India's American alliance

By Sudhanshu Ranade

Mr. Jaswant Singh has added yet another feather to his cap. First President Bush `dropped by' in the midst of his meeting with the National Security Adviser, Ms. Condoleeza Rice; and whisked him off for a little one-on-one discussion of their own. Meanwhile, just across the corridor, a former chief of the India desk at the State Department was thoughtfully presenting Secretary Colin Powell with a free copy of Mr. Jaswant Singh's book on Indian foreign policy. Now, immediately after the `failure' of the Indo- Pak. summit at Agra, we had General Henry H. Shelton, chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, rushing into Delhi, seemingly all prepared to take the `dropped catch'.

Nevertheless, we should not allow ourselves to get taken in by a satisfying but illusory sense of rapid forward movement. One of the first things the new U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Robert D. Blackwill, would have noticed on arrival in Delhi, apart from the long queue for visas, would have been the news about the demolition of yet another `decrepit' Indian mosque. One is reminded of the story of the freshman college student who kept telling his dad, right through the year, about the feathers he had been adding to his cap. Dad was somewhat sceptical; when junior wired for money at the end of term, he replied `use feathers; fly back'.

About this time last year, as the U.S. presidential campaign gained momentum, the MIT Press published a book, carefully put together and co-edited by Prof. Blackwill, about America's Asian Alliances. Those who have read the book will be struck by the way that Colin Powell followed its script, chapter and verse, in his recent tour of east/southeast Asia and Australia.

The first two chapters, respectively, explain why (though its role in Europe may have been more visible) Asia has been important for U.S. foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century; and continues to be so. Chapter three, on the U.S.-Japan `alliance', explains that Japan is, among other things, hemmed in by memories of its role in World War II; which, as in the case of Germany in Europe, are carefully stoked from time to time by both the losers (China, Korea) and the sole surviving winner of the war. Presumably, it is because Japan does not have very many options that the U.S. singled it out for reprimand after it, like everyone else, voted ``against the U.S.'' on the Kyoto Protocol after President Bush's abrupt turnaround.

Chapter 4 discusses the `alliance' between the U.S. and the equally hemmed in South Korea; emphasising the fine line that must be walked between this alliance and the one discussed in the previous chapter.

Chapter 5 discusses the alliance between the U.S. and Australia; the latter being depicted as the star player in the region, in part to allay the fears that are voiced in Australia from time to time (and even more so in New Zealand) about `needlessly' taking too prominent a part in Great Power Politics.

The next chapter, which concludes the book, was authored by Prof. Blackwill himself. In a brief section on `other Asian actors', the Ambassador argues that the ``preoccupation'' with India, and all that ``giddy talk in the U.S. and elsewhere regarding India as a potential strategic partner'', should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, so far as south Asia is concerned, ``for the next five years, developments in Pakistan are likely to have a greater impact on (U.S.) interests than those in India''. In other words, it is all very well to give India a hand up, on general principles. But it cannot be allowed to win too visible a success in Kashmir; because the U.S. simply cannot afford to let Pakistan fail. Extremist forces there have either to be snuffed out; or their energy diverted into channels that would, from the global point of view, be less harmful.

Given its all-embracing title, one is puzzled about the book's total silence about west and central Asia. But not for long; soon one realises that the `presentation' is basically intended to prime Australia for its `historic mission'. Though the `battle' against China was sure to spill over into other parts of Asia, those would be separately taken care of.

So far as the `allies' of the U.S. are concerned, the general idea is to recreate for each the cosy relationship between Lord Krishna and his gopikas: He is with every one of them, each of them is alone with Him.

Russia, too, figures with India in the few short paras on `other Asian actors'. As Ms. Condoleeza Rice explained to Prof. Putin during her recent visit to Moscow, as a friend (after all, Russia is a friend, isn't it), Russia has no need to fear the de facto abolition of the treaty on Anti- Ballistic Missiles. It does, however, need to worry about rogue states like North Korea and Iraq, said Ms. Rice; before going on to add, in a stage whisper, a few words about China's culpability in this affair; in case someone at Moscow hadn't noticed.

Were I our Minister for External Affairs and Defence, I would have felt uneasy at the thought of simultaneously taking so forward a role in `containing' China, while coming forth boldly to `battle' terrorism `wherever it exists'; even as the fires rage at home: unquenched; unquenchable. Nor do I understand how Mr. Jaswant Singh has allowed himself to get swayed by all that `giddy talk'. Of the common cadre of the BJP, this is only to be expected. From Mr. Jaswant Singh, one expects more.

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