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Opinion
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For sustainable talks with Pakistan
THE FIRM PLEDGE by the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee,
to pursue a process of dialogue with Pakistan is certainly a
welcome sign of salutary diplomacy. An exposition of the
necessary political will marked his reply to a debate in the Lok
Sabha on the recent Agra summit. Undeniably, this acquires
importance in the context of unmitigated frustrations in both New
Delhi and Islamabad over the manner in which the Agra talks had
decelerated without a definitive outcome. However, Mr. Vajpayee
has also disclosed, perhaps consciously, that he resorted to
rhetorical repartees in a serious effort to stop Pakistan's
President and Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in his
tracks at Agra. Finding that Gen. Musharraf would not relent in
his advocacy of the ``wishes'' of the Kashmiris, the Prime
Minister, by his own statement, asked the Pakistan Army Chief
whether he had in fact ``consulted'' the people of his country
while assuming power in 1999. Now, shorn of the perceived
efficacy of this candid counter-argument in silencing Gen.
Musharraf on that occasion, Mr. Vajpayee has shown himself to be
not averse to adopting negative tactics to score simple debating
points. Gen. Musharraf had in fact been invited to that summit in
spite of his status as a military ruler who suppressed democracy
in his own country. Nonetheless, it is also possible that the
Prime Minister has not revealed the totality of the relevant
context out of some concern for the confidentiality of the
overall conversations that he had with Gen. Musharraf at Agra.
Yet, a rational reality that must be underlined is that
diplomatic semantics, however smart, cannot lead to a sustainable
dialogue with Pakistan. Moreover, there is really no meaningful
alternative to substantive parleys with Islamabad.
It is no less true that the Musharraf administration often tends
to play to the gallery outside the strict domain of an active
engagement with India. Notable among Pakistan's contributions to
the semantic discourse on the Agra summit is Gen. Musharraf's
presumptive attempt at a dialectical dismissal of New Delhi's
accusations about Islamabad-inspired cross-border terrorism
within Jammu and Kashmir as also elsewhere in India. In
Islamabad's book, the alleged acts of terror on the Indian side
of the Line of Control (LoC) do not bristle with horrific
attributes on two counts. Pakistan's contention is that the LoC
is not the same as an international border and that the saga of
terror, which India campaigns against, is intrinsically a
characteristic of the Kashmiri ``freedom struggle''. Now, while
the Kashmiri ``freedom struggle'' is in some ways central to the
main dispute between New Delhi and Islamabad, quintessentially
semantic indeed is Pakistan's proclivity to disregard India's
arguments on the basis of a distinction between the LoC and a
border.
Certainly unexceptionable is Mr. Vajpayee's sense of confidence
in India's ability to meet the multi-pronged menace of terrorism
and also any external aggression. In a sense, though, the future
course of India-Pakistan talks may be charted in the context of
the Prime Minister's insistence on judging Pakistan by the
``litmus test'' of the efforts it might make to end cross-border
terrorism. Islamabad's considered responses, as distinct from its
initial dismay over some aspects of Mr. Vajpayee's latest
statement, will also be crucial. At Agra, Mr. Vajpayee and Gen.
Musharraf appeared to have reckoned, either directly or
implicitly, with the possibility of a trade-off between
Pakistan's plea for intensive discussions on Kashmir as the prime
issue and India's demand that Islamabad agree to address the
question of cross-border terrorism. In this limited sweep, the
deliberations at Agra marked a qualitative departure from the
Lahore Declaration of 1999. New Delhi's perception is that the
Lahore and Shimla documents do not enthuse Gen. Musharraf.
However, a forward movement can yet be envisioned if India and
Pakistan strive harder for friendship in the unstable bilateral
environment that calls for conventional and nuclear risk
reductions too.
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