The demand for autonomy

By Ajay K. Mehra

THOUGH THE Indian state, even as it came into existence, became aware of the potential of pluralism and identities constituting society to articulate itself to demand a political system with an `adequate' power-sharing arrangement, its response since inception to such potential as well as the demands made by such political identities has been slow, inadequate, erratic, partisan and opportunistic. Often expressed in terms of separate Statehood, Union Territory status, autonomous district councils, greater autonomy, even secession, the political desires of these identities have over the years found expression as linguistic, regional or tribal entities to demand `autonomy'. Yet the Indian state has failed to develop a rational response pattern to deal with this phenomenon, which has been recurring with regular frequency since the reorganisation of States in 1956. On the contrary, time and again political parties and leaders, both in power and in the Opposition, have found it expedient, irrespective of the political cost to the nation, to use the emerging desires and demands for `autonomy' entirely on partisan grounds.

How else do we explain the emergence of political manoeuvres for Harit Pradesh/Kisan Pradesh and Vidarbha just a year after the creation of three States? The demand for a separate Vidarbha carved out of Maharashtra is an old one and some members of the Maharashtra Congress from the region, including some MPs and MLAs, reasserted the claim to form a Vidarbha Pradesh Congress Committee under Mr. NKP Salve on October 16 in Mumbai. In fact, the Vidarbha leaders, restive at the delay in the submission of a report by the Congress' committee (headed by Mr. Pranab Mukherjee) to examine the viability of Statehood for Vidarbha, claimed to have taken their `first step towards Statehood'.

The case of Harit Pradesh/Kisan Pradesh is even more curious. Unlike many demands for autonomy or separate Statehood with a long history still lying in abeyance, this demand neither has a history, nor a definite geography. On the one hand, the Haryana Chief Minister, Mr. Om Prakash Chautala, is the promoter of the idea of Kisan Pradesh, merging areas from Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, on the other, the Union Minister for Agriculture and Rashtriya Lok Dal President, Mr. Ajit Singh, is spearheading the demand for Harit Pradesh. Mr. Singh's paradoxical statements unambiguously express obvious partisanship in this demand. Showing flexibility over the name and the capital of the proposed State, he clarifies that it `will not be the domain of Jats alone', but also of `Gujjars, Brahmans, Jatavs, Ahirs, Kurmis, Muslims, Bengalis, Sikhs, Jains and several others who have equally contributed to the prosperity of the region.' His only interest is that the present trend of diverting most of the revenue generated in western Uttar Pradesh to the eastern part should stop to check growing underdevelopment, unemployment and crime.

While Mr. Singh's political eclipse in recent years, despite a hold over the Jat votes in his `region', is the evident reason for the awakening of his conscience for the region he identifies as Harit Pradesh, it is difficult to fathom the politics that motivated Mr. Chautala to visualise a pradesh of kisans in the desh of kisans. Though Mr. Singh has shown flexibility about the physical boundary of the proposed State, it is not clear whether these two leaders would submerge their political boundaries at some stage to present a united front for this cause. Since both Mr. Chautala and Mr. Singh are members of the NDA and the latter has only recently been inducted into the Union Cabinet after protracted negotiations and with an eye on the Jat and OBC votes in the coming Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, obviously the BJP is hoping to reap political harvest out of this new `statecraft'.

It is indeed possible to put these two recent manoeuvres for statehood in the larger perspective of autonomy, or self- governance and grassroots democracy, and development, which are intricately and inseparably linked to the democratic processes of governance and distribution of powers and resources. The national movement witnessed an integrative process in which identities were used by perceptive leaders from Dadabhai Naoroji, Tilak to Sri Aurobindo, who emphasised the importance of the regional cultural heritage in creating an Indian national identity. Gandhiji understood the importance of the sub-national identities in the nationalist movement, and he could effectively mobilise them. The Congress reorganised its units along linguistic lines in 1920, which perhaps created the basis for linguistic States after Independence and gave ethno-regional rationale to sub- national governments.

However, the apprehensions about federal principles among the key leaders of the national movement eventually led to the present federal arrangement tilting heavily in favour of the Centre. The strong Central Government approach of the Motilal Nehru Committee Report (1928) gave way to a `Republic of India wherein the various territories would possess and retain autonomous units together with residuary powers, and exercise all powers and functions of government and administration' in the Objectives Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly in 1946, which found a reflection also in the first report (April 1947) of the Union Powers Committee of the Constituent Assembly, presided over by Nehru. However, the same committee, nay the entire Constituent Assembly, preferred a strong centre once the Partition became a reality. Ambedkar, who expressed centrist bias way back in 1939, was instrumental in excluding local government from the constitutional scheme.

The Indian discourse on autonomy and power has been substantially influenced by the federal arrangement emerging out of the post- partition mindset; neither the power arrangement, nor the fruits of development trickled sufficiently to the grassroots. The reluctance of the leadership in States to share power with the grassroots level created local discontent on power-sharing and development, some of which have indeed proved irresoluble.

Thus, even as the States Reorganisation Commission wound up its work after creating 14 States, the Bombay State was ablaze with demands for bifurcation on linguistic grounds. Soon after it was the turn of the Punjab on the same grounds. Several such demands such as Telengana, Vidarbha, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh, Uttaranchal, Gorkhaland, not to speak of the complex situation in the northeast despite a mini-reorganisation in the early 1970s, kept appearing from time to time; some have been resolved on their own political weight, some are still smouldering. The question of autonomy based on the Anandpur Saheb resolution pushed Punjab to the vortex of terrorism in the 1980s. It is one of the major questions in the case of Jammu and Kashmir as well.

The desire for self-governance among communities at all levels in a civilisational society like India is expected. Fortunately, the Constitution has sufficient instrumentalities to satisfy those demands, provided they are viewed in the proper perspective and efforts to resolve them are non-partisan. Fortunately, with the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution the structure for pyramid of power is in place. Their genuine implementation as instruments of power-sharing would indeed take care of some of the grievances that are reflected in demands for autonomy. Simultaneously, a rational review of the question of statehood from the perspective of good governance is required so that such demands, both genuine and partisan, do not keep arising. Of course, that would mean that leaders and political parties would have to rise above partisan considerations.

(The writer is Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Noida, U.P.)

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