|
Online edition of India's National Newspaper Friday, August 17, 2001 |
|
Front Page |
National |
Southern States |
Other States |
International |
Opinion |
Business |
Sport |
Entertainment |
Miscellaneous |
Features |
Classifieds |
Employment |
Index |
Home |
|
Opinion
| Previous
| Next
Bloodletting in West Asia
By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan
NO ONE is talking any more of peace in West Asia. The maximum
that is hoped for is a lull in the daily bloodletting. The
parties most directly concerned, the Israelis and the
Palestinians, are so involved in the cycle of violence and
counter violence that has become their daily life that they do
not have the time to reflect on any long term or even medium term
strategy for even a ceasefire, let alone peace. The only external
agency which can and ought to do something, namely the United
States, seems to have run out of ideas and the desire to arrest
the slide which is threatening to engulf the entire region.
The suicide bombing in Jerusalem on August 10 has taken the
crisis to an extraordinarily high level. While the Israeli
Government had to `do something' to satisfy public opinion, its
takeover of Orient House and flying of the Israeli flag over it
was calculated to generate the kind of response from Palestinian
extremists which the Israeli right would use to demand and
justify more disproportionate reprisals against the Palestinian
Authority institutions which had nothing to do with the terrorist
attacks. It would make extremists of moderate Palestinians, just
as the Jerusalem attack contributed to radicalising sections of
the Israeli left.
The situation has become particularly alarming since responsible
Israelis are openly calling for the overthrow of the Palestinian
Authority and even of Mr. Yasser Arafat. The former Prime
Minister, Mr. Ehud Barak, called for a change saying it was
simply impossible to negotiate peace with Mr. Arafat. The present
Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon, has employed any number of
undiplomatic adjectives to describe Mr. Arafat. Others have
expressed preference for talking to a different leadership, on
the stated premise that it was bound to be more moderate. They,
of course, know not what they are saying. They ought to realise
that if there is one Palestinian who can sell an unpopular
settlement to his people - and any deal will be unpopular on both
sides - it is Mr. Arafat. No one is indispensable; but even the
New York Times, in an editorial, described Mr. Arafat as ``the
only realistic Palestinian negotiating partner''.
After the failed Camp David summit talks of July 2000, the media
and leaders in Israel and America spoke ad nauseum about how Mr.
Arafat missed a golden opportunity to strike a deal that he was
not likely ever again to be offered. It is a repeat of that old
Abba Eban song of the Palestinians never missing an opportunity
of missing an opportunity. Enough revisionist writing has come
out over the past few weeks about Camp David credibly challenging
the accounts that Mr. Barak had offered Mr. Arafat `the moon'.
What Mr. Barak had offered was three disconnected areas in the
West Bank with numerous settlements to remain in place. Mr.
Robert Malley, a member of the small American team at Camp David,
has stated that no other Arab party - not Sadat's Egypt nor King
Hussein's Jordan - came even close to the kind of compromises
that Mr. Arafat was prepared to offer at Camp David. Of course,
this is not to take anything away from the undoubtedly courageous
package which Mr. Barak put on the table, But, as Mr. Malley says
in his article in the New York Times, the measure of Israel's
concessions was not how far it moved from its original position
but how far it moved towards a fair solution. As for Camp David,
Mr. Henry Kissinger aptly concludes in his new book, ``Does
America need a foreign policy?'', it turned the Middle East from
a difficult problem into an intractable one.
As things are at present, it is not easy to see how the violence
can be ended. On the Israeli side, it is undeniable that a large
number of innocent lives have been lost as a result of terrorist
attacks for which there can be no justification. Nor can the
policy of `targeted assassinations' by official Israeli agencies
be justified. One can be excused for wondering, given Mr.
Sharon's background of at least indirect responsibility for the
massacres of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatilla camps in
Lebanon in 1982 as well as his deliberately provocative visit to
the Haram El Sharif in the Old City in September last year, about
the genuineness of his declared wish for peace. At least one
important moderate Arab leader has publicly said that there was
no prospect of peace so long as Mr. Sharon remained in power.
On the Palestinian side, Mr. Arafat is accused of not reining in
the terrorists, of not incarcerating those on Israel's wanted
list, indeed of trying to win on the `battle field' what he could
not get at the negotiating table. Mr. Arafat must make every
effort to curb the violence. But he is not in control of Hamas or
of the `street'. The `street' in the Arab countries is an
unpredictable factor over which even the most autocratic dictator
has no absolute control and for which all Arab rulers have a
healthy fear and respect. Following Mr. Sharon's visit to the
Temple Mount last September, there has been tremendous
radicalisation of Palestinian society. Even some Palestinian
civil society leaders, universally regarded and respected for
their moderate views and known for their dislike for Mr. Arafat,
refuse to condemn suicide bombings. Besides everything else, Mr.
Arafat also has a real problem of image with his `street'. There
is a widespread perception among the Palestinian population that
those around Mr. Arafat are incorrigibly corrupt. The system is
not transparent and the Palestinian people are too well educated
and politically conscious to tolerate for long a state of affairs
which fosters an atmosphere of corruption.
Having said this, however, it needs to be emphasized that
Israel's actions, in particular the perpetual siege of the
Palestinian territories, the policy of closures, have rendered
Mr. Arafat's task almost impossible. There is even irresponsible
talk from Israelis of reoccupying these territories by force and
of driving the `Tunis' leadership away, out of Palestine. There
is no surer recipe for disaster.
While things cannot go on like this forever, they probably will
go on for long. Some 75 per cent of the Israeli population
supports targeted assassinations and a similar percentage on the
Palestinians supports suicide bombings. There does not seem to be
any pressure on Mr. Sharon, domestic or external, to try for a
breakthrough. After all, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu is waiting in the
wings. Mr. Arafat, for his part, would dearly like to have an
independent Palestinian state recognised by everyone, including
the U.S. and Israel. He is certainly not young but he is not
about to accept just any deal. He is realistic enough to realise
that he will never get all that he wants, but he is unlikely to
humiliate himself or his people. It would be unrealistic for
Israelis to expect a complete change of heart among the
Palestinians in their feelings towards the Israelis. Israelis and
Palestinians will not be able to break the deadlock by
themselves, through bilateral contacts alone. The mistrust
between the two peoples has been intensified as a result of the
events of the past nine months. They, particularly the
Palestinians, need external help which the U.S. alone is in a
position to extend. The Americans can be excused for not wanting
to burn their fingers but they have no choice, they will have to
come in, sooner or later. They have already embraced the concept
of `monitors'; they should work harder to make Israel agree to
it. The closures will have to be ended, not just eased. Mr.
Arafat will have to make a credible effort to curb violence. A
package, demanding concessions from both and offering something
to each, will have to elaborated. Such a package does exist in
the form of the Mitchell Commission report which both sides claim
to have accepted. It or a modification of it needs to be
implemented quickly. The issues are such that any so-called final
settlement is bound to leave significant sections on both sides
deeply unhappy. The only theoretical solution which can bring
real peace is a truly binational state, but that is a chimera.
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail
|
|
Section : Opinion Previous : Politico-military mismatch in J&K Next : Redeem the pledge | |
|
Front Page |
National |
Southern States |
Other States |
International |
Opinion |
Business |
Sport |
Entertainment |
Miscellaneous |
Features |
Classifieds |
Employment |
Index |
Home | |
|
Copyrights © 2001 The Hindu Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of The Hindu |
|