Change of guard in Bangladesh - II

By Muchkund Dubey

ANOTHER MAJOR concern in India is that the BNP's accession to power would adversely affect Indo-Bangladesh relations. The general impression prevailing in India is that the Awami League is pro-India whereas the BNP is not particularly friendly. This impression is erroneous. For neither the Awami League nor the BNP is pro or anti-India. Both of them are fiercely pro-Bangladesh for which they must be respected, even though it may not always be in India's interest. Besides, it is significant that no party made India an election issue. India did not figure at all in their manifestos and was rarely mentioned in the election campaign. Moreover, on several issues affecting India, the two parties reflected similar views in their manifestos. These were basically nationalist and not anti-India views.

If one goes by the experience of dealing with BNP Governments, it is true that Indo-Bangladesh relations had come to a standstill during the last year or so of Begum Zia's Government. But the then Government of India is as much, if not more, to blame. Begum Zia came on an official visit to India within a year of coming to power in 1991. This was hailed as the harbinger of more active and dynamic bilateral relations. But the Government of India did not take any initiative to deal effectively with any of the issues raised during the trip. The then Prime Minister did not pay the much expected return visit to Bangladesh. Thus by sheer inaction, both sides worked inexorably towards a stagnation of the relations. In this the larger share of the blame must be attributed to the bigger neighbour which is endowed with greater capacity to act.

The image of the Awami League as a pro-India party puts the party at a disadvantage in securing public approval for agreements and measures designed to resolve bilateral issues. The BNP suffers from no such constraint. Rather, every demonstration of its success in striking deals with the big neighbour goes to its credit. India had very meaningful relations with the BNP regime under President Ziaur Rahman and during the first few years of Begum Zia's Government. Under the former, an agreement had been reached on most of the parameters, except price, for selling gas to India. There was an agreement in principle on allowing the transit of Indian goods through Bangladesh territory to other parts of India and operational details to give effect to it were being worked out. Again, the quantum jump in India's exports to Bangladesh took place during Begum Zia's Government after Bangladesh embraced liberalisation in a full-fledged manner. There is going to be no rollback of liberalisation under the BNP Government. If at all, it is going to be further accelerated which would open further opportunities for Indian exports. Besides, the business community which has developed vested interests in dealing with India is generally better represented in Parliament and the Government during the BNP's rule than under the Awami League.

The BNP's position on gas export to India appears to be more constructive than that of the Awami League. Whereas the BNP manifesto states that the sale of gas will be made ``on the basis of transparency and in the wider interest of the country'', the Awami League manifesto talks about such sale only after ensuring that at least 50 years' requirement of the country are met. The BNP manifesto keeps open the possibility of providing transit facilities to India when it says: ``No country will be allowed to use Bangladesh landmass, waterways, sea coast and airspace for military purpose.'' This is of course unexceptionable.

The stipulation in the BNP manifesto that the party on coming to power, would seek appropriate changes in the 30-year agreement on water- sharing with India, is certainly a cause of concern for India. However, it is very doubtful that Dhaka would take the risk of re-opening such a complex agreement which represents a very delicate balancing of the interests of the two countries. The Bangladesh Government would, of course, insist on a faithful implementation of the agreement, which is quite understandable.

The promise in the BNP manifesto to bring about appropriate changes in the Chittagong Hill Tract Agreement would appear to be more plausible, as the BNP has successfully sought the votes of the Muslim settlers in the CHT, whose representative has won one parliamentary seat from that area. The Government, therefore, will be under pressure on this issue. It might create problems for India and for Indo-Bangladesh relations by causing further exodus of Chakma refugees to India. But it will pose greater problems internally for Bangladesh. Hence the new Government should be expected to tread warily on this delicate path.

It will be tragic if, in the context of its present U.S. and Pakistan-centric foreign policy, India ignores the change that has taken place in our eastern neighbourhood and follows a laissez faire policy in conducting relations with the new Government in Bangladesh. India must make the first move in getting closer to the new Government. The Prime Minister should send a special envoy to convey his greetings to Begum Zia and his invitation for the earliest possible visit by her to India. India should go on taking all possible and politically prudent initiatives to maintain an active relationship with Bangladesh through frequent high-level visits, activation of all existing institutions for conducting bilateral relations and creation of new institutions. We should not also be in an indecent hurry to pressure Begum Zia to take decisions on issues of our interest like gas sale, transit, rail links etc. which over the years have got unnecessarily politicised. Let her take her own time in deciding on these issues. Let these decisions be taken under her own internal pressure of economic logic, objective reality and national interest.

It will be so much better if the special envoy is also authorised to convey to her Government, India's positive response to Bangladesh's long-pending request to grant duty-free entry into the Indian market for 25 groups of products. Economics is by far the most important dimension of India's relations with Bangladesh. In this, trade is the crucial component, which is bound to acquire greater buoyancy with the acceleration of liberalisation in Bangladesh. Bangladesh's heavy dependence for export earnings on ready-made garments ensures during the years to come a large market in Bangladesh for India textiles.

The present Government, as the previous ones, will definitely raise the issue of huge deficit in the trade balance in favour of India. This can be explained away on solid economic grounds such as: a trade deficit is not necessarily disadvantageous to a trading partner; trade deficit with India is merely an assertion of India's comparative advantage vis-a-vis third countries, etc. But that will not do. This is more of a political issue and that of the very character of the long-term bilateral economic relations than a matter of mere trade imbalance, in a static sense of the term. For serving better its political and long-term economic interests, it is incumbent on India to help Bangladesh bring about structural changes in its economy, particularly in the external sector. This should be done by helping enlarge the production base and export capacity of Bangladesh and by moving quickly towards unilateral free trade with it. This is what the developed countries are most probably going to do in the next round of WTO trade negotiations. Why should India, which has such a vital stake in its economic relations with Bangladesh, not show the way?

(Concluded)

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