More than a duel

By Rajmohan Gandhi

LARGE NUMBERS of the public in India and Pakistan and in different parts of Jammu & Kashmir have felt saddened, disappointed and possibly even cheated by the outcome of the Agra summit. Mr. Vajpayee's promise, expressed more than once, to be innovative over Kashmir and go beyond the beaten track, Gen. Musharraf's assurances of flexibility, the pre-summit underlining of the agenda-free, one-on-one character of the talks, allowing scope for unexpected openings, and the choice of the Taj as the backdrop amounted to a hope-inducing build-up. People indeed thought Messrs Vajpayee and Musharraf might explore a Kashmir settlement and an end to militancy in Kashmir - the two appeared to be intertwined goals attainable together or not at all.

Now, however, some post-summit pronouncements appear to suggest that the Agra exercise was conducted not to deal with problems affecting the daily life of millions, but merely to find one or two mutually acceptable phrases; that the negotiation was editorial, not political, and the aim was phrase-making, not peacemaking. To quote from the memorable closing statement by the Indian Government's spokesperson, Ms. Nirupama Rao, the destination that sadly eluded the politicians and officials assembled in Agra was a joint statement, no more and no less. Evidently the peak of an Indo-Pakistan settlement, or even a base camp, was not pictured by the minds involved.

Less innocent and childlike than the public, the two wise Governments knew better, so that now, after the Agra letdown, they are both able to regard the result as encouraging and satisfactory even if inconclusive. (This remark has to be qualified following New Delhi's latest pronouncement that any draft nearly agreed to at Agra should in effect be torn up, and that any future talks should pick up the threads from Lahore 1999.)

Those who felt almost hoodwinked by the Agra outcome will not be easily placated. That a basis for a settlement was close at hand was the private summit-eve assessment of several seasoned hands, and one that received a boost on the afternoon of July 14, when 20-odd Delhi-based persons - political figures like Mr. V. P. Singh and Mr. I. K. Gujral and analysts and journalists including this writer - interacted with Gen. Musharraf for over 40 minutes. Conceding that Kashmir and violence in Kashmir had to be addressed together, Gen. Musharraf seemed to entertain and to convey a measure of hope. Within minutes Mr. V. P. Singh went on record suggesting that a deal appeared to be close at hand. The next day, as the Agra talks proceeded, analysts appearing on TV discussions also voiced their glad suspicion that ``the Agra match had been fixed''.

When word was aired around 1 p.m. on Sunday, July 15, that the Indian side had officially summarised the extended Vajpayee- Musharraf one-on-one as positive, and that the Pakistanis had characterised the same discussion as very very positive, the mood of great expectations seemed almost to give way to celebration.

I hope that one day we will know the facts about this pre-lunch one-on-one dialogue of July 15 that everyone found so positive. Was there an accord on the simple essentials of a deal, possibly a move forward by India on Kashmir matched by a Pakistani commitment against terrorism in Kashmir? In the absence of such an agreement, would either side's officials have commented so enthusiastically?

However, this seemingly reasonable surmise runs into a problem. The so-called one-on-one dialogue was not wholly confined to the two heads of Government. Note-takers were present. When every word uttered was being recorded, would Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf have felt free to discuss moves for reconciliation frankly with each other? Even when they knew that elements in both countries were waiting to pounce on them with the charge of softness towards the enemy?

Belief in any meaningful accord having been reached in the Sunday one-on-one is also weakened by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh's remark on July 17 that in substance the Indian statements used at the summit had been prepared by South Block weeks previously. Which makes one wonder whether the summit was really designed to afford room for fresh approaches sparked off in an unstructured Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting. Or was Agra only an unavoidable but harmless response by India and Pakistan to the urgings of the international community, a response that would change nothing but suggest a concern for peace, and require nothing more than the playing for the nth time of stale records?

The pre-summit battle for the Agra agenda seemed waged between some who wanted Kashmir to fill all of the agenda and others who wanted Kashmir wiped clean off the agenda, both sides implying that listing Kashmir plus other subjects would be an absurdity. This either/or formulation, intellectually fallacious but politically attractive, was also seen in the debate over Kashmir being either the sole issue between India and Pakistan or merely an issue. The notion that Kashmir could be something else, namely a crucial issue, apart from being the site of great sadness, apparently found few takers in Agra.

To some Indians of the either/or school, nothing underscores India's diplomatic failure more than Gen. Musharraf's supposed success in bringing Kashmir to the fore, and in conducting a media campaign. Such critics would presumably share the praise that NDA leaders have publicly offered to Mr. Vajpayee for ``raising India's concerns strongly'' and for ``not having compromised''. To them, Agra was a duel that one contestant would win and the other lose, not an opportunity for the subcontinent.

The headlines summarising Mr. Jaswant Singh's post-summit statement proclaim that Kashmir and cross-border terrorism proved to be the two blocks in Agra. (He also mentioned a third block, namely Pakistan's alleged denigration or devaluation of the Shimla and Lahore agreements, but that has received less play, possibly because of Gen. Musharraf's explanation that he did not disown Shimla or Lahore, though he repeated that those two agreements had not in the end led to a resolution of the Kashmir question.)

Mr. Jaswant Singh spoke dignifiedly and ought to be commended for not directly criticising the Pakistani leadership. I am pretty certain that he realises that the two blocks identified by him are in fact the key to a possible resolution, provided they are addressed together and seriously. Pakistan cannot undertake to end or substantially reduce violence in Jammu and Kashmir if there is no response from India to the Kashmiris long-enduring struggle for democratic rights; and the Indian people will not support substantial moves towards self-rule in Kashmir if Pakistan does not stand four-square against terrorism.

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir as well as that in Pakistan seemed far from the minds of some in India who reacted strongly against Kashmir's place in the Agra discussions. The Pakistani President was not being facetious or sensational when he spoke of the anger he would invite in Pakistan if he did not stress Kashmir. As for the Kashmiris, they saw Mr. Vajpayee's invitation to Gen. Musharraf in the context of the ceasefire and the Pant initiative announcements and accordingly assumed that Kashmir would be a principal and immediate subject in Agra.

Kashmiris would not have appreciated the cartoon in an Indian daily in which Mr. Vajpayee invites Mr. Musharraf to join him in climbing a steep hill where after terrorism, trade, visa, nuclear and other issues are patiently cleared and left behind, a peak called Kashmir is allowed to appear. There is a qualitative difference between the issues of Kashmir and terrorism on the one hand, and visas and trade on the other. The latter too are of great importance but do not produce killings, wounds and oppressions, which is what Kashmir daily experiences, a tragedy enhanced and at times caused by the violence of the mujahideen. It is no offence to want to reduce this tragedy, an objective unrealisable without Kashmir and militancy being addressed together. The Agra outcome makes this task harder, and the possibility of increased violence in Jammu and Kashmir greater. And if indeed Mr. Vajpayee has developed cold feet about `innovativeness' and Gen. Musharraf about `flexibility', then we are in for a difficult season.

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