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Friday, August 17, 2001

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Bloodletting in West Asia

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

NO ONE is talking any more of peace in West Asia. The maximum that is hoped for is a lull in the daily bloodletting. The parties most directly concerned, the Israelis and the Palestinians, are so involved in the cycle of violence and counter violence that has become their daily life that they do not have the time to reflect on any long term or even medium term strategy for even a ceasefire, let alone peace. The only external agency which can and ought to do something, namely the United States, seems to have run out of ideas and the desire to arrest the slide which is threatening to engulf the entire region.

The suicide bombing in Jerusalem on August 10 has taken the crisis to an extraordinarily high level. While the Israeli Government had to `do something' to satisfy public opinion, its takeover of Orient House and flying of the Israeli flag over it was calculated to generate the kind of response from Palestinian extremists which the Israeli right would use to demand and justify more disproportionate reprisals against the Palestinian Authority institutions which had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks. It would make extremists of moderate Palestinians, just as the Jerusalem attack contributed to radicalising sections of the Israeli left.

The situation has become particularly alarming since responsible Israelis are openly calling for the overthrow of the Palestinian Authority and even of Mr. Yasser Arafat. The former Prime Minister, Mr. Ehud Barak, called for a change saying it was simply impossible to negotiate peace with Mr. Arafat. The present Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon, has employed any number of undiplomatic adjectives to describe Mr. Arafat. Others have expressed preference for talking to a different leadership, on the stated premise that it was bound to be more moderate. They, of course, know not what they are saying. They ought to realise that if there is one Palestinian who can sell an unpopular settlement to his people - and any deal will be unpopular on both sides - it is Mr. Arafat. No one is indispensable; but even the New York Times, in an editorial, described Mr. Arafat as ``the only realistic Palestinian negotiating partner''.

After the failed Camp David summit talks of July 2000, the media and leaders in Israel and America spoke ad nauseum about how Mr. Arafat missed a golden opportunity to strike a deal that he was not likely ever again to be offered. It is a repeat of that old Abba Eban song of the Palestinians never missing an opportunity of missing an opportunity. Enough revisionist writing has come out over the past few weeks about Camp David credibly challenging the accounts that Mr. Barak had offered Mr. Arafat `the moon'. What Mr. Barak had offered was three disconnected areas in the West Bank with numerous settlements to remain in place. Mr. Robert Malley, a member of the small American team at Camp David, has stated that no other Arab party - not Sadat's Egypt nor King Hussein's Jordan - came even close to the kind of compromises that Mr. Arafat was prepared to offer at Camp David. Of course, this is not to take anything away from the undoubtedly courageous package which Mr. Barak put on the table, But, as Mr. Malley says in his article in the New York Times, the measure of Israel's concessions was not how far it moved from its original position but how far it moved towards a fair solution. As for Camp David, Mr. Henry Kissinger aptly concludes in his new book, ``Does America need a foreign policy?'', it turned the Middle East from a difficult problem into an intractable one.

As things are at present, it is not easy to see how the violence can be ended. On the Israeli side, it is undeniable that a large number of innocent lives have been lost as a result of terrorist attacks for which there can be no justification. Nor can the policy of `targeted assassinations' by official Israeli agencies be justified. One can be excused for wondering, given Mr. Sharon's background of at least indirect responsibility for the massacres of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatilla camps in Lebanon in 1982 as well as his deliberately provocative visit to the Haram El Sharif in the Old City in September last year, about the genuineness of his declared wish for peace. At least one important moderate Arab leader has publicly said that there was no prospect of peace so long as Mr. Sharon remained in power.

On the Palestinian side, Mr. Arafat is accused of not reining in the terrorists, of not incarcerating those on Israel's wanted list, indeed of trying to win on the `battle field' what he could not get at the negotiating table. Mr. Arafat must make every effort to curb the violence. But he is not in control of Hamas or of the `street'. The `street' in the Arab countries is an unpredictable factor over which even the most autocratic dictator has no absolute control and for which all Arab rulers have a healthy fear and respect. Following Mr. Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount last September, there has been tremendous radicalisation of Palestinian society. Even some Palestinian civil society leaders, universally regarded and respected for their moderate views and known for their dislike for Mr. Arafat, refuse to condemn suicide bombings. Besides everything else, Mr. Arafat also has a real problem of image with his `street'. There is a widespread perception among the Palestinian population that those around Mr. Arafat are incorrigibly corrupt. The system is not transparent and the Palestinian people are too well educated and politically conscious to tolerate for long a state of affairs which fosters an atmosphere of corruption.

Having said this, however, it needs to be emphasized that Israel's actions, in particular the perpetual siege of the Palestinian territories, the policy of closures, have rendered Mr. Arafat's task almost impossible. There is even irresponsible talk from Israelis of reoccupying these territories by force and of driving the `Tunis' leadership away, out of Palestine. There is no surer recipe for disaster.

While things cannot go on like this forever, they probably will go on for long. Some 75 per cent of the Israeli population supports targeted assassinations and a similar percentage on the Palestinians supports suicide bombings. There does not seem to be any pressure on Mr. Sharon, domestic or external, to try for a breakthrough. After all, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu is waiting in the wings. Mr. Arafat, for his part, would dearly like to have an independent Palestinian state recognised by everyone, including the U.S. and Israel. He is certainly not young but he is not about to accept just any deal. He is realistic enough to realise that he will never get all that he wants, but he is unlikely to humiliate himself or his people. It would be unrealistic for Israelis to expect a complete change of heart among the Palestinians in their feelings towards the Israelis. Israelis and Palestinians will not be able to break the deadlock by themselves, through bilateral contacts alone. The mistrust between the two peoples has been intensified as a result of the events of the past nine months. They, particularly the Palestinians, need external help which the U.S. alone is in a position to extend. The Americans can be excused for not wanting to burn their fingers but they have no choice, they will have to come in, sooner or later. They have already embraced the concept of `monitors'; they should work harder to make Israel agree to it. The closures will have to be ended, not just eased. Mr. Arafat will have to make a credible effort to curb violence. A package, demanding concessions from both and offering something to each, will have to elaborated. Such a package does exist in the form of the Mitchell Commission report which both sides claim to have accepted. It or a modification of it needs to be implemented quickly. The issues are such that any so-called final settlement is bound to leave significant sections on both sides deeply unhappy. The only theoretical solution which can bring real peace is a truly binational state, but that is a chimera.

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