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Caste and social structure - II
By Satish Deshpande
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Contrary to the inflated rhetoric of the anti-Mandal backlash, the OBCs are not overtaking the upper castes - not even in the rural areas where they are undoubtedly a force to reckon with.
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THE INTERNAL class composition of caste groups (discussed earlier) tells us only half the story about the Indian social structure - we also need to consider the caste composition of class groups. This can be done by mapping the NSSO's 55th Round data on to the 1991 Census population figures (since all the relevant data are not yet available from the 2001 Census). This exercise tells us that in rural India, the caste composition of the below the poverty line population (BPL) is as follows: Scheduled Tribes 16 per cent, Scheduled Castes 27 per cent, Other Backward Classes 37 per cent and ``Others'' 21 per cent, while that of the top two MPCE classes is: 4 per cent Scheduled Tribes, 10 per cent Scheduled Castes, 33 per cent OBCs, and 53 per cent ``Others''. These figures need to be evaluated against the caste composition of the rural population as a whole, and such a comparison tells us that the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes are over-represented in the BPL population (by a factor of 1.5 and 1.2 respectively), and under-represented in the top two MPCE classes (by factors of 0.4 and 0.5 respectively). The opposite is true of the ``Others'', who are under-represented in the BPL population (0.7) and over-represented among the top two classes (1.7). The most interesting finding, though, is that the OBCs are neither over-represented nor under- represented in any segment of the class spectrum - they are present in all classes roughly in proportion to their share of the rural population.
A similar analysis for urban India indicates a wider gulf between the ``Others'' and all other caste groups. Thus, the ratios of share in specific class groupings to the share in the total urban population are as follows: In the BPL population, the Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and OBCs are all over-represented by factors of 1.4, 1.5 and 1.2 respectively, while the ``Others'' are under-represented at 0.7. And among the top two MPCE classes, the reverse is true, with the Scheduled Tribes (0.7), and especially the Scheduled Castes (0.3) and OBCs (0.5) being significantly under-represented, while the ``Others'' are over- represented by a factor of 1.6. In other words, the ``Others'' form as much as 78 per cent of the top two classes, though they are only 50 per cent of the urban population; the other half of urban India is restricted to the remaining 22 per cent, of which the OBCs account for 15 per cent.
Looking at the land ownership data from the 55th Round, we find that the ``Others'' comprise 50 per cent of all households owning more than 4 hectares of land, while the OBCs are 35 per cent, Scheduled Castes 6 per cent and Scheduled Tribes 8 per cent. Although this does not tell us how much land is owned by each group, it does suggest that popular stereotypes about the OBCs having ousted the upper castes from land ownership may be somewhat exaggerated.
These are rough comparisons and there are many gaps and silences in the data. The most important of these is the omnibus category of the ``Others''. Although the 55th Round has taken a giant leap forward by separating the OBCs from this category, it still does not allow us to disengage the forward caste Hindus from other religious communities. And because the NSSO does not provide cross-tabulations among categories (that is, data on persons belonging to more than one group, such as Muslim OBCs or Christian Scheduled Tribes and so on), it is not possible, strictly speaking, to use the data on religious communities (published separately by the NSSO) for this purpose. It is to be hoped that the NSSO will build on the seminal contributions of the 55th Round and address these problems, because caste inequality is too important an issue to be wished away. For example, rough estimates - without the benefit of cross-tabulations - seem to suggest that Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes, OBCs and Muslims may together account for around 90 per cent of the population below the poverty line in both rural and urban India. If true, this is of immense significance for policy and deserves detailed investigation.
It is equally important, on the other hand, not to read too much into statistics. As is well known, ``Other Backward Classes'' is itself an invented term for a residual collection of castes that is difficult to define. Yesterday's inventions are often today's realities, but they are also changing realities, and it is crucial to track these changes. As the 55th Round data shows, the OBCs are a unique group in rural India because they form a sizeable plurality (one third or more) all along the class continuum from top to bottom. (By contrast, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes are very thin at the upper end of the economic spectrum, while the ``Others'' are thin at the bottom end.) While this explains why the OBCs are seen as a pivotal group in rural (and by extension, national) politics, it also underlines the fact that they are a group with considerable internal differentiation.
Incidentally, this is one stereotype that seems to be quite true - rural OBCs do appear to be a very diverse group. Therefore, it is quite likely (though not certain) that those OBCs who occupy the top rungs of the rural class spectrum actually have very little in common with those at the bottom except the label. Indeed, the NSSO data prefigures precisely the processes at work in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere that are encouraging the emergence of distinct sub-groups such as the ``Most Backward Castes''. However, in urban India - the seat of true privilege - the OBCs are a relatively under-differentiated and underprivileged group.
The State-level data and especially the inter-State and inter- regional variations are interesting and would repay careful analysis. Amid the variations, one striking feature that remains constant in all the major States is the pre-eminence of the ``Others'' category, which by most criteria is clearly ahead of all the other caste groups though the extent of the lead varies. Contrary to the inflated rhetoric of the anti-Mandal backlash, the OBCs are not overtaking the upper castes - not even in the rural areas where they are undoubtedly a force to reckon with, and certainly not in urban India. Tamil Nadu is a good example: in a State numerically dominated by the OBCs and with a long history of reservations, the ``Others'' are way ahead in terms of the index of over/under- representation in the top two MPCE classes: 2.6 compared to 1.2 for the OBCs in the rural sector, and a whopping 3.1 (possibly the highest index among all major States) compared to 0.6 in the urban sector.
Although we have no earlier data for comparison, it is reasonable to suppose that the ascendance of the ``Others'' was even more comprehensive in the past. Indeed, this may be why the (predominantly upper-caste) middle classes love to hate the OBCs - because, unlike the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, they have the numbers and may be acquiring the resources to make a dent in the monopoly over privilege that the upper castes have enjoyed hitherto.
In sum, the NSSO's 55th Round data offers a vital point of departure for a reasoned debate on social inequality in contemporary India, and what can and ought to be done about it. But there is still a long way to go and much to be learnt, especially about the privileged upper castes who have been travelling incognito in our statistical system. Until the day it ceases to influence life-chances, we will need more, not less, data on caste. For we must measure and monitor - not censor - what we wish to transcend.
(Concluded)
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