America's script for Afghanistan

By T. Sreedhar

THE DEVELOPMENTS in the international system since September 11 clearly indicate that the U.S. is attempting coercive diplomacy to defeat its adversary in Afghanistan. To begin with, it had caged Afghanistan by sealing all its borders. All of Afghanistan's neighbours including Iran cooperated with the U.S. in closing the borders. Simultaneously, by ordering its military to move closer to Afghanistan, the U.S. made it clear to its adversary in Afghanistan that in the event of not surrendering, it was likely to take severe punitive action. This was followed by the opening of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. By this the U.S. made room for the Taliban and its sympathisers in Afghanistan to escape its wrath. In the process it is also meeting the criticism of a section of the international community that innocent civilian population will be victims in the event of U.S. military operations. By delaying the military operation, the U.S. can now say it is giving time for the civilians to move out. Making the anti-Taliban forces re-launch their offensive against the militia followed these two measures.

If the media reports are to be believed, Osama bin Laden's godfather in the Saudi establishment and King Fahd's nephew, Prince Turki al Faisal, was replaced as the director-general of Saudi intelligence around the middle of September by Prince Nawaf Bin Abdul Aziz. After this change, Saudi Arabia announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Taliban. The U.S. thus seems to have ensured that there is no support from Riyadh to Osama and his Al-Qaeda organisation. Having put into operation these tactical moves, the U.S. on September 24 announced the freezing of assets of the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine and 26 other organisations that work with them and whom the U.S. considers as being primarily responsible for the tragic events of September 11 in New York and Washington.

All these measures will have a visible impact, say in 3-4 weeks on the U.S. adversary in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, and Osama bin Laden have appealed to their fellow faithful to rise in revolt against the U.S. Here four questions arise. First, are Osama and Mullah Omar charismatic enough to inspire their fellow faithful to launch a jehad against the U.S. and its allies. The plethora of statements from Washington indicate that though the U.S. acknowledges that Osama has remarkable organisational skills, it feels that he and Mullah Omar are not charismatic enough. If this assessment is right, the American script for Afghanistan will work.

However, if the U.S. assessment is wrong, the consequences can be disastrous. It may be alienating a large number of countries in the Islamic world. The result of such an alienation can have a profound impact on the emerging post-Cold War world order.

Second, the extraordinary situation in which it was placed forced the U.S. to co-opt Pakistan into its strategy. Everyone understands the compulsions behind this move, but Pakistan is a fragile polity. The Taliban's philosophy is being increasingly accepted in Pakistan. If we go by Pakistani media reports, the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan, adjacent to Afghanistan, are alienated from Islamabad. One can be reasonably certain that in the coming weeks, Mullah Omar, a Pashtoon, will appeal on both sides of the Durand line, the Pak-Afghan border, by saying that the Pashtoons, honour is at stake. In a society governed by tribal loyalties and age-old customs, such an appeal will have a considerable impact. The Pashtoons feel they were cheated by the British while leaving the Indian subcontinent in 1947 by not granting them separate nationhood. Over the years the Punjabi mafia that ruled Pakistan further alienated the people of the NWFP and Baluchistan through their lopsided policies. The ``hate Islamabad'' relationship between the NWFP and Baluchistan was clearly reflected in the decision of tribal chiefs of NWFP meeting on Sept. 25 and unanimously deciding to join their fellow Pashtoons in their fight against the U.S.

Within 24 hours of this announcement, Gen. Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan would not cooperate with the U.S. if it launched an attack on the Taliban and replaced it with the Northern Alliance or Zahir Shah, the ex-King.

This extraordinary u-turn in policy can also be attributed to two other reasons. The Pakistani elite has always looked upon China as its closest ally in the region and often described Sino-Pak. relations as an all-weather friendship. Hours before the new Pakistani shift in policy, China described Pakistan as just another ``neighbour''. This sharp reaction can be considered as China clear disapproval of Pakistan's new relationship with the U.S. This must have rung alarm bells in Islamabad. Similarly, Iran, another neighbour of Afghanistan, unlike Pakistan refused to yield to any U.S. offer in return for providing facilities to the proposed action by Washington in Afghanistan.

Gen. Musharraf may also be thinking that like Gen. Zia during the U.S. `fight' against the Red Army in Afghanistan, what the Americans are offering financially is `peanuts' to the risks he is taking by being a frontline state to the U.S. ``crusade'' against global terrorism. In the coming weeks, the U.S. may offer more incentives to Pakistan to stay with it. That is a different story. But the U.S. has to keep its fingers crossed over the extent of support Gen. Musharraf will be able to extend.

Third, the Americans appear to be depending excessively on the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine. Everyone in this part of the world knows that the Alliance is a loosely knit organisation without any proper agenda. Some of its leaders like Dostum and Hekmatyar failed to give up their egos in their fight against the Taliban. With the result that inspite of considerable assistance from several countries bordering Afghanistan, the Alliance was defeated by the Taliban.

Since the beginning of September, the gains being claimed by the Northern Alliance in and around Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif can be attributed to the Taliban vacating these areas to re-group to face the U.S. attack.

Even if one assumes that the Alliance would succeed in the fight against the Taliban, one is not sure that there will not be a fight for leadership. In addition, Pakistan is not going to accept such a development. Already Pakistan has made public its reservations about the role of the Alliance in any future political setup in Afghanistan. Therefore, one is not certain how far the Alliance can be an alternative to the Taliban.

The U.S. may argue that it is in no mood for nation-building in the post-Taliban period. Like in 1989, if it leaves Afghanistan without establishing a broad-based government there is every possibility of the country returning to radical politics. Therefore, the script-writers in Washington will have to come up with a proper plan for a responsible government in Kabul in a post-Taliban scenario.

Last, any campaign in Afghanistan by an external power must take into consideration the weather. According to a study done at the IDSA, any U.S. operation against the Taliban must be completed before the end of November. From December to February, airborne or ground operation will be extremely difficult in the inhospitable terrain.

Can the U.S. in the next 60 days, achieve its objective of catching Osama dead or alive and punish those who harboured him? Every informed person on Afghanistan doubts very much the U.S. capabilities in achieving this objective before November-end.

(The writer is Senior Research Associate, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)

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