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For a way forward
By K.K. Katyal
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The people and the policy-makers in India would do well not to let themselves be dragged in the mire of past suspicions and, instead, face the present challenges with confidence.
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THERE COULD not have been a higher point in the bigpower diplomatic involvement in the India-Pakistan imbroglio than what was witnessed in the last ten days. The U.S. President, George W. Bush, meets the Home Minister, L. K. Advani, who earlier has had talks with important seniors of the Administration, Condoleeza Rice, National Security Adviser, and Colin Powell, Secretary of State, during the Washington stay. In New Delhi, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, holds detailed discussions with his counterpart here, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and other important leaders of the Government. Mr. Bush and Gen. Powell are in telephonic contact with the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf. This in the wake of telephonic conversations with Mr. Vajpayee of the Presidents of Russia and France, Vladimir Putin and Jacques Chirac. And Gen. Powell will be in the subcontinent again this week. A breathtaking sequence, indeed. What is the meaning for India of this high-pitch activity? And what is the state of New Delhi's preparedness to meet the resultant challenges? Unfortunately, even the broad outlines of its strategy are not known. If the Government has formulated one, but chosen not to make it public, it is another matter. Then there is another question - can India trust the western powers? Especially when there were instances in the past of their preference for political expediency over principles.
There is no ambiguity about the thrust of the recent conversations. It is about the current drift in the relationship between India and Pakistan, the continuing escalation, the scenarios of confrontation - and the urgency of first checking and then reversing this trend. In specific terms, two issues are involved - terrorism and Kashmir - the first pressed by India, the second by Pakistan. Islamabad connects the two issues, as part of a cause-and-effect argument: New Delhi rejects any talk of a linkage. The western powers, judging by their repeated public statements, have an in-between position - their first priority is the package of measures to counter and eliminate terrorism, but they would like this to be quickly followed up by meaningful efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem. That was what the latest Blair mission was about and that is also the central point of the exhortations by the U.S. India will, no doubt, feel comforted by the tough line of the West against terrorism ``in all forms and in all manifestations''. But is it ready to meet the second situation - that will arise out of insistence by the U.S. and others, for an early meaningful bid to find a way out of the Kashmir problem? Pressure on this count may be stepped up now that the West seems impressed by the anti-jehadi package unfolded by Gen. Musharraf during the weekend.
True, there will be no formal third party involvement, no mediation (not because of lack of such a desire on the part of the U.S. or the U.K. but because of New Delhi's opposition to a mediatory role by others). The western powers will go along with India in its insistence on a bilateral dialogue - but this time it may be accompanied by proddings by others. The bilateralism may, thus, be internationalised for the first time since the Shimla Agreement of 1972. What will be New Delhi's fall-back position in that eventuality?
Having conceded the role of the U.S. and others in regard to the steps to put an end to terroristic violence in Jammu and Kashmir (even having urged upon them to play such a role) India will not be on a strong ground in resisting their pressure or exhortation or advice on Kashmir- related matters.
The first part of New Delhi's strategy is public knowledge - the armed build-up on the borders with Pakistan, coupled with steps such as the recall of the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad, cutting down the strength of the diplomatic missions in the two countries, stoppage of over flights by Pakistani planes, stoppage of the train and bus services. Pakistan, as was to be expected, reciprocated in kind, especially with the ``defensive'' measures. Whether the decision-takers in New Delhi have in mind the extreme option or whether the arms build-up is meant to reinforce the diplomatic pressure - and thus avert an open confrontation - is not known. Even if the preference is for the second alternative - and foolproof steps are taken to guard against an accident, an unintended move or a miscalculation triggering an armed conflict - and the battle against terrorism is won, the matter would not end there. The strategy for the next phase is not known - and perhaps, has not yet been formulated - both in external and internal contexts. As for the external aspect, secret back-channel diplomacy of the type that was tried just before and after the Lahore bus trip (and scuttled by Kargil) could be used again.
Internally, the resumption of the process that was started with the appointment of the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman, K. C. Pant, for talks with various groups in the State but given up mysteriously could be a viable starting point.
In his Independence Day address from the ramparts of New Delhi's Red Fort, Mr. Vajpayee assuringly spoke of free and fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir. This, we are told, was no pro forma reference but was intended to convey a message to various sections in the State, notably to those who rely on the gun to achieve their political objective. There is a case for fine-tuning this assurance and for imparting a measure of transparency.
As for the demand for increased autonomy for the State, because of the peculiar circumstances of its accession to the Union, the present Government will find it hard to inspire confidence among the people. The BJP has only put on the backburner its demand for the repeal of Article 370 of the Constitution, giving a special status to the State, but not given up that position. Any move by the Government to consider an autonomy package is certain to be opposed by the Sangh Parivar.
The question whether India can trust the western powers, the U.K. and the U.S., has come to the fore because of the publication of a book by a retired foreign service officer, C. Dasgupta, based on the secret documents of the British Government, now declassified on the expiry of the specified period. The unintended coincidence of the publication of the book with the present crisis has naturally given a sharper focus to the British role in regard to Kashmir during the period before and after the Partition. Here is a small sample from his account: ``By the beginning of November (1947), British policy entered a new phase. The initiative passed from the men on the spot to the mandarins of Whitehall. Britain began to move away from a position based on legality and impartiality to a policy based on immediate political and strategic considerations... British political and strategic interests dictated a tilt in favour of Pakistan. The Foreign Office feared that antagonising Pakistan might `align the whole of Islam against us', jeopardising British interests in the Middle East. Pakistan was a potential ally and her proximity to the Gulf gave her great geo- political importance.''
The British tilt towards the Muslim League, in the creation of Pakistan, had been well documented in the past. For instance, Wali Khan, son of Badshah Khan, in his book, `Facts are Facts,' published 15 years ago, quoted the words of the Viceroy in 1940 who wrote to the Secretary of State in London: ``All I can say is that if Congress are set on having a fight here, they are going to have a fight not only with us, but also with the Muslims.''
At this stage, the people and the policy-makers in India would do well not to let themselves be dragged in the mire of past suspicions and, instead, face the present challenges with confidence and courage. Let it not be assumed that the U.K. (and, at its instance, the U.S.) would let the prejudices and assumptions of 1947 dictate their policies now. At the same time, it is clear, these two powers would primarily be guided by their political and strategic interests. The job of Indian diplomacy is to establish that there is no conflict between their goals and India's interests.
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