The prospects in Afghanistan

By T. Sreedhar

THE FIRST phase of the U.S. war against terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, that began with the bombing of main towns and cities in Afghanistan on October 7, seems to have ended on October 14-15. In this phase, as envisaged by analysts, the U.S. resorted exclusively to air operations. According to rough estimates, American and British air forces flew over 100 sorties and fired around 75-80 cruise missiles and 2,000 bombs. Before analysing the impact of these aerial attacks, three factors need to be noted.

First, what are the U.S. objectives in launching these aerial attacks? The foremost seems to be to destroy any military hardware at the disposal of the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine. Though it is well known that the combine's hardware is at best of 1960s vintage, the U.S. is apparently not willing to take any risks. The combine's military hardware must have been totally destroyed by the third day of the bombing.

The U.S. also wanted to convey to its adversary the type of punitive action it was willing to take. The aerial bombing of selected targets must have made it abundantly clear to the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine that it could not match its adversary in air power. Unlike during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 where carpet bombing was done, this time selective target bombing by the U.S. and its allies kept the non-military casualties to the minimum.

The U.S. must have hoped a fear psychosis would creep into the Taliban after seeing its air power; and would break the ranks of the Taliban and that some would defect or change their loyalties. There were unconfirmed reports by western news agencies of some defections among the Taliban forces.

The U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, must have been under considerable domestic pressure to do something. The period between September 11 and October 7 was largely used to gather ground intelligence and mobilise world opinion against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Second is the behaviour of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda after September 11. From the developments, it appears that the leaders of the combine, having anticipated the likely U.S. reaction, seem to have moved to the mountains leaving their residences in places such as Kabul and Kandahar to the third and fourth line of cadres. The first week of intense aerial bombing does not seem to have had any impact on the Taliban cadre as much as one anticipated. Though there were reports of people running away towards Pakistan and Iran, this is not a new phenomenon in the Afghan context.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda cleverly played the Islamic card. They were able to whip up emotions by projecting the U.S. bombing as a war against Islam. The success of this strategy was clearly visible in Pakistan where rallies were held in all important towns and, most observers agree that the hartal on October 15 by pro-Taliban forces, on the eve of Gen. Powell's visit to Islamabad, was a success. Sensing that it will not be able to control public opinion if the war is prolonged, the ruling elite of Pakistan is asking the U.S. to complete the campaign quickly. Others in the Islamic world have urged the U.S. to show restraint and caution.

On the media front, CNN and BBC like in 1991, were not able to mobilise public opinion in the Islamic world in favour of the U.S. action. For obvious reasons, the western media tried to show the U.S. air power against a ``impoverished adversary whose sin is not fully established.'' ``To kill a fly, cruise missiles are being used and the western media is gloating over it,'' said one observer. In the process Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based television network, was cleverly used by the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine to put across its view point. One was not surprised to read reports that the Al-Jazeera viewership touched 40 million and that the CNN/BBC viwership was less than half of it in the Islamic World.

Lastly, the centrality of Operation Enduring Freedom is Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, which in reality is an Arab phenomenon. Of the 19 persons identified as being responsible for the September 11 attacks, all are reported to be Arabs; 11 are from Saudi Arabia, one an Egyptian travelling on a Saudi passport. They are not from impoverished Afghanistan. If the U.S. is attacking Afghanistan for having hosted these Arabs, the attacks should be against the Taliban rulers and not against towns and cities. Here the use of air power seems to have been counter-productive. Therefore, the sympathy factor towards Afghanistan is increasing among the general public in the region.

Equally important is the U.S. coopting the Pakistani military in the fight against terrorism. During the past few years, Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran and India have directly described Pakistan as being the root cause of terrorism and violence in South and Southwest Asia. Though everyone understands the U.S. tactical compulsions in coopting Pakistan, it has not gone well with the public. The question repeatedly being asked is how can Pakistan's ruling elite, which created the Taliban and collaborated with Al- Qaeda, be rewarded. The logic of ``set a thief to catch a thief'' does not seem to have been accepted. Even if the U.S. privately says it is a tactical alliance, it is not being viewed favourably by others.

In this backdrop, if we examine the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, we are nowhere near achieving the objectives. The Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine seems to have shifted its command to the mountains much before the campaign began and the U.S. bombs appear to have hit empty buildings and bunkers. At least we have no confirmed reports to suggest that the Taliban morale has been broken and that it is in a mood to surrender. A stray case of Mullah Ahmed Muttawakil, Taliban Foreign Minister, going to the United Arab Emirates has been reported but not confirmed.The Taliban and Al-Qaeda seem to be working on the assumption that the West would not commit land troops except in specific commando operations. Any Islamic country is also unlikely to deploy troops. Even the U.S.'s closest ally in the present operations, Pakistan, may not be willing to lend its soldiers for any land operations.

That leaves the choice to the Northern Alliance, which has been fighting the Taliban for the past six years. There are some risks in giving a free hand to the Northern Alliance, a loose combination of all non- Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Taliban and the Pakistani Army, while conquering the areas dominated by non-Pashtuns, committed horrendous crimes. In a village in the north all the ablebodied people were killed by the Taliban early this year. Therefore, the possibility of reprisals against the Pashtuns in general and the Taliban militia in particular is being feared by everyone.

Mr. Bush may have satisfied his domestic constituency by bombing Afghanistan. But the stalemate on the battlefront is not going to help him in anyway. If the stalemate prolongs beyond mid- November, it could prove an advantage to the Taliban-Al-Qaeda combine. The holy month of Ramzan will start; and will be followed by an unusually harsh winter if we go by weather forecasts. Can the U.S. achieve its objective of catching Osama bin Laden ``dead or alive'' by mid-November? No one seems to have an answer as yet.

At this point of time, two other observations can also be made. The war is now being conducted as a single theatre of operation. If the Taliban and Al-Qaeda begin experiencing reverses, it may open up another front. Where and when no one is sure.

If the war drags on, from the present indications, to next year, the imponderables that need to be taken into consideration, by both sides will be far too many.

(The writer is Senior Research Associate,Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi).

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