Jammu on the brink

By Balraj Puri

THE KILLINGS of Hindus in the Jammu region should not be dismissed as stray terrorist acts of desperate militants. The Jammu problem is as old as the Kashmir problem. Jammu was more populous than the Kashmir Valley before independence, when the State was ruled by a Jammu-based Maharaja. It was the worst- affected part of the State in 1947 as a wave of riots from neighbouring Punjab engulfed it and the Maharaja was indecisive on the issue of accession. The tribals' raid from Pakistan forced him as well as the National Conference, led by Sheikh Abdullah, to opt for India. But the ceasefire on January 1, 1949, divided the non-Kashmiri speaking areas of the State, including the Jammu region, into Indian and Pakistan parts, while the Kashmiri- speaking area remained intact.

Power was then transferred from the Jammu-based ruler to the Kashmir-based leadership. Lack of a political base in Jammu, prejudices against its people and ignorance about its genuine leadership, inter alia, prevented the leaders of Kashmir from sharing power with Jammu. I argued for some arrangement for giving the people of Jammu a share of political power in the new setup in one of my first meetings with Nehru after Independence. He saw continuance of the Maharaja as constitutional head of the State as a solution. This was an inadequate response.

For, while real power would remain with the Kashmiri leadership, Jammu would have only an illusion of it with the result that a democratic movement would never grow in the region. The experiment failed as the Maharaja was forced to abdicate in May 1949 when tension between him and Sheikh Abdullah became irreconcilable. In July 1952, Nehru, after consultation with Abdullah, accepted my proposal for regional autonomy. But, the Jana Sangh and its affiliate in Jammu, the Praja Parishad, rejected it. Instead, they sought transfer of more powers from the State to the Centre - ``full accession''. This provoked a sharp reaction in the Kashmir Valley where Sheikh Abdullah had rallied people against Pakistan on the plank of autonomy within India.

I led a mass campaign for regional autonomy in the mid-1960s under the banner of the Jammu Autonomy Forum which received support from all communities and parts of Jammu and sympathetic response from Kashmir. The Government thereupon appointed a Commission of Inquiry, headed by the retired Chief Justice of India, P.B. Gajendragadkar, to study causes of regional tensions. Its report said, ``theoretically it may be conceded that regional autonomy would cement Jammu's relation with Kashmir''. But in view of opposition of the major political parties, the report was not accepted.

The 1968 J&K People's convention unanimously accepted my formula that the future of the State should keep in view the interest of its three regions and ensure implementation of an internal constitutional setup which provided for regional autonomy. Before coming to power in 1975, Sheikh Abdullah called a convention of representatives of Jammu and Ladakh and sought their support on the basis of regional autonomy. As Chief Minister, he repeated his commitment on various occasions and in various fora. Somehow he did not honour his word when in power.

Dr. Farooq Abdullah appointed me working chairman of the Regional Autonomy Committee. I submitted my report in June 1998 which proposed devolution of political power at regional, district, block and panchayats levels and allocation of funds according to an objective and equitable formula, based on social indicators such as health, education, share in State services and admissions to technical institutions, contribution to the State exchequer, area and population. Measures were also suggested to safeguard and promote cultures of various ethnic communities.

For six months, the Chief Minister could not find time to discuss the report with me, despite many requests. After that, I was removed from the RAC and an officially drafted report was released which proposed division of Jammu and Ladakh regions on religious lines without proposing any devolution of political and economic powers. This was a final blow to the secular identities of these regions and the faith of the people in the ruling leadership of Kashmir. Jammu politics was further polarised by the BJP and the National Conference along religious lines. The Constitution under which Jammu and Kashmir was being governed already had inbuilt provisions for regional and communal tensions. Mutual provocations diverted the aspirations of the two regions in divergent directions; the Hindu of Jammu looking to Delhi and the Muslims of Kashmir looking across the border for support. In the process, regional identities got eroded. The Muslims of Jammmu, composing 30 per cent of its population and being in a majority in three out of its six districts, as also the Hindus of Kashmir tended to get isolated in their respective regions. As regional identities got weakened, religious identities grew stronger.

Meanwhile, repeated promises by not only the ruling party but the entire Kashmiri leadership for sharing power with Jammu through regional autonomy were not kept. The consequent bitterness coupled with grievances against misgovernance, corruption and nepotism found expression in anti-Kashmir sentiments in Jammu (which were sought to be diverted into anti-Muslim sentiments) echoed by anti-Jammu sentiments in Kashmir (which are sought to be diverted into anti-Hindu and anti-India sentiments). Apart from false and unfulfilled promises, Jammu's urge for empowerment was sought to be met through a bseries of illusions: a Maharaja from Jammu without power who represented an institution that could not last long, a process of transfer of power from the State to the Centre, which could not go on beyond a limit, President's rule instead of a Kashmiri Chief Minister, which is not a permanent solution.

The latest in the series of steps to ``mollify Jammu's sentiments'' is the extension of Disturbed Areas Act and Special Powers Act to the whole of the region which would transfer some of the power of the ``Kashmiri-dominated'' civil administration, which had lost the confidence of the people of the region, to the security forces. But none of these measures is a substitute for transfer of power to the people. This, through a federal and decentralised setup, is the only way to reconcile the aspirations and interests of all the regions and communities of the State.

Unlike Kashmir, which is uni-religious now, Jammu has a mixed population. The brand of militancy in Jammu is far more fanatical than that in Kashmir. The aim is to create communal trouble. To check this, unity among the people and their cooperation are more important than the number of troops. This is a task for the political leadership and the civil administration. It is unjust to shift the task on security forces who have neither the knowledge of the local situation nor professional training to promote communal harmony and enlist the people's support, which are essential for anti-terrorist operations in Jammu.

Even if the Constitution cannot be changed into a federal form and autonomous regional bodies, as promised for so long, cannot be immediately established, ad hoc political and civil institutions are absolutely necessary to prevent possible communal conflagrations, towards which Muslim and Hindu fanatics are pushing the regions and which are bound to have repercussions far beyond the borders of the region and the State.

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