The inherent contradiction

By K. Shankar Bajpai

THE UNITED States' discussions with our Prime Minister and with Pakistan's leader, which must inevitably be seen together, confirm, at the summit level, the approach its other leaders have been already indicating: with India, various shared objectives reinforce shared values to build broad, long-term relations; with Pakistan, an immediate shared objective takes precedence over other values to reinstate a practical alliance. There is not much here for either satisfaction or alarm, but one danger is signalled for India to take note of: prepare for intensified pressures on Jammu and Kashmir.

The reported essentials have been much examined for winners and losers. The Americans said nothing new on Kashmir, have not given Pakistan F16s or agreed not to fight during Ramadan - negatives for Pakistan; however, no bigger say for India in Afghanistan as well. American formulations on terrorism carefully fudge Pakistan's role in Jammu and Kashmir, the very fact of calling for talks - which has difficulties for India - and for taking account of the wishes of the people - which India has been spared for years - is bound to encourage anti-Indian elements in Jammu and Kashmir. All such points could certainly be pointers; they are also to be expected as inevitable components of the very delicate balancing act Washington has to perform to keep India well disposed and the Pakistan President, Gen. Musharraf, well- placed. Unfortunately, America's ritual contention that ``it is not a zero sum game with one's gain being the other's loss,'' simply will not wash.

The key fact is that, whatever its own or the surrounding circumstances, Pakistan's overriding, unvarying objective is to do India down, via Jammu and Kashmir or otherwise. It created and used the Taliban and terrorism as an instrument against India; it now sees better prospects, not least against us, in making itself America's instrument against the Taliban and that aspect of terrorism, while maintaining its right to continue its own brand of terrorism. Without doubting America's sincerity, or over- estimating its commitment to Pakistan, there is no avoiding a powerful escalation of this Pakistani effort against us.

Delhi's primary answer to this - and all our parties presumably agree since none can enunciate any other - is that we will defy all pressure. No doubt we can do that, but the costs of doing so in international isolation are enormous - and avoidable.

Our overriding objective is to ensure that the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir is not changed to our detriment. Official pronouncements to this effect are not enough; we must convince the world why that is our overriding objective. It is not that a country does not like giving up what has been, for whatever reasons, so long a part of it; it is that the consequences of change are so explosively dangerous. The point the Prime Minister has started stressing, that this is not a matter of territory but nationhood, must be put across intensively - and convincingly. No country in history has ever comprehended so many diversities - and in such huge numbers - within the framework of democracy; however imperfect, India's achievement is extraordinary - and all the more needed after September 11. We are facing alarming challenges from within, the worst coming from our brave-posturing chauvinists, with their obscurantist exclusiveness, who know nothing about fighting but demand the most extreme action. When Pakistanis say Jammu and Kashmir is the unfinished business of Partition, they forget the massacres and migrations that accompanied it. Some Pakistanis seem to see benefits even in further carnage, but no Indian can risk it - and no sane outsider can want it. Those who urge us to ``settle'' with Pakistan must realise what horrors they are inviting.

That is the difficulty about urging Indo-Pakistan talks: it sounds so sane and sensible, and India appears unreasonable in avoiding them. Unfortunately, when we say we are ready but Pakistan should create the right atmosphere by stopping terrorism, we are obscuring the issue. The only basis and purpose of talks must be to cool the Jammu and Kashmir issue, as Pakistan has been given opportunities for in the past. But Pakistan's purpose is to change the status quo drastically, whereas formalising it is the maximum India can concede. We are back to the fundamental problem that no solutions are possible in the given circumstances; circumstances must change to permit what cannot be thought of today. The change that could transform prospects most strikingly would be if India and Pakistan had developed a constructively cooperative relationship - precisely what happened in the example often cited of the historic conflict between France and Germany. More surprising things have happened - consider how completely Pakistan's situation changed in a few weeks. However, at present there is no escape from a fresh Pakistani effort to wrest Kashmir, and urging us to talk leads nowhere. We must gear ourselves to face this challenge on our own.

What we must take into account:

(a) Nobody anywhere, including in Moscow, believes either that Pakistan has no case on Jammu and Kashmir, or that India's troubles there are entirely Pakistan-created, or that we can resolve them without talking to Pakistan.

(b) International attitudes lately inclined toward India because we seemed to be an emerging power while Pakistan seemed both in a mess and wrongly oriented. Even then, we did not get full support against its mischief in Jammu and Kashmir - the Prime Minister has revealed that even when backing us on Kargil, Washington urged us to make territorial concessions. Now that it is a favoured ally, Pakistan will extensively exploit all the implications of (a).

(c) Pakistan's fundamentalists might just spoil Gen. Musharraf's game; and many Americans worry about working with a military dictator, yesterday in league with the Taliban, but neither of these opposite elements can lessen the American administration's full reliance on and backing for this regime. Washington has shown it is sensitive to our sensitivities, but to suppose we will not be pressed for talks - and more - would be dangerously unrealistic.

(d) Pakistan is offering not only immediate but long-term usefulness to America - e.g. as the moderate Islamic power that can be a channel to other Islamic states, and, along with a cooperative Afghanistan where also it can help, as the outlet for Central Asian oil. Since it knows well how to use the PR techniques we so persistently refuse to learn, it is building on all this to solidify its already revived support in America.

Our talks in Washington should not be brushed aside as representing a policy of preventing us from upsetting American plans. The basis for long-term cooperation was specifically indicated. This, however, is a potential for the future; in the short term, not only do interests differ but much could go wrong. Pakistan is working to make them go wrong, and we cannot count on Washington to take our side. Nobody can make us do what we do not want, but to defy the looming pressures demands a brand new strategy; - we must stop delaying the long overdue effort to tackle the situation within Kashmir; a carefully thought-out campaign is needed to persuade the powers that count why the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir cannot be tinkered with; above all we must start on a sustained, purposeful and efficient domestic reinvigoration especially of our economic capabilities. Can today's politics allow any government to do all that?

(The writer is former Secretary, External Affairs Ministry.)

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : State Governments in business
Next     : The demand for autonomy