Safety first: building confidence during the nuclear transition

By Deepanshu Bagchee & Matthew C.J. Rudolph

Amid all the post-Agra hand wringing, much has been made about Pakistan's intransigence on cross-border terrorism, India's inability to think creatively about solutions in Kashmir, and the media's responsibility in covering the delicate cross-border relationship. And again Kashmir has grabbed headlines as fresh attacks provoke severe counter-measures from an NDA Government that feels increasingly vulnerable.

At just such a sensitive moment, everyone seems to have forgotten the crucial issue of nuclear safety. The best way to avoid a nuclear accident or miscalculation is to press forward with India-Pakistan nuclear-related confidence-building measures (CBMs).

There are two reasons why this issue must be addressed immediately. First, the Agra summit allowed the leaders of both the countries to meet face to face for the first time since the Kargil conflict and the October, 1999 military coup in Pakistan. Such normalcy, though not necessarily warmth, presents an opportunity to negotiate fresh CBMs. Second, the post-Agra violence in Kashmir proves yet again that as long as India and Pakistan are unable to resolve outstanding issues, the threat of greater violence and escalation will persist.

In the future, South Asian nuclear safety may get a boost from an unlikely source - unilateral Indian action. In a recent research paper, Ashley Tellis of the U.S.-based think-tank RAND argues that India does not seek to build a ready nuclear force (www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB63/).

Referring to India's emerging nuclear posture as ``force-in- being'', Tellis suggests that in the future, India would maintain a nuclear deterrent consisting of unassembled nuclear warheads under strict civilian control, with dedicated delivery systems kept away from their operational areas. These components could be brought together rapidly to create a usable force during an emergency.

As befits a peaceful democracy, such a policy would establish a relatively credible logistics-based Indian commitment to ``no first use''. It would also increase stability in a crisis, and would probably garner Indian some prestige internationally. However, more than three years after the 1998 nuclear tests, the composition, size and deployment patterns of Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces remain unclear, adding to the risk of miscalculation or accidents. If Tellis is to be believed, India will soon be settling down to a post-Pokhran II nuclear posture.

But change in bilateral nuclear relations is always fraught with risk, and until there is an explicit harmonisation of India's declared nuclear doctrine, made public in August 1999 (www://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm), and her actual force posture, a more robust bilateral regime of CBMs will be crucial.

CBMs would reassure the weaker power Pakistan, increase transparency in both directions, and smooth the transition to a formalised subcontinental nuclear status-quo.

Shortly following the nuclear tests, an initial set of CBMs were negotiated as part of the 1999 Lahore Declaration. The two sides agreed to provide advance notification of ballistic missile test- flights, maintain a unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear testing, and improve existing communication links between the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs). Despite the post-Kargil diplomatic chill, the first two have reportedly been adhered to.

Alas, in the more than two years since Lahore, little fresh progress has been made. The initial CBMs agreed to then, should now be expanded to include several further measures.

Communications

First, the two sides should go beyond DGMO-level communications, and establish dedicated communications systems and protocols between their respective nuclear command groups. This would facilitate the signalling of intentions or accident warnings.

According to Mr. P. R. Chari of the New Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, ``the need for a common language to understand each other's signalling, such as sounding different states of alert in an emergency, is of supreme importance to defuse future crises and avoid conflict.'' While there would be no way to prevent bluffing in a crisis, any measures that facilitate pre-launch communication, or extend pre- launch preparations merit serious consideration.

Missiles

Measures should be developed to make deployment slower, flight- times longer, and post-launch self-destructions more reliable. Agreeing to a specified non-deployment zone for missiles could be a useful start. According to Kent Biringer of the U.S.-based Sandia National Laboratories, ``for shorter-range missiles, decisions to move the missiles away from borders and out of range of the other side could build confidence and reduce the potential threat level.''

Verification could be provided through third party satellites or by cooperative aerial reconnaissance. The latter method is in line with a proposal from Ambassadors Teresita Schaffer and John Hawes. In a 1999 report from the Washington- based Stimson Center, these veterans of South Asian and arms control diplomacy suggested that, ``a programme of cooperative aerial observation would offer immediate, tangible security advantages for both sides.''

Technical Control

Finally, given the new warmth emerging between New Delhi and Washington, and the increasing need for the U.S. to reassure Pakistan, a three-way nuclear safety consultation committee could be formed. As bait, the U.S. can offer equal access to hardware and technical assistance to introduce safety-enhancing procedures such as the use of permissive action links (PALs), which provide a coded-lock on nuclear weapons preventing unauthorised or accidental use.

Both critics and advocates of overt India-Pakistan nuclearisation can agree that, in the near term, safety must be a top priority. As the political leadership on both sides has done little to promote safety-enhancing nuclear-related CBMs, the time has come to apply public and elite pressure on these governments to address this matter with the greatest urgency.

(The writers are, respectively, correspondent for the programme Worldview India on Doordarshan, and doctoral candidate in Political Science at Cornell University.)

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