Politico-military mismatch in J&K

By V. R. Raghavan

THE APPLICATION of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1990, (SPA), beyond the Jhelum valley demonstrates the mismatch in the political and military policies of the Government. The massacres in Doda and the bomb blast in Jammu railway station were serious incidents. Such incidents had occurred in the past, but the Government had not sought to impose the SPA. What grounds justified the grant of the SPA's sweeping powers this time remain unclear. This is particularly disquieting in the light of the Government's assertion in Parliament that the security forces had the upper hand against the militants. The fact remains, however, that its introduction has been seen, not entirely without justification, as an admission of policies pursued thus far having failed. It is, therefore ,time to examine the strategic underpinnings of the policy being pursued from Delhi.

The SPA's application in more areas is indicative of increased emphasis being placed by the Government on a military response. There is, however, no corresponding thrust on the political front. In fact, the critically important political dimension has received a serious setback. The announcement by the Government in Parliament, about its plans to substitute greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir with special powers is a substantial strategic U-turn, whose ramifications will be serious and far reaching. The grant of special powers to security forces has, however, done little to enhance the credibility of the policies. The shift from the political initiatives of the previous two years to a decidedly military thrust is evidence of either loss of confidence in political leadership, or, of an abiding but misplaced faith in the efficacy of a militarist approach.

During the last two years a series of political initiatives on Jammu and Kashmir were initiated from Delhi. There was considerable preparatory work involved. The release of political leaders from detention, the encouragement to and continuing of the ceasefires for nearly six months, the opening of dialogue channels with a number of political groups of varied beliefs, and above all the commencement of a peace momentum had raised hopes in and outside India. It would not be incorrect to say that the BJP-led Government had demonstrated greater strategic savvy on Jammu and Kashmir than was evident in the preceding decade. There was a clearly perceptible shift towards political discourse from the largely military framework of managing the conflict. The debate on autonomy was unlike anything seen in a long while. It opened up the much needed space in which options and alternatives could be discussed rationally. The BJP-led Government and the Prime Minister were seen to be capable of seizing opportunities and of bold measures.

The invitation to General Pervez Musharraf was undeniably a part of the peace process imaginatively begun in Jammu and Kashmir. That the Agra summit failed to come up to expectations was not a complete surprise, other than in the mileage seemingly gained by Pakistan's military leader. The meetings nevertheless showed to both sides the limits of each others ability to seek peace. It would also have shown, given the better understanding of what each side was willing to do, the outlines of a future political strategy. That so soon after the Agra summit the policy has so emphatically shifted from the political to military dimension would seem to indicate a strategic shift in Delhi. Therein lie possibilities of adverse outcomes both in the short and in the long term.

The Doda killings and Jammu shootings were incidents of the kind seen in earlier years. However, incidents caused by militant activity cannot be the determinants of policy. Unfortunately, this has been the policy pattern in Jammu and Kashmir because of a misunderstanding of the relative importance to be given to political and military dimensions of policy. Sound political initiatives and effective governance involve the people in countering the militants. This allows the security forces time and resources to conduct aggressive operations against militants. In the absence of political involvement of the people, security forces are compelled to be defensive. The need to guard and protect everything brings about a massive deployment all over the state. This inevitably hampers civilian life and before long alienates the population. In the absence of political activity, the security presence seems oppressive. Policy then gets determined by shooting incidents and military measures, instead of a comprehensive strategic outlook where politics retains primacy.

In the absence of a pro-active political strategy, the Government is forced into a policy of ever increasing military measures. It deploys more and more forces, and uses the logic of military measures to answer criticism of political failures. It falls back on claiming success based on the indices of killings. The Government's dilemma is seen in its Parliamentary replies, where it is reduced to claiming success on the basis of numbers of militants killed each month. That it claims success on the basis of 233 militants killed in July compared to 217 in June this year is proof of marginal military results becoming alibis for the absence of political gains. That an Indian Government can be reduced to using body counts as proof of success is a sad reminder of its inability to distinguish between the easy but fallacious and the difficult but correct priorities. Choosing the easy and expedient military course has led to ruinous consequences in other democracies. In fact, the choice is fraught with risks of political leadership misleading the people.

In the last major carnage in the Doda area, the Government talked of a new military grid, of unified command, of military advisors to the Chief Minster, of pro-active tactics. In the recent Doda massacre, it has again played with words and talked of a directed unified command, modified dynamic deployment, and new tactics. It has moved in additional forces, which will only change the density of security forces without improving security. Military measures will improve military security but can do little to improve human security consisting of political stability, accountable governance, participatory politics and economic empowerment. The application of the SPA in multi-ethnic segments of Jammu and Kashmir is an unimaginative military response with the potential of wider political consequences. The credibility of the Government's claims to a strategic understanding of the situation cannot be improved by this measure, without a meaningful political content.

The challenge in Jammu and Kashmir will ultimately have to be met through Indian political initiatives. The international reality is that no major power is capable of or even interested in a particular outcome to the imbroglio. It would be presumptuous to believe that any major power would force an outcome on either India or Pakistan. They will do everything to ensure that the two new nuclear weapons states will not go to war. Short of a war that can involve nuclear risks, a continuing sub-optimal military conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is entirely an Indian challenge to meet. The way to meet that political challenge is not by repeated recourse to military measures or even by applying the SPA across the State. The SPA is a special tool to be employed selectively and for limited purpose. It should not be made a permanent measure applied over decades. The SPA cannot be an instrument of governance without the population concluding that the political leadership prefers to govern through the security forces. It is an indictment eminently avoidable by a democracy.

The Indian Government has recently stated that it is up to Pakistan to choose the kind of relationship it wants with India. This is an unexceptionable formulation. It is also, however, true that India needs to choose the kind of relationship it wishes to have with the people of Jammu and Kashmir. State-sponsored terrorism in the cloak of jehad, or camouflaged as a freedom struggle, requires a firm response. It requires that the militant is given no quarter, and those who use the gun against innocents receive the full measure of an armed response from the Indian state. This operational response against terrorism needs, however, to part of a larger political process. Military measures should supplement the political and not be a substitute. The politico-military mismatch in Jammu and Kashmir needs to be remedied speedily.

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