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News Analysis
A hand of friendship and after
By K.K. Katyal
KATHMANDU, JAN. 7. That the India-Pakistan tensions would dominate last week's SAARC summit was expected but what form it would take was not clear. In the run-up to the Kathmandu meet - and up to its very end - there was intense speculation on whether it would provide an occasion for efforts for a thaw in India-Pakistan relations, whether there would be a meeting between their heads, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf. It was considered nearly certain that, in the informal ambience of the ``retreat'', they would find themselves face to face with each other and there would be no escape from an engagement, formal or informal. In any case, so said the crystal-gazers, the two Foreign Ministers, Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar, are bound to get together - it may be an arranged ``chance'' meeting but it is certain. In the end, things worked differently - and unpredictably. Mr. Vajpayee stayed away from the ``retreat'' which, in any case, had been scaled down because of the late arrival of the Pakistan President.
Who would have thought that Gen. Musharraf, in a demonstrative show, go to a surprised Mr. Vajpayee's seat at the podium, during the summit inauguration, to extend ``a hand of genuine and sincere friendship'' and the Prime Minister, acknowledging the gesture, would remind him of two betrayals in the past - Kargil after Lahore and the attacks on the Parliament House and the Kashmir Assembly after Agra? The question whether there was a meeting between the two leaders remained unanswered even after the end of the summit, there being conflicting interpretations by the two sides. It all started with the General's remarks at a hurriedly-summoned press conference after the summit's concluding ceremony that he had had an ``informal interaction'' with Mr. Vajpayee and hoped that it would lead to a formal interaction. According to Mr. Vajpayee, they merely exchanged courtesies. Whatever be the truth, there was an exchange of signals as the two heads and two Foreign Ministers found themselves together during the summit. This was, no doubt, an advance, though halting. What else was the meaning of what happened in the full view of the media at the concluding ceremony? The Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, Brajesh Mishra, was seen jotting down something on a paper, showing it to Jaswant Singh and, after a while, passing it on to Mr. Sattar. Obviously, India was keen on keeping up the tough posture but, at the same time, was agreeable to giving time to Gen. Musharraf ``to dismantle the edifice of terrorism'', to use Mr. Singh's words. How would the handshake episode be seen by the rest of the world? The headlines of the English language dailies of Nepal provided the first indication. ``Vajpayee snubs Musharraf, demands end to terrorism'', according to the Himalayan Times. ``Hand of friendship raises and dashes hopes'', according to the Kathmandu Post.
Two questions arise out of the Kathmandu developments. One, how will the world community take Pakistan's show of courtesy and India's response? Two, what accounts for the different interpretations put on the ``meetings'' by the two sides? For the past few days, especially after the build-up by India in the wake of the December 13 strike, several countries, big and small, had been exhorting India and Pakistan to take conscious steps to guard against an armed conflict, seen as having the potential of a terrible catastrophe because of their nuclear capability. This pressure is bound to be stepped up - with India being told to begin unwinding the war alert and Pakistan required to take effective, meaningful steps against the terrorist organisations and their leaders. Such calibrated, mutually-reinforcing steps are not outside the realm of possibilities but what is important is the political will of those at the helm in the two countries. Given the cause-and- effect sequence, Pakistan will need to take the first step. The Kathmandu summit may not have provided an occasion for a formal Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting on the sidelines, but it did help re- establish contacts at levels that matter at a time when escalation was the name of the game.
Gen. Musharraf, it was clear, over-stretched the point when he described a few sentences exchanged on the present situation for some five minutes as ``informal interaction''. True, they did not discuss the weather, as the Pakistani spokesman pointed out but it was no substantive exchange of views. Pakistan's over-projection had a purpose - to present an image of reasonableness for the consumption of the world community with a view to ensuring that it tells New Delhi to respond to Islamabad in kind, instead of continuing with the build-up which, as was clear, had caused a deep worry to Pakistan.
And precisely for that reason, India sought to underplay the contacts - it would not like to reduce the pressure till it has the evidence of credible steps by Pakistan against the terrorist outfits that had mushroomed there with the blessings of the official agencies.
Some of the steps taken by Islamabad may fall in this category but it could not afford to be seen as addressing India's concerns, for that would evoke cries of appeasement and sell-out by the jehadis. As a result, India has a difficulty in treating the Pakistani action as a sequel to its concerns. Matters are made worse when the Pakistani establishment links the anti- terrorist action exclusively with the domestic problems such as sectarian violence and, at the same time, continues to harp on the Kashmiri freedom struggle theme. This makes it difficult for Mr. Vajpayee to come out with a positive response. Then there is the political dimension - the engagement with Pakistan does not go well with the hardliners in the Sangh Parivar. Also, it does not fit in with the platform, adopted by the BJP for next month's Assembly elections, especially in the key State of Uttar Pradesh. But there is a merit in the Government's stand - that because of its resolve for a decisive fight against terrorism, it could not be satisfied with half-measures and cosmetic steps by Pakistan.
How do the mediapersons from Pakistan view Gen. Musharraf's gesture? An act of statesmanship which will go well with the major powers. They repeatedly draw attention to the reversal of Pakistan's stand on the Taliban and are sore that its meaning has not been grasped by India. The General, they say, has a limited political space to operate and needs understanding of his predicament.
They also talk of the risk taken by him in appearing over-enthusiastic for a handshake with Mr. Vajpayee. Obviously, they have in mind the happenings in the past - in 1997, for instance when a tight embrace between I.K. Gujral, then External Affairs Minister, in New Delhi with his visiting Pakistani counterpart, Gohar Ayub, evoked sharp protests back home against the ``japha diplomacy'' (the diplomacy of embrace). Mr. Ayub was taken to task for being warm with the ``murderers of Kashmiri freedom-fighters''.
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