India and the great powers

By C. Raja Mohan

IF INDIA can overcome the political hangover from Agra, it will find itself in the middle of some remarkable developments on the world scene. In the last couple of weeks, when India was hosting Gen. Pervez Musharraf and coming to terms with the outcome of the talks with Pakistan, a diplomatic play that could reorder relations among the United States, Russia and China entered a critical moment. It is a game that could significantly transform India's security environment in the coming years.

High level political contacts marked an important phase in every set of bilateral relations among Washington, Moscow and Beijing in the last few days. When India was busy at Agra, the President of China, Mr. Jiang Zemin, travelled to Moscow and signed a new treaty of friendship and cooperation with Russia. Soon after, the American President, Mr. George Bush, met his Russian counterpart, Mr. Vladimir Putin, on the margins of the G-8 summit at Genoa, Italy, and announced an agreement to work out a new bilateral strategic framework. And within days, the U.S. Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell, went to Beijing to smooth the ruffled ties with China.

Any one of these developments on its own would be seen as having a direct bearing on India. Taken together the three developments introduce an unprecedented dynamism to the Indian security environment. But given our renewed preoccupation with Pakistan and a raging domestic political battle over ``who lost Agra'', none of the potentially dramatic changes in great power relations has got the deserved attention in India.

The Sino-Russian relationship has been one of the principal determinants of India's security environment. Adversaries for nearly three decades from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, Russia and China are returning to a relationship that has all the rhetorical trappings of an alliance. Apprehensive about the unchecked power of the U.S. in the post- Cold War world, Russia and China are beginning to hold hands.

Like everyone else in the world, India too will be in two minds in judging how far the Sino-Russian romance will go. Ideologues on the left will be cheering for such an alliance, and will want India to join Russia and China in a grand alliance against the dominant power, the U.S. But the centrists in the Indian strategic community have grown up with the certitude of Sino- Russian rivalry or at least wariness, and are afraid that an alliance between the two giants to its north will constrain India's geopolitical space and weaken the value of the Indo- Russian relationship.

A careful Indian assessment might come up with scenarios that point to the continuing uncertainty in Sino-Russian relations. The realists would suggest that despite the common desire to limit American power, Russia and China will find it difficult to return to an alliance of the type the world saw between the two communist states in the 1950s. As neighbours, they have a history of mistrust and will always be wary of the other's potential to make trouble. Moscow, from its own long-term interests, might want to be somewhat careful in adding to the rising power of China. Beijing, in turn, would always worry about the pro-Western impulses in Russia that could tug it towards the U.S. and Europe.

But the biggest obstacle to a substantive Sino-Russian alliance may be the U.S. itself. There are strong compulsions in both Moscow and Beijing to explore and sustain a cooperative relationship with Washington. Russia and China are certainly concerned about the current American dominance over world affairs and the strong tendency in Washington towards unilateralism. While seeking greater space for themselves, Russia and China also know the dangers of confronting the U.S., which remains the principal source of capital and modern technology for both. No wonder that both Moscow and Beijing are in the middle of some sophisticated diplomatic engagement with Washington. The unfolding dynamic of the U.S.-Russian relationship is perhaps the most important among the great power relations. For the first time since the two nations briefly allied with each other in the middle of the last century to defeat fascism, America and Russia are exploring the prospects of a new partnership. The Bush Administration, which came to power a few months ago with all its Cold War anti-Russian instincts intact, is now proclaiming that Russia is no longer an enemy and that Mr. Putin may be a trustworthy partner.

The U.S. plans for missile defence which appeared to sharpen U.S.-Russian tensions a few weeks ago now look amenable to a broad strategic understanding between Washington and Moscow. Determined to pursue the missile defence programme, the Bush Administration is reaching out to Moscow and offering a deal - significant cuts in the existing nuclear arsenals in return for an eventual modification of the ABM treaty. The Russians have not said ``yes''; but they have not said ``no'' either. All indications are that pragmatic Putin is not averse to a deal; and that he will bargain very hard.

The U.S. is also broadly hinting that it might consider Russian participation in the technological development of future missile defences as well as a more cooperative economic relationship. While there remains a shadow between the potential and reality of a new partnership between Washington and Moscow, it never looked more probable than today. And when it does happen, a Russo- American partnership is likely to radically alter the rules of the nuclear game as well as the nature of Eurasian geopolitics.

A U.S.-Russian understanding would clearly put China at a disadvantage; but the expansive commercial relationship between the U.S. and China is likely to mitigate the dangers of a new Cold War confrontation between Washington and Beijing. While the trade between Russia and America is barely $ 10 billions and that between Russia and China is even less, the two-way trade between America and China is about $120 billions.

Corporate America's high stakes in China have already helped end the summer of discontent between Washington and Beijing. American companies have exerted pressure on the Bush Administration to tone down its adversarial attitude towards China. The visit by Gen. Powell to Beijing is being widely interpreted as a return to ``business as usual'' between the two nations. Gen. Powell has consciously dropped the recent references to China as a ``strategic competitor''. The explanation: the Sino-U.S. relationship is too complex to be captured by a single cliche.

That should disappoint all those in India who thought the Bush Administration was sending out invitations for the long-awaited containment party against China. To be sure, the Bush Administration remains deeply divided about China, and policy makers in Beijing are worried about a potential military alliance between India and America. But ties between the U.S. and China appear to be returning to a more predictable trend of engagement that defined their relations in the last couple of decades. If India is looking for geopolitical clarity to define its national security strategy, it may not find it any time soon. Instead, New Delhi should stay with some basic principles in pursuing its foreign policy objectives.

First, it should strive for an open-ended engagement with all the great powers of the world. Second, the foundation of such an engagement must be economic cooperation. Currently India's commercial ties with all the great powers are way below potential and need to be upgraded quickly. Third, India needs to consolidate the traditional ties with Moscow, rapidly expand strategic cooperation with the U.S., and strive hard to resolve the accumulated bilateral problems with China and build political trust with the northern neighbour. Simultaneous and multi- directional engagement would stand India in good stead and prepare it for any radical shifts in great power relations.

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