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Colin Powell's visit
By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan
WHAT IS the purpose behind the visit of the American Secretary of
State, Gen. Colin Powell, to India and Pakistan at this stage? Is
it merely to express the appreciation of his Government for the
support extended by these two countries in the war against
terrorism? Or, is it something more?
In Pakistan, Gen. Powell will convey the profound gratitude of
the Administration as well as the people of the United States for
the vital support extended by Pakistan in the war against Osama
bin Laden and the Taliban, not just in the form of logistics,
intelligence sharing and use of air space, but, equally
importantly, in the diplomatic game by sending delegations to
Kandahar to talk to the leaders of the Taliban in an apparent
effort to persuade them to agree to the demands of the American
President, Mr. George W. Bush. That politico-diplomatic exercise
was of great significance for Mr. Bush since it bought him time
not only to deploy and position his forces but also to
demonstrate to the Islamic world as well to his own people that
he was being responsible and reasonable. Those two weeks enabled
him also to put together a coalition of some 40 countries in what
is undoubtedly a crucial war against terrorism.
Pakistan used the time to develop a framework of policy which
would take care of the superpower's demands and, at the same
time, protect and further its national interests in all fields,
not excluding military. As it happens, the international
community, including India, might have exaggerated the domestic
difficulties of Pakistan's ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and this
suited him just fine. Once Pakistan came to the conclusion that
its interests dictated total identification with the American
objectives, it did not stop at anything. It even abandoned the
Taliban, its own creation, stopped hostility towards the Northern
Alliance and embraced the idea of King Zahir Shah playing an
important role in post- Taliban Afghanistan, thereby ensuring an
effective voice for itself in government-formation. Indeed, Gen.
Musharraf has already received assurances in that regard from
America. Thus the Americans have much to be grateful for to
Pakistan. We, in India, would believe that Pakistan has received
much more in return but that would be our perception which might
not be shared by the other party to that equation.
In India, Gen. Powell would certainly thank the Government for
its offer of cooperation - an offer which, for the most part, has
remained unutilised simply because the U.S. did not feel the need
to use our air space or our airfields in the military campaign.
He will try to reassure us about the renewed military
relationship between his country and Pakistan, asking us not to
attach undue importance to it or to read too much into it. He
will reiterate previous statements about the U.S. being
determined to deal with other terrorism once Osama bin Laden and
company are dealt with.
He will surely tell our leaders that the U.S. has not made any
commitment to Pakistan about Kashmir. He will once again condemn
the terrorist attack on the Assembly complex on October 1. By
time he comes to Delhi, Jaish-e-Mohammad might have declared a
terrorist organisation. He would repeat his Government's
position, namely, that the solution of the Kashmir dispute must
be arrived at by Pakistan and India, taking into account the
wishes of the Kashmiri people. All these statements and
reassurances will be important; their significance should not be
minimised.
Will there be something else on Gen. Powell's mind? One cannot
exclude the possibility of his indicating the willingness of the
U.S. to be ready to help restart the dialogue between India and
Pakistan, and to be helpful in initiating some kind of a
substantive discussion of the Kashmir problem. Mr. Bush, in his
remarks soon after Gen. Musharraf's televised address of
September 19, had suggested that the new situation created in the
aftermath of the September 11 events might offer an opportunity
for improved India-Pakistan atmosphere. The Prime Minister, Mr.
Atal Behari Vajpayee, did write to Mr. Bush, asking him to convey
a message to Pakistan that India's patience was not unlimited
and, no doubt, the latter did transmit an appropriate message to
the General.
Encouraged by Mr. Vajpayee's approach, which was dictated by the
murderous attack on the Assembly complex in Srinagar, Mr. Bush
might be tempted to at least throw feelers about a possible U.S.
role in the Kashmir imbroglio. Gen. Musharraf, whose
international standing has shot up in recent weeks, would be
portrayed as a very reasonable man with whom it would be possible
to negotiate in a restrained, polemic-free atmosphere. By
renewing a multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan, the U.S.
would claim to have regained as well its influence with it which
can only be for the good of Indo-Pakistan relations.
There is no denying the fact that the relations between India and
Pakistan, already strained after Agra, have become more tense in
recent days. The emotional outburst of the Jammu and Kashmir
Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, following the Assembly
massacre and his public call for attacking the terrorist training
camps across the Line of Control is an accurate indication of the
mood in the State, widely shared in the rest of the country. One
can, therefore, understand if the Americans, and the
international community as a whole, feel concerned at the
heightened tension between the two nuclear neighbours.
The politics in our country might not permit it, but we ought to
devise a response, if indeed Gen. Powell has any such thing on
his agenda, which, without amounting to an acceptance of any
mediation, would not slam the door for some form of creative
diplomacy to be deployed in future. After all, even Nehru had
accepted American mediation way back in 1962 on the very same
Kashmir issue in the wake of our war with China. True, India was
much weaker then, militarily and economically. Also, the
coalition government of today does not enjoy the kind of
confidence that Nehru enjoyed even after the debacle of 1962.
Nonetheless, Mr. Vajpayee has shown, by his actions, that he is
not afraid to take politically difficult decisions. He has also
said, in his ``Musings from Kumarakom'', that he was determined
to look for a solution to the Kashmir problem and that, in that
search, he would not hesitate to try new approaches. If the U.S.
can satisfy us on the question of our terrorism, if not fully,
then at least to some extent, it might create an atmosphere
wherein our people and politicians might be willing to
countenance some American role in the Kashmir question.
In any case, we ought not to react out of pique at the over-
generous manner in which the Americans are repaying Pakistan for
what they perceive as the crucial help they have received in
their war against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It would be
ironic if the triangular equation involving the U.S., India and
Pakistan were to change, with Pakistan enjoying warm relations
and India feeling frustrated and bitter towards the U.S. The only
country which would welcome such a denouement, though it would
deny it, would be Pakistan.
(The writer is a former Permanent Representative of India to the
United Nations and U.N. Special Coordinator in Gaza.)
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