India and Pak. in the new scenario

By Muchkund Dubey

THE LAUNCHING of the global campaign against terrorism by an international coalition led by the United States has already resulted in a reordering of the foreign policies of major powers and has set in motion forces which have the potentiality of bringing about a significant restructuring of international relations. As Afghanistan has been chosen as the arena for the first phase of the campaign, our region, South Asia, has been profoundly affected by this sudden shift in U.S. priorities. It was, therefore, natural for the Prime Minister to have taken advantage of his recent visits to Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. and his address to the U.N. General Assembly to project India's interest and explain its position. His view that there can be no ``ideological, political or religious justification for terrorism'', that we should reject ``arguments seeking to classify terrorism according to its root causes'' and that the campaign should target terrorism everywhere and in all its forms, was generally endorsed by his interlocutors.

But this does not imply that after the completion of the mission in Afghanistan, the coalition will necessarily turn to Pakistan and destroy the networks and camps in that country which are engaged in carrying out terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. This will very much depend upon the outcome of the operation in Afghanistan, the U.S.' assessment of the role played by Pakistan as a frontline state and the importance the U.S. attaches to building a longer term relationship with Pakistan.

For the present, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, by his decision to join the coalition, seems to have done extremely well for himself and his country. He has won legitimacy for his military dictatorship and obtained very significant economic goodies for his country. Western leaders and media are never tired of heaping encomiums on him as a ``strong'' and ``visionary'' leader and a ``reliable'' partner. Gen. Musharraf has by now succeeded, to a considerable extent, in restoring Pakistan to its earlier position of a close ally of the U.S. He is now talking of a ``good futuristic relationship'' with this country.

The U.S. and its Western allies are perhaps looking upon Gen. Musharraf as the only leader in Pakistan who can rid the country of its extremist Islamic elements and set it on a truly modernistic course - politically, socially, culturally and economically. This should involve not only reining in the fundamentalist forces, but also dismantling their network and camps engaged in perpetrating terrorism in Kashmir, restoring democracy, providing for a separation of the state from religion; abrogating the blasphemy laws, extending equality of treatment to the Shias and Ahmedis in matters of religion, overhauling the madrassa education system, and not arrogating to itself the extra-territorial responsibility of protecting Indian Muslims.

If Gen. Musharraf is indeed intent on bringing about these changes, he deserves India's full support and understanding. For, no country, apart from Pakistan itself, is likely to benefit more from it than India. But having travelled in the reverse direction for a full 53 years after Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah wanted to work for establishing a secular Pakistan, is it possible for Pakistan to return to his vision? This would mean giving up Pakistan's present raison d'etre and making a beginning towards defining a new identity based on modernistic values.

It is not an altogether impossible task for Pakistan to start reversing the course, particularly in the present new phase of globalisation? If Pakistan can really undertake this project and complete it, it will have a profound positive impact on India's polity and society. Some of the present dominant political forces based on an appeal to religion would disappear, while the secular political parties will have to bring about drastic adjustments in their policy towards Pakistan. This would mean the beginning of a golden era in South Asia. The Kashmir problem will acquire a different character altogether. The demand for its accession to Pakistan on religious grounds will yield place to demands for self- governance or genuine and comprehensive autonomy within the Indian Union. It would be in India's highest interest to concede such a demand.

Unfortunately, there is no indication that Pakistan is poised for such a change, Gen. Musharraf has no intention, vision or capacity to bring about this change. Islamic states, as opposed to secular ones, are part of the international order. Pakistan happens to be somewhere on the extreme side of this spectrum. Any assumption that this order will drastically change is totally unrealistic. In any case, this cannot be the objective of the global campaign against terrorism. For, this will upset too many things in too many places and end up in utter frustration. There will, of course, be reforms in the Islamic societies because of internal stirrings. But there could also be, as in the recent past, a recrudescence of religious extremism because of the failure of the reformist and liberal projects in the economic and social fields.

The basic contradictions in Gen. Musharraf's position on combating terrorism should, by now, have become clear to the U.S. and its allies. On the one hand, he is proclaiming his intention, and also taking some action, to suppress extremist Islamic forces, but on the other, he is advancing a differentiated doctrine of terrorism in order to justify using the same extremist elements to carry out a `jehad' in Kashmir. He has indulged in all kinds of subterfuge to ensure the survival of the Taliban in some form or the other. The U.S. has also seen how thousands of Pakistanis have joined the Taliban in Afghanistan. The U.S. has destroyed camps where Afghans, Pakistanis and Arabs were being trained to carry out terrorist activities in Kashmir. The U.S. must also be aware that the same religious outfits in Pakistan which have trained and sent extremist elements westward to fight against it in Afghanistan are also training and sending militants eastward to fight against India in Kashmir.

All this should lead to the Pakistan-based terrorist outfits being the obvious target in the second phase of the struggle against terrorism. This is what the ground reality and plain logic would demand; but it cannot be taken for granted. The U.S. and its Western allies may very well be guided by what they perceive to be their wider national interests in the region. They may therefore decide to take a pragmatic view and let Pakistan off the hook.

India should therefore be capable under all circumstances of handling the situation in Kashmir on its own. Unfortunately, the Central Government's prolonged inability to take full control of the situation on the ground and the total bankruptcy of its policy for settling the issue with our own Kashmiris have put India in an indefensible position internationally and are threatening its unity and cohesion internally.

India has very few direct leverages as a partner in the international coalition against terrorism. Its main leverage remains its bilateral relations with the major powers. Our entire influence in the world will depend on the level, quality and excellence of these bilateral relations. And major powers will attach importance to their bilateral relations with India only so long as its economy remains dynamic and its society resilient, cohesive and in peace with itself. These domestic preconditions for external influence need to be underlined because of the persistent propensity of the present Government to attribute its failures to external factors and to seek external assistance for solving what are essentially domestic problems.

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