not live up to the expectations and ended without producing even a bald agreed statement summarising the principal events and reiterating that the dialogue will continue. The disappointing outcome has been attributed to a variety of factors - the role played by the media, particularly the unprecedented hype generated by it and the way it was manipulated for partisan ends, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj's inept briefing on the first day, Pakistan's wilful and blatant departures from the norms of summit diplomacy and the unstructured agenda and inadequate preparations for the summit.

None of these factors constitutes the real cause of the summit's failure. High expectations were inherent in the circumstances in which the summit was held and reflected the longings of the people on both sides of the border. Besides, it is natural for people to dream and for political leaders to aim high and seek to realise the vision of peace, harmony and prosperity in the region. In the present era of globalisation, it is impossible, and indeed improper, to restrict media coverage of momentous events. The media has its prejudices as have the other sections of the society. Besides, to remain competitive, the media often panders to the prejudices and predilections of its consumers. In the process, it magnifies and fuels these prejudices. But in democracies in particular, there is hardly anything governments can do about it.

It is up to the media to apply self-discipline and present a balanced and complete picture. The challenge that lies before governments is how to use the media to their best advantage. At the Agra summit, the Pakistanis left the Indians far behind in this race. Mrs. Sushma Swaraj's comments no doubt came in handy for the Pakistanis to further highlight their case on Kashmir, but it has had no impact on the outcome of the summit. Pakistan's departure from the norm of conducting high level diplomacy was entirely in keeping with the past pattern of its behaviour on such occasions. What was surprising was the inability of the Indian side to anticipate and adequately provide for it.

Finally, these days it is not uncommon to have summits without a structured agenda. The plea for a summit without an agenda generally comes from the party to a dialogue which has a single point to pursue and which thinks that the best way to score its point lies in isolating the leader of the other side from his experts and advisers and working on his susceptibilities to flattery and for claiming personal credit for success. Sometimes, in the pursuit of broader objectives, it becomes very difficult beyond a point to reject such a plea. However, it is unthinkable that Indian diplomats will send their leaders unprepared to even an agendaless summit.

The failure of the summit should be attributed to the differences of an irreconcilable nature between the two countries on major issues and no evidence of a change in the objective situation to warrant a shift from the long-held positions. There is some evidence of a change in the Indian position on Kashmir mainly because of the fast deterioration in the situation on the ground. The people of Kashmir are almost totally alienated from India and largely because of this militancy has grown many times over. The old BJP mantra of suppressing militancy by force has proved ineffective. The Government has, therefore, been desperately trying for some time to bring external pressure to bear on Pakistan to bring down the level of violence. It also appears that having failed to find a political solution to the problem within the framework of the Constitution, the Government has been looking for an externally-brokered artificial solution. The Government's declarations of a ceasefire, the appointment of Mr. K. C. Pant as its interlocutor with the Kashmiris and the sudden decision to invite Gen. Pervez Musharraf were all intended to placate and seek the assistance of external powers, particularly the United States, and not to solve the problem of Kashmir in the best interest of India. During the last few days, the Government, including at the level of the Prime Minister, has almost confirmed the essentially external orientation of the recent moves.

However, the Government developed cold feet at the summit because of the fear of an adverse domestic political fallout and the breach of trust by Pakistan during the summit. It, therefore, retreated to its traditional position on Kashmir. Thus the earlier tentative move towards walking down the path of solution with Pakistan, rather than finding a solution with our own Kashmiris, seems to have been put on a hold for the time being. The other reason for the stiffening of the Indian position was the insistence by Pakistan that progress in all other areas will be held hostage to progress in solving the Kashmir problem.

Another reason for the disappointing outcome of the summit was Pakistan's refusal even to recognise the fact of cross-border terrorism abetted and assisted by it, let alone taking action to reduce or stop it. India's expectations on this score are totally unrealistic. For, given its objective regarding Kashmir, Pakistan is bound to exploit India's vulnerability thereby fomenting violence. It can scarcely be expected to give up what it considers to be the most potent means at its disposal to realise its goal. The Government of India has been proceeding on the assumption that Pakistan can be forced to change its position through external pressure. Here, the Indian policy-makers are exaggerating the leverages that these powers have over Pakistan and their preparedness to use them.

Another wrong assumption is that Pakistan's agreement with India to stop cross-border terrorism will provide it the opportunity to rein in religious fundamentalism which is in Pakistan's own interest, and for getting out of its present economic crisis. There is a strong element of wishful thinking in this analysis. From Pakistan's perspective, its domestic situation is not as grim as depicted by Indian analysts. Besides, Pakistan does not think that cessation of cross-border violence and normalising relations with India are indispensable for dealing with its domestic problem of religious fundamentalism. Finally, no Government in Pakistan can be expected to compromise on the ideology of Pakistan, which is the very raison d'etre of the state. And Pakistan regards the annexation of Muslim-majority Kashmir as the completion of that ideology. Hence, the persistent reference to Kashmir as the unfinished agenda of Partition. Pakistan should be least expected to change its stand on cross- border terrorism at a time when it perceives that the fulfilment of Partition's agenda is well within its grasp.

Given these ground realities, there was an element of inevitability about the sad end of the summit. One has, therefore, to wait for a change in the situation on the ground to find a meeting point with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. It has always been within India's power, and often within its grasp, to bring about such a change by its own actions in Kashmir without depending upon either Pakistan or other outside powers. This can be done by healing the wounds of our Kashmiris and travelling the last mile to fulfil their aspirations.

Our leaders have failed to scale any heights at the summit. There is no point in their - and here I include the Opposition also - squabbling over who was responsible for the summit's failure. They should instead turn to the Valley to witness for themselves the all-pervading agony there, the daily suffering and the humiliation at every step. Then they will realise why the Kashmiris want to take their destiny in their own hands without leaving anything to India. Can the leadership of India muster the courage, vision and political will to give to the Kashmiris what is their due and thereby save the situation for India?

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