War in Afghanistan

By V. R. Raghavan

A NEW Afghan war is about to commence shortly. A massive coalition of countries interested in eliminating terrorism has agreed to combine its resources to cleanse Afghanistan of its terrorist ideology. The fact is that terrorism is a response of the weaker adversary in a conflict where the other side holds overwhelming military and economic power. It is the response to an unequal military conflict and has been correctly termed asymmetric war. An asymmetric war can be continued without fronts, without military forces and by attacking the people instead of the military. Now that economic power drives all aspects of security, economic assets become targets in asymmetric wars. That was what the attacks of September 11 were all about. They struck at the people and the economy. The response is also an asymmetric buildup of military power. The conflict between massive military power and massive terror response is about to reach unprecedented levels.

The Taliban made the strategic error of claiming legitimacy for terrorism by giving it state support. It has placed itself in the invidious position of neither being able to hand over Osama bin Laden nor of disclaiming its role in international terrorism. Since it will not hand over Osama, it has become the target of war against terrorism. This combined with the Taliban's medieval manner of Islamic governance has turned almost all Islamic states against it. It represents the majority Pushtun population of Afghanistan, but has squandered that population's loyalty by its barbaric rule. That opens the possibility of targeting the Taliban as a separate entity from the Pushtun population.

The U.S. coalition against terrorism has deployed a massive military force. Much of it comprises air attack capabilities based both on land and at sea. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Naval Fleets are assembled in addition to long range bombers, AWACs, stealth aircraft. Cruise missiles form part of this awesome military buildup. There are nearly 30,000 ground troops getting ready for the impending operations. The Taliban's military capability is entirely asymmetric in comparison. Its military hardware consists of a little over 500 assorted tanks with poor maintenance standards. There are about 1,000 artillery pieces, some multi-barrel rocket-launchers, a few combat aircraft and some helicopters. Much of the munitions, crew for tanks, instructors for artillery, and command and control facilities were Pakistan dependent. This hardware can be destroyed by the coalition air power within a week or two of the start of the operations.

The strategic objectives of the military operations being planned by the U.S. have not been spelt out. They are also unlikely to be listed to retain surprise and flexibility of options. It is, however, not difficult to make an estimate. The immediate purpose of the strikes in Afghanistan would be to assuage a justifiably angry and seriously shaken public in the U.S. That would require air strikes against known and anticipated locations where Osama may have taken shelter. The operations against Osama would continue until he is eliminated. Fired by his personal brand of martyrdom he would rather perish and be a hero than be captured and stand trial. The Osama saga will become folklore in the Islamic world. There are children named Osama by their parents, in adoration of a man they see as a martyr. We shall before long see, the dramatic pictures from the cameras mounted in combat aircraft showing laser guided munitions destroying Osama locations. War as a spectator sport will have everyone glued to the TV. Hopefully it will also satisfy the desire for justice being done to the man behind the horrendous events in New York and Washington.

The Bush administration has apparently had a major change of focus in foreign and security policy since the September 11 attacks. Terrorism offers not only a long term policy focus but also unlimited opportunities in advancing U.S. strategic interests. Control over Afghanistan would link the energy-rich Central Asian region to a proximate U.S. presence. The U.S. influence and military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asian states, not unlike that over the oil-rich Gulf states, would be a major strategic gain. The NATO's eastern limits are already on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. The U.S. has put in place an ongoing military arrangement with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan is not lagging in its desire to regain influence in Afghanistan with U.S. assistance. A western military presence in a region extending from Turkey to Tajikistan would have a far- reaching strategic impact. The energy scenarios for the 21st century would be reconfigured substantially by such an arrangement. This is not to say that the arrangement would undesirable. The region can be a major source of wealth and political stability by eliminating terrorism and replacing radical Islamic influences.

A regime change in Afghanistan is more likely to be the major strategic purpose of the U.S.-led military operations. It would not be a difficult objective to attain in military terms. The Taliban's military hardware will be destroyed within a fortnight once operations commence. Its command setup, communications hubs and ability to move forces would be neutralised soon. Taliban forces would be isolated into groups and forced to be on the move by the coalition's unrelenting air operations. It will get no replenishment of munitions and oil and its ability to offer a cohesive military response would be ended. That is where the Northern Alliance and the coalition's ground forces would join the battle. Every attempt would be made to capture and eliminate the Taliban leadership. A new political alliance would be put in place. In all this, the willing participation of the majority Pushtun population will be critical. It is unclear if a new political alliance will be able to obtain and sustain that participation. The Taliban leadership could escape to Pakistan, which would strain U.S.-Pakistan relations to breaking point.

A major geopolitical change of the order envisaged above will require a substantial role for Pakistan. Its geographic, political and cultural linkages and its own strategic considerations make Pakistan central to a future dispensation in Afghanistan. In short, control over Afghanistan necessitates control over Pakistan. The Central Asian states long under threat from a Taliban-led Afghanistan, can provide the instrument of a Northern Alliance. However, it is Pakistan which will bring the ballast necessary for long term stability in Afghanistan. This will require a major change in Pakistan, whose social, religious, economic and political systems have been permeated by the Afghan condition. That change will have to be brought about by the military-led Government. In the absence of credible political alternatives, a very long spell of military government will become inevitable if the strategic vision for Afghanistan and Central Asia has to become a reality. Pakistan's military high command has the potential to be split, on continuing a long campaign against its erstwhile proteges in Afghanistan. What that would do to the long term prospect of stability in Pakistan, and its zeal to continue a conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, is not difficult to imagine.

Afghanistan should not divert attention from the Middle East which is critical to international terrorism. Its wealth, its deep antipathy to what is perceived as persecution of Arabs, its terror technology sophistication and its close links in Europe and U.S., make it the fount for terrorist acts. That region needs to be addressed as urgently as Afghanistan, if terrorism is to be truly eliminated. Advancing strategic interests at the expense of the causes of terrorism, will be counterproductive to the new- found urge to put an end to it. Unless that is taken in hand, asymmetric wars will not end. In fact they would be fought with new tools. That is where Pakistan figures high in terrorism's risk profile. A divided polity, armed groups fired by religious fervour, availability of nuclear weapons, and military rulers divided among themselves all add up to a volatile combination of destabilising factors. Controlling and bringing around Pakistan to being a modern and liberal state - which it is eminently capable of being - will take a major effort and even more time. An unstable or unwilling Pakistan cannot be a recipe for a stable Afghanistan. It remains to be seen if the major powers have the stamina to stay the course. Afghanistan will sorely test the will of all states, big or small.

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