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Judges in their own cause - I
By Prashant Bhushan
ON OCTOBER 15, 1999, the Supreme Court, without even giving
Arundhati Roy a notice or an opportunity to be heard - and
therefore in violation of the principles of natural justice -
proceeded to make the following remarks against her: ``Judicial
process and institution cannot be permitted to be scandalised or
subjected to contumacious violation in such a blatant manner in
which it has been done by her. ... Vicious stultification and
vulgar debunking cannot be permitted to pollute the stream of
justice. ... We are unhappy at the way in which the leaders of
the NBA and Ms. Arundhati Roy have attempted to undermine the
dignity of the court. We expected better behaviour from them''.
The provocation for the use of this rather strong language by the
court were the following passages in her essay `The greater
Common good', that the court took exception to: ``I Stood on the
hill and laughed out loud. I had crossed the Narmada by boat from
Jalsindhi and climbed the headland on the opposite bank from
where I could see, ranged across the crowns of low bald hills,
the tribal hamlets of Sikka, Surung, Neemgavan and Domkhedi. I
could see their airy, fragile homes. I could see their fields and
the forests behind them. I could see little children with littler
goats scuttling across the landscape like motorized peanuts. I
knew that I was looking a civilization older than Hinduism,
slated-sanctioned (by the highest Court of the land) to be
drowned this monsoon when the waters of the Sardar Sarovar
reservoir will rise to submerge it.''
``Why did I laugh? Because I suddenly remembered the tender
concern with which the Supreme Court Judges in Delhi (before
vacating the legal stay on further construction of the Sardar
Sarovar dam) had enquired whether tribal children in the
resettlement colonies would have children's parks to play in. The
lawyers representing the government had hastened to assure them
that indeed they would and what's more, there were seesaws and
slides and swings in every park. I looked up at the endless sky
and down at the river rushing past and for a brief, brief moment
the absurdity of it all reversed my rage and I laughed. I meant
no disrespect.''
``Who owns this land? Who owns its rivers? Its forests? Its fish?
These are huge questions. They are being taken hugely seriously
by the State. They are being answered in one voice by every
institution at its command - the army, the police, the
bureaucracy, the courts. And not just answered, but answered
unambiguously, in bitter, brutal ways.''
``According to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 the government is
not legally bound to provide a displaced person anything but a
cash compensation. Imagine that. A cash compensation, to be paid
by the Indian government official to an illiterate tribal man
(the women get nothing) in a land where even the postman demands
a tip for a delivery! Most tribal people - or let's say most
small farmers - have as little use for money as a Supreme Court
judge has for a bag of fertilizer.''
I seriously doubt that any unbiased observer, even one unfamiliar
with the controversy surrounding the Sardar Sarovar project, and
even one who has not read her entire essay which provides the
context and justification for these remarks, would consider them
to be ``scandalous'' or ``contumacious violation'' or ``vicious
stultification'' or ``vulgar debunking'', which pollutes the
``pure stream of justice'' of the Supreme Court. But then, that
is the pronouncement of the highest court of the land. Who is to
question its wisdom?
A year later, on October 18, 2000, came the final judgment of the
Supreme Court on the Sardar Sarovar case by which the Narmada
Bachao Andolan's petition was virtually dismissed along with a
gratuitous lecture extolling the virtues of large dams, while
making snide remarks against the NBA as being an organisation
opposed to the development of India. On December 13, 2000, the
NBA held a demonstration outside the Supreme Court in which the
Court's judgment was criticised and denounced. Arundhati Roy
attended the Dharna as an observer and supporter of the NBA,
though she did not make any speech or raise any slogans.
In February 2001, the Supreme Court issued notice to Roy, Medha
Patkar and myself for Criminal Contempt of Court on the basis of
a petition filed by five lawyers who alleged that she along with
Patkar and me had led this demonstration, shouted vulgar slogans
against the Court, and had assaulted and threatened the
petitioners.
The petition filed by the advocates had several fatal defects.
First, the petition did not disclose the addresses of the
petitioners or the respondents as required by the Supreme Court
Rules. Roy's address was mentioned as ``Booker prize winner'',
Patkar's as, ``Leader NBA'', and mine as ``Advocate Supreme
Court''. The address of all the petitioners was mentioned as
``Bar Library No. 1''. Second, the petition was signed by only
one of the petitioners though according to the rules it should
have been signed by all five of the petitioners. Third, the
affidavit in support of the petition was signed by only one of
the petitioners though it purports to be on behalf of two of
them. Lastly, the petition did not contain the consent of the
Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General of India, which is a
mandatory requirement of the Contempt of Court's Act. And that is
quite apart from the absurdity of the charges of assault and
threats made in the petition against us. Even the local police
station had refused to register the FIR of the petitioners on
these charges. Despite these defects, the Court entertained the
petition and notices were issued, requiring Roy, Patkar and
myself to be present in Court in person on every hearing of the
case.
In these circumstances, Roy in her affidavit in reply, while
asserting her right to be present at the demonstration and
setting out the facts of what happened there, also expressed her
indignation at such a petition being entertained at all by the
Court. Her affidavit went on to say: ``On the grounds that judges
of the Supreme Court were too busy, the Chief Justice of India
refused to allow a sitting judge to head the judicial enquiry
into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves matters of
national security and corruption in the highest places.''
``Yet when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely
unsubstantiated petition in which all the three respondents
happen to be people who have publicly - though in markedly
different ways - questioned the policies of the government and
severely criticised a recent judgement of the Supreme Court, the
court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice.''
``It indicates a disquieting inclination on the part of the court
to silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate
those who disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on
an FIR that even a local police station does not see fit to act
upon, the Supreme court is doing its own reputation considerable
harm.''
On August 28, the Supreme Court dismissed the contempt petition
of the lawyers, holding that it was grossly defective and coupled
with the fact that even the police who were present at the dharna
had refused to register the FIR of the petitioners, and in view
of the abominable behaviour of the petitioners in Court, the
allegations in the petition did not inspire confidence. However,
the Court went on to hold that the above paragraphs of Roy's
affidavit themselves amounted to contempt since they imputed
improper motives to the Court. The Court has thus directed the
issue of a second contempt notice on this basis!
It has always been accepted, even in pronouncements by the
Supreme Court, that the Court and its judgments can be subjected
to strong, even trenchant criticism. Is the same yardstick not
available for comments on the use or abuse of the Court's powers
of contempt? In the case of Arundhati Roy, the Court took offence
at the fact that in her affidavit she had questioned the
discretion of the Court.
(The writer is a public interest lawyer in the Supreme Court.)
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