Can U.S. restrain Pakistan?

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI, OCT. 2. As the Government reacts strongly against the escalation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, Indo-Pak. tensions pose an important test to the international coalition against terror that the Bush Administration has assembled.

In proclaiming over the last two days that ``India's patience is limited'', the Government is cautioning the United States and Pakistan not to take its restraint for granted. India is arguing that if the U.S. does not want to let Indo-Pak. tensions undermine the efforts of the international community in flushing out terrorists from Afghanistan, Washington needs to press Pakistan to turn off the tap of terrorism against India.

Curbing the temptation of taking advantage of Pakistan's difficult situation, India has chosen not to complicate the political life of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. While India understands the importance of Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. at this juncture, it would not want Islamabad to assume that it has a free hand to intensify cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

Sustaining the coalition is one of the biggest challenges in the pursuit of any war. Restraining warring members of a coalition is not entirely new to the U.S. During the Gulf War against Iraq in 1990-91, it had to exercise enormous pressure on Israel not to react against attacks from Baghdad, which tried to divide the coalition by drawing the Jewish state into the war.

As it set about building an international coalition against the Taliban regime following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. came to an early conclusion that cooperation from Pakistan was critical. The U.S. was grateful for the quick and unquestioning Indian support, but only Pakistan could provide it the much- needed access to Afghanistan and intelligence on the Taliban.

Washington was conscious of the potential destabilising impact of Indo-Pak. differences on the coalition. It hoped that India would not launch on a course that could provide an excuse for Gen. Musharraf not to cooperate.

India publicly suggested that it had no desire to complicate the life of Gen. Musharraf at this stage. Implied was the suggestion that it would not endanger Pakistan's security at a critical moment in its national life.

As it supported the U.S. war against international terrorism, India came round to accepting that the immediate American focus would be on draining the swamp in Afghanistan and eventually terrorism in other parts of the world. But the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly by the Jaish-e-Mohammed has shattered all expectations of even a temporary quiet and raised questions about India's policy of exercising restraint.

By all standards this is one of the worst terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir. The symbolism of the attack has not been lost on the Government.

India is also concerned that Pakistan, as it seeks to comply with the international pressures on Afghanistan, might want to step up terrorist activity in Kashmir as a way of mollifying the extremists at home.

In his letter to the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, reiterated India's reluctance to overburden American efforts at building an international coalition. But at the same time, he said, India was not prepared to watch Pakistan step-up terrorism in Kashmir. Any further escalation, he suggested, might compel him to act in defence of India's ``supreme national interest''.

The ball, in other words, is in the U.S. court. If it wants India to maintain restraint, it has to impress upon Pakistan to play by the same rules.

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