The end of Pakistan's great game?

By Kesava Menon

``WON'T ALL of Afghanistan's problems be solved if it becomes a part of Pakistan?'' The question was posed by a Pakistani journalist to the Afghan Ambassador in Islamabad in the early 1990s. ``You have your history all mixed up,'' came the prompt reply. ``Afghanistan was never a part of Pakistan but Pakistan in times past has been a part of Afghanistan.''

The Ambassador in question represented the regime of Najibullah and his anger towards a Pakistan that was supporting the mujahideen groups was understandable. (At the time Najibullah was trying to negotiate a deal with the mujahideen, though still fighting them, and his envoy's presence was tolerated in the Pakistan capital). But there was something more than the hostility between the regimes that made the Ambassador give such a caustic and undiplomatic response. His Pashtun pride - the pride of the Durranis - would not let him accept that the men of the Salt Ranges (people who have always been conquered by invaders from the east and the west) should now entertain thoughts of ruling the Afghans.

Fast forward to another scene a few months later by which time Najibullah was gone and Pakistan's protege Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was jostling for power in Kabul. Professor Sibghatullah Mojadedi was nominally the President but all Afghanistan-watchers were waiting to see how the conflict between Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood would pan out. Masood everyone agreed was the far more able commander and from all indications the far more pleasant person. But Hekmatyar had Pakistan's backing and the odds seemed to be in his favour.

It was in this setting that the second scene unfolded. The Pashtun leader of a small opposition party buttonholed an Indian journalist in the near-empty cafeteria of the Pakistan National Assembly. India had made a big mistake, he said, by failing to militarily pressure Pakistan when it was fully engaged in the mujahideen war. By failing to apply such pressure India had harmed Afghanistan's cause, was his contention. ``Why can't India understand that what the Afghans are facing is Punjabi colonial aggression,'' he said in parting.A decade since then the circle seems about to close. Pakistan's hold over Afghanistan, courtesy the Taliban, seems destined to come to an end within a few days time. While the western media appears fascinated by the Taliban's ``indefatigable'' warriors and the masses from the madrassas that are flowing out into the streets of Peshawar and Quetta, only the newcomers among these journalists probably see any merit in these stories. The activists of the two wings of the Jamaat Ulema-e- Islam who are parading in the streets and burning the U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush's effigy are doing so only because their leaders, Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq, have been given the nod by the ISI. These demonstrations make Gen. Pervez Musharraf look good and bolster his claims that he made a very bold decision to join the U.S. coalition despite the threat from the fundamentalists.

Former Talib (students) from the madrassas run by the two wings of the JUI and other religious parties form one element in the core group of the Taliban while the Arab-Afghans form the other. The rest of the support is more diffuse. Local, district and provincial clan leaders who led the mujahideen bands against the Soviets make up this more ephemeral group of supporters. They were either bought over (probably with funds provided by the two West Asian states that joined Pakistan in recognising Mullah Omar's regime once it was installed in Kabul) or bowed to the inevitable when confronted with the combination of the Talibs and the Arabs that had been welded into an effective force under the supervision and with the assistance of the ISI.

Tensions between the core Taliban elements and the more ephemeral groups was in evidence right at the outset when a clan of Pashtuns forced Mullah Omar's regime to hand over the body of Dr. Najibullah which had been battered and left to hang in a Kabul street. But Mullar Omar, or more probably the ISI, appear to have handled the contradictions rather well till the aftermath of the September 11 bombings in the U.S. Recently there has been a flood of reports that Pashtun clans and local chieftains have been deserting Mullah Omar's regime in province after province of south-eastern Afghanistan.

If the Pashtun clans continue to desert the Taliban this development could form the fulcrum on which the whole situation in Afghanistan turns around. It is highly probable that Pakistan has had to close down its close support for the Taliban now that western intelligence and special forces are present in large numbers in the territories. Without the active support and guidance of Pakistan the two core elements of the Taliban constitute a force that has been considerably reduced in effectiveness.

The Pashtun clans that are now reportedly asserting their independence of Mullah Omar's regime are the real people of the land led by their traditional elite. In contrast, those recruited from the madrassas and the Arab-Afghans are artificial entities with no roots. Neither the madrassa recruits nor the Arabs will have any sanctuaries in Afghanistan once the local people have turned against them. Earlier the core of the Taliban could coerce the local people because they had external support but now they can only do so if they concentrate their forces against particular clans at a time. If they do so concentrate they will provide relatively easy pickings for the U.S. air armada that is just looking for juicy enough targets to take out.

Mullah Omar's regime has probably been the first in Afghan history in which the under-class, as represented by the gleanings from the madrassas, has ruled the country. From most accounts neither the madrassa recruits nor the Arab-Afghans have treated the traditional elite with any respect, especially in the cities. The desire for revenge would be very strong and it is not inconceivable that the tribesmen will turn on the madrassa recruits and the Arabs even if they (the tribesmen that is) are not able to forge unity among themselves whether through a Zahir Shah- convened Loya Jirga or otherwise.

The situation is fraught with a host of negative prospects for Pakistan. In turning their backs on the Taliban, Pakistan has succeeded in serially betraying every single faction and group in Afghanistan. Pakistan is now apparently trying to get on the right side of the designated ``good guys'' by cosying up to the Zahir Shah option, but are the Afghans going to forget or forgive what Pakistan has done to their country? Minority groups bundled together under the Northern Alliance have never considered the Taliban as anything but a force of Pakistani colonialism. Will the now-emerging Pashtun elite forgive Pakistan for subjecting it to the rule of the under-class and foreigners for five years and more?

It is too early for anyone to predict whether Afghanistan will slip into even greater chaos than before or whether, miraculously, this war-torn country will achieve a measure of stability. But it does look like Pakistan's great Afghan enterprise has come to an end. There was a time when Pakistan entertained visions of using a subordinate Afghanistan as the launching pad for extending its influence into Central Asia. At the very least, Pakistan thought, a subordinate Afghanistan would provide it with ``strategic depth'' against India. These hopes are a shambles now.

There could be worse to come. There are already reports that Baluch and Pashtun nationalists in western Pakistan are be- stirring themselves for a new struggle for extensive autonomy. If rage inside Afghanistan against Islamabad's interventionist policies runs out of control Pakistan could be left with a western border land that is as turbulent and rebellious as it was till the Soviet invasion gave them and the Afghans a common purpose.

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