Re-engaging Pakistan

By C. Raja Mohan

ABOUT THREE weeks ago the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in defending his decision to support American military action against Afghanistan, called on India to lay off Pakistan. But this week, he picked up the phone to talk to the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, with apparently a conciliatory message. What is going on? Gen. Musharraf's call surely came at the urging of the United States and Britain, which are deeply concerned at the mounting Indo-Pakistan tensions after the October 1 terrorist attack in Srinagar. But the more important question is whether Gen. Musharraf's call opens the door for reviving the peace process between India and Pakistan.

The visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell, in the next few days to the subcontinent and the prospect of an early visit to Pakistan by the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, reflect the rapidly shifting terrain of the relations between India, Pakistan and the U.S. since the attacks on New York and Washington a month ago. The transformation of this triangular relationship could be one of the most likely consequences of the American war against international terrorism. For India, this may be an important opportunity to set in motion a process that could nudge Pakistan in a positive direction with assistance from the global community.

India's own political mood since the September 11 terrorist attacks has tended to oscillate between extremes. Its initial expectation was that Pakistan, as an important sponsor of international terrorism, will finally face the wrath of the international community. But the coalition rediscovered the importance of Pakistan in the battle to isolate the Taliban. This generated deep political discomfort in New Delhi that Islamabad may gain at its expense in the new international context. The terrorist outrage against the Assembly in Srinagar earlier this month appeared to confirm India's worst suspicions that Pakistan will now be emboldened to step up its cross-border violence. When Mr. Vajpayee threatened that India was losing its patience with Pakistan and would be compelled to respond to Islamabad's provocations, the international community woke up.

The British Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, decided to come to India after his dash to Pakistan, in a bid to calm the nerves in New Delhi and step up the pressure on Islamabad to exercise restraint. Since then, Gen. Musharraf has sacked the chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad, known to be in league with the jehadis, and superseded two others who were his close allies in ousting the civilian government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif two years ago. Under pressure from the U.S., Gen. Musharraf has also begun to crack down on extremist groups in Pakistan organising street protests.

In his telephonic talk with Mr. Vajpayee on Monday, Gen. Musharraf, at least verbally, condemned the terrorist attack in Srinagar, promised cooperation in confronting international terrorism and called for renewed diplomatic engagement. India will have a right to be sceptical about Gen. Musharraf's intentions. After the approach he unveiled during his visit to Delhi and Agra in July, caution and distrust of his commitment to peace with India may be natural in New Delhi.

After all, twice in the last three years Mr. Vajpayee had reached out to Pakistan in travelling to Lahore and in inviting Gen. Musharraf for the Agra summit. India got the war in Kargil within weeks after Mr. Vajpayee returned from Lahore. After Agra, India was left with a sense of being walked all over by Gen. Musharraf. Despite the bitterness that lingers after Agra, India would be short-sighted in not taking the opportunity to re-engage Pakistan at this critical moment.

Why should India engage Pakistan after Lahore and Agra? What is there to suggest that Gen. Musharraf, the perpetrator of Kargil and the offending guest at Agra, can now be seen as a credible interlocutor for India? Cynics would be right to ask these questions. Cynicism can indeed be a healthy antidote to unrealistic policies by governments. But cynicism can never show the way forward in a difficult situation.Gen. Musharraf's intentions may or may not have changed. But what has certainly changed is the international context after September 11. Gen. Musharraf's compulsions and policy alternatives have altered dramatically following the American war against international terrorism. As he twists in the wind whipped up by the confrontation between the U.S. and the Taliban, Gen. Musharraf's swagger that we saw in New Delhi and Agra has gone.

Many in India have argued that Gen. Musharraf's hand has been strengthened by the international crisis. As the world rushes to embrace Gen. Musharraf, Pakistan is no longer being shunned the way it had been after the military coup of October 1999. Following September 11, the U.S. has committed itself to shore up Gen. Musharraf as he gropes to find a way forward for Pakistan in the present crisis. Pessimists in the capital have been tempted to see these two facts as inimical to India. But there is a different way of looking at them.

In gaining American support for his own survival, Gen. Musharraf has had to pay a price in sacrificing the huge strategic investments that the Pakistani establishment has made in Afghanistan over the last two decades. As part of the war against international terrorism, Gen. Musharraf is now being asked to help strangulate his own creation, the Taliban, dismantle the infrastructure for terrorism in Afghanistan, and begin to crack down on the ideological support bases inside Pakistan itself. The U.S. has thrown a vital economic lifeline for Gen. Musharraf. While it promises to bail him out, the U.S. has also acquired a powerful new leverage over Gen. Musharraf. Washington has manoeuvred itself as the most potent influence on Pakistan's internal and external policies.

The diplomatic challenge for India is to ensure that this new leverage of the international community is utilised to push Pakistan in the short term to curb its support for violence in India and over the long-term towards political moderation, economic modernisation and peace with its neighbours. When Mr. Powell comes here next week, his immediate concerns would be the stability of the international coalition in the present war and the prevention of an escalation of Indo-Pakistan tensions to the nuclear level.

India needs to reaffirm at once its commitment to restraint as well as a refusal to accept further provocations from Pakistan across the border. In other words, India will not initiate moves to destabilise the situation; but it will respond to acts of terrorism with all means at its command. Looking beyond the immediate concerns, India and the U.S. have a common interest in stabilising Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state. Finding ways to think and work together on this objective must be the centre- piece of India's talking points with Gen. Powell. The short-term requirement for moving towards this goal is indeed an end to the sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan

In promoting this long-term objective, India needs to express a readiness to re-engage Pakistan. A possible trip by Mr. Jaswant Singh to Islamabad in the coming weeks could help directly reassure Pakistan that India has no desire to fish in its troubled waters. Mr. Singh could also reaffirm India's willingness to begin comprehensive negotiations with Pakistan on all issues, with special political focus on the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, terrorism, and nuclear confidence-building measures. There was a near agreement at Agra in July to discuss these issues at the political level. If Pakistan agrees to immediately turn off the tap of cross-border violence, Mr. Singh should be ready to announce an agreement in Pakistan to begin talks on these subjects as well as others such as trade, Siachen and people-to-people contacts at the official level.

As the stage is set for a crucial round of triangular talks among India, Pakistan and the U.S., the formula for diplomatic success presents itself. Gen. Powell needs to persuade Gen. Musharraf to put down the gun and accept a comprehensive dialogue with India. In return, New Delhi should agree to negotiate seriously on Kashmir as part of a broader normalisation of relations with Islamabad.

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