Agreeing to disagree

By K. K. Katyal

IT WILL be pointless to pretend that there is no dissonance between India and the U.S. arising from the post-September 11 situation, especially the current operations against international terrorism. The recent visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell, to New Delhi was utilised for full- length discussion, and although the two sides' perceptions could not be harmonised, the situation is not unmanageable. This was evident from the remark of the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, at the joint press conference: ``as two democracies, we could disagree on an event but we do not need necessarily to be disagreeable about the disagreement''. The two sides will do well to keep articulation of their differences low key.

It is, no doubt, a worthwhile objective to ensure against misunderstandings with America - as also to work for managing the differences. September 11, as Gen. Powell told Indian interlocutors, was regarded a watershed, leading the U.S. to focus closely on the threats of international terrorism. India has extended full support to the U.S. in the operations in Afghanistan, which, according to Washington's assessment based on firm intelligence reports, is the epicentre of the activities that led to the attacks in New York and Washington. But New Delhi would like the battle against terrorist violence to be conducted in its totality and was, naturally, sore that its concerns over this very menace were not being addressed. It is in order to draw attention to the infirmity in Washington's approach, but, in the final analysis, India has to, by itself fight terrorism the trans-border brand of which it has been a victim for years. It will not help New Delhi to base its strategy exclusively on expectations of help by the U.S. or on the grievance against Washington in case it is not forthcoming. The recent developments have served to re- establish that there are no permanent friends or permanent foes, there are only permanent national interests. The U.S. would like India to understand the geo-political compulsions that had led to warmth with Pakistan. Likewise, New Delhi would expect understanding of its problems. Mutual appreciation of each other's compulsions is the essence of a mature relationship. The two sides were seized of the problem in the joint working group on counter-terrorism. The issue was also taken up by Mr. Jaswant Singh towards the end of the protracted security dialogue with the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott. But what was the end result? Even when Washington's relationship with Pakistan was not particularly cozy, Islamabad could not be persuaded to go slow on its ``political, diplomatic and moral support'' to ``freedom- fighters'' - an euphemism for material, operational backing for terrorists. It would be naive to expect the U.S. to do so now. And that too at a time when the thinking in New Delhi and Washington is not quite on the same wavelength.

There is no ambiguity about the subjects on which their positions could not be reconciled. One, the U.S. characterisation of the Kashmir problem, with emphasis on its centrality to Indo-Pakistan ties and, arising out of it, its stand in regard to terrorist violence in the State, and, two, the shape of the post-Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan. Islamabad, Gen. Powell's first port of call, was visibly satisfied with the accommodation of its viewpoint on these issues. As noted by Dawn editorially, ``a meeting of minds between President Musharraf and Secretary Powell was obvious on two important issues of the moment, namely, Afghanistan and Kashmir. The convergence of views between Pakistan and the U.S. shows realism and throws into bold relief the two countries' shared perceptions of the Afghan situation. Another positive outcome of Secretary Powell's visit was his statement that the Kashmir issue was central to the relationship between India and Pakistan.''

At this stage, a grim view need not be taken of what New Delhi sees as the lack of understanding by Washington of its concerns, as also of the new warmth in America's relationship with Pakistan. The plan for the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's meeting with the U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, in Washington on November 9 gives rise to hopes for a positive turn.

Lest the U.S. should have been influenced by Islamabad's disinformation campaign on last week's incident, when several Pakistani posts along the Line of Control were smashed as part of the punitive action against infiltrators, the Indian side explained the situation at length. This, it was pointed out, was not to be construed as a policy decision to cross the LoC but was to be seen as a sequel to the mandate to the security forces to be pro-active in their bid to check infiltration. The situation was tackled by the local commanders, there being no specific instructions from New Delhi.

Another issue on which the Indian side did not mince words was the nature of help to be given to Pakistan by the U.S. as a reward for the decision to ditch (apparently) the Taliban, its own creation. New Delhi had no objection to economic assistance or even to contacts at the military level or any training programme, but the supply of new weapon systems to Pakistan, the U.S. side was told, would have dangerous consequences - and would lead to a new arms race. In support were cited instances from the past when Islamabad turned the barrel of virtually every gun, supplied by the U.S., towards India. The American side sounded reassuring on this count.

What were the other points made during Gen. Powell's visit? The U.S. side repeatedly drew attention to Mr. Bush's statement that their fight against terrorism was global. The U.S., it was clear, regarded the violence in Jammu and Kashmir as terrorism, not a freedom struggle. To the extent the terrorism infrastructure in Afghanistan was damaged as a result of U.S. operations, the external props to violence in Jammu and Kashmir would weaken, giving India a distinct advantage. Condemnation by Gen. Musharraf of the ``act of terrorism'' in Srinagar was cited as a sign of the new thinking in Islamabad, of which the other manifestations were the action against the leaders of fundamentalist organisations and the pruning of pro-Taliban forces in the armed forces, some of which were associated with the ``struggle'' in Jammu and Kashmir. A case was made for the early resumption of a dialogue between India and Pakistan.

All this did not allay Indian fears. New Delhi was not prepared to give that positive a spin to Gen. Musharraf's moves, as was sought to be given by the U.S. New Delhi's experience was of a big gap between his India-related words and deeds. Yes, India was all for renewing the dialogue process but said that it would exercise its discretion as regards the timing.

The exchanges on the shape of the post-Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan remained inconclusive. The U.S., it was clear, was going slow in extending direct support to the Northern Alliance, the only credible anti-Taliban force on the ground. It was no secret that the U.S. avoided attacking the forward positions of the Taliban because that would facilitate the Alliance's entry into Kabul. The U.S. takes a dim view of that prospect - because of the fear that the Alliance, comprising as it does of the minority communities, may take revenge against the majority community, the Pashtuns, the mainstay of the Taliban, leading to a bloodbath or civil war. Another and the weightier consideration was Pakistan's deep hostility towards the Alliance. And the U.S. would like to accommodate Islamabad on this count. India favours a composite government representing all sections, particularly the majority, assuming office in Kabul. However, it does not accept the Pakistan line, well-received in Washington, suggesting inclusion of ``moderate Taliban'' in the new setup. There is no moderation in this brand of extremism, according to New Delhi. Also, India is opposed to the stationing of an international peacekeeping force and instead favours policing help to the new regime. And New Delhi feels it has a stake in the future of Afghanistan.

There the matter stands at present between India and the U.S. Over now to the Washington summit next month.

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